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Preface
In this book I am trying to investigate the relationship between ethnic
pluralism and American politics in an era of political and social change.
The study has been worked out over a lengthy period of time, in several
stages. Where I originally sought to inquire into a limited area of
political analysis and a small number of elections, I have found myself
being pushed into a steadily expanding period of time and a wide variety
of interrelated sociopolitical and intellectual problems. During the course
of this intellectual voyage my conception of the problem has changed
considerably; new questions have supplanted older ones. Similarly, new
methods and tools have been required to deal adequately with the com-
plexities of the problem.
The analysis of political behavior seems particularly suited to quanti-
tative analytical techniques. The methodological discussion in the Appen-
dix will explain how I have endeavored to build quantitative models for
description and analysis. Hopefully a reasonable balance has been struck
between the number and the word, with the strengths and weaknesses of
each being duly recognized. Certainly the myriad forces involved in mass
political behavior in a democratic society require all the analytical devices
and insights the historian can bring to them.
Throughout my work I have had the sage counsel of Prof. Samuel P.
Hays of the University of Pittsburgh; he has shared with me his shrewd
critical insights into specific problems and into historical inquiry gener-
ally, and I am most grateful to him. I have also been greatly assisted by
the substantive and methodological work of a generation of social scien-
tists, a debt inadequately expressed in the impersonality of footnotes.
I am grateful also to Profs. Richard Jensen of Washington University
and Robert Zemsky of the University of Pennsylvania for their effective
x Preface
presentation of insights into the handling of quantitative techniques in
history at the 1968 summer program of 1:he Inter-University Consortium
for Political Research at Ann Arbor. ])espite these and other debts,
remembered and forgotten, the responsibility for the substance and
method of the study is of course my own.
I would like to thank the following institutions for the facilities and
assistance made available to me: the <:hicago Historical Society, the
Newberry library, the American Jewish Archives, the Midwest Interli-
brary Center, the University of Chicago libraries, the Roosevelt Univer-
sity library, the Northern Michigan University library, the library of the
National Opinion Research Center, and the Johnson Publishing Com-
pany. The Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago, and
particularly its warehouse staff, were especially 'hospitable to my burden-
some needs on a number of occasions. And the Department of Economics
of California State College-Los Angeles generously made available for
my use its Underwood-Olivetti Programma desktop computer.
My wife, Suzanne, has devoted hune.reds of hours to this study, in
recording countless election returns, calculating endless percentages, help-
ing with the preparation of graphs and tables, proofreading, and relocat-
ing data which I was sure was lost forever. Additionally, she has rendered
those intangible assistances which are so essential to sanity amidst schol-
arship; without her this book would J:lot have been completed. My
daughter, Eden, contributed her smile.
Part One
Ethnic Politics
I890-I936
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1. Ethnic Groups
& Their Politics
This book comprises a study of the political behavior of the ethnic groups
of a major American city from 1890 to 1936. More specifically, it centers
on the role of those groups in the rise to unprecedented power of the
Democratic party in Chicago. Thus emphasis will be placed on the period
from the end of World War I to the first Roosevelt election.
The central questions will be: what was the role of ethnic groups in
Chicago's politics, and to what extent was the changing political balance
of power attributable to their political behavior? I shall first be concerned
with describing ethnic political behavior, and then with uncovering the
reasons behind it.
In the course of the inquiry, a number of ancillary questions will also
arise. How do ethnic groups make their way into the American political
system and into American society generally? What is the key to party and
leadership success in the politics of a pluralistic society? What kinds of
issues mean the most to American voters? Are local, state, and national
politics one, or separate? What are the dynamics of political relationships
and are they one-way or reciprocal? Do American political parties have
discoverable ideologies or self-conceptions?
A number of methodological questions will also arise. How are
political relationships to be understood? How easily determined is the
apparently simple question: to which party does a group of people
belong? What are the best tools for analyzing political history? Which
among a group of variables is most important in the only partly rational
phenomenon called political behavior?
The role of urban ethnic groups in bringing about the revival of the
national Democratic party by the early 1930S has been appreciated by
many historians. Only since they have begun to employ new methods,
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however, have the origins and extent of this role begun really to be
understood. Samuel Lubell, in his pace-setting The Future of American
Politics, studied the political behavior of American counties and cities and
used their demographic variations to explain political development. He
pointed to the 1928 election as the great turning point in the revival of
the Democratic party.1 Historians have followed his lead and have exam-
ined this development more intensively.2
The tools of social science have been central to this more careful
understanding of the role of groups in the American political process.
These tools have been important in two ways. First, they can be employed
in historical analysis, providing more complete and more definite infor-
mation than was previously available. The use of quantification was a first
step, and one that is still being taken.8 More sophisticated, not necessarily
quantitative, social science concepts are now also available and pertinent
to political history.4 And second, historians have been directed toward
new foci of investigation-leaving behind traditional and stereotyped foci
and moving on to consideration of perhaps more meaningful interrela-
tionships among men and groups of men.5
This study attempts to analyze political development through a com-
bination of quantitative and qualitative techniques. Its statistics and meth-
odology are elementary and technically simple, which well suits the
1 Samuel Lubell, The Futu1'e of American Politics, 2d ed. (Garden City, N.Y.,
1956) .
2 E.g., J. Joseph Huthmacher, Massachusetts People and Politics, I9I9-I933
(Cambridge, Mass., 1959); David Burner, The Politics of P1'ovincialism (New
York, 1968).
8 See William C. Aydelotte, uQuantification in History," American HistoNcal
Review 71 (April 1966): 803-25; and response by Samuel P. Hays and Lee
Benson, American Historical Association Newslette1' 4 (June 1966): 8-16.
4 On voting, see Bernard Berelson and others, Voting: A Study of Opinion
F01'mation in a Pf'esidential Campaign (Chicago, 1954); Angus Campbell and
others, The Voter Decides (Evanston, 111., 1954); Paul Lazarsfeld and others,
The People's Choice, 2d ed. (New York, 1948). An outstanding example of the
kinds of conceptual tools afforded is Robert K. Merton, Social T heo1'y and Social
St1'ucture, rev. 00. (Glencoe, 111., 1957). On the relevance of these concepts and
methods to historiography, see Edward N. Saveth, ed., American Histof'Y and the
Social Sciences (New York, 1964).
5 See Samuel P. Hays, uHistory as Human Behavior," Iowa Journal of Histof'''
58 (July 1960): 193-206, and uNew Approaches to American Political History,
1880-1920," Paper presented to the meetings of the American Historical Asso-
ciation, Dec. 1961.
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complexities of political relationships. Conceptually, the method is some-
what more ambitious, since it employs theories of social science which
have remained largely unapplied. It assumes that the historian is fortu-
nate in his straddling of the humanities and the social sciences, being able
to take from each that which best suits his particular area of analysis. If
this appeals to neither determined methodologists nor implacable tradi-
tionalists, it nonetheless seems ideal for studying the sometimes rational,
sometimes irrational, and always complex dynamics of historical develop-
ment.
An ethnic group is a group of people held together by a common
culture, which can be national, racial, religious, or simply historic. Here
we shall be dealing with seven ethnic groups whose cultural tie is
basically national: Czechoslovakian-Americans, Polish-Americans, Lith-
uanian-Americans, Yugoslavian-Americans, Italian-Americans, German-
Americans, and Swedish-Americans; one whose cultural tie is basically
racial: Negroes; and one whose cultural tie is religious, with elements
of race and nationality: Jews. On occasion other ethnic groups will be
referred to, for example, the white Anglo-Saxon Protestant American,
whose cultural tie, as the label suggests, is mixed. The ethnicity of each
of these groups is pretty clearly defined. Although there were internal
divisions within them, the forces of integration were almost always
greater than those of disintegration.
The ethnic group is important in politics only if its members make
political decisions as members of the group-that is, when the ethnic
group is a reference group. One has many membership groups; those that
he uses for decision are reference groups.6 Almost all of an individual's
social decisions are made in a frame of reference produced by the groups
to which he consciously or unconsciously belongs. Different situations
will produce a response in the same individual from various of his
reference groups, depending upon which of the memberships is evoked by
the situation. A further valuable distinction can be made between positive
and negative reference groups.7 In the former, one is motivated toward
the norms of the group. In the latter, one positively forms counternorms
6 Robert K. Merton, ttContinuities in the Theory of Reference Groups and
Social Structure," in Social Theory and Social Structure, p. 307.
7 Ibid., pp. 282-83, 300-301.
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in an effort, again conscious or unconscious, to reject the group (e.g., a
German-American who positively decides opposite to what he sees as the
German-American reaction to a situation). The reason for the latter is
often a desire to feel part of a group to which one does not really belong.
An uUncle Tom" practices negative reference group behavior. In either
case, of course, the individual is operating in such a manner that this is his
reference group.
These concepts are important in dealing with ethnic political behav-
ior because the ethnic group is a most important reference group, particu-
larly for the first generation, but also, in reduced force, for succeeding
ones. Obviously, the ethnic voter need not always vote as a member of his
ethnic reference group. He might also vote as a member of the working
class, or of the white race, or something else; the situation will tend to
dictate this. But there are sufficient reasons to conclude that ethnicity
provided the strongest consistent frame of reference for the ethnic voters
of Chicago in the first third of the twentieth century. In any event,
reference groups strongly influence political behavior. They tend to estab-
lish what have been called upolitical roles"; a German-American, for
example, would tend strongly to vote Republican because UGermans have
always voted Republican," and so on.8 This kind of force is as strong as
the ethnic tie itself and tends not to be overcome until the political role
itself is somehow changed. That is, if a German votes Republican because
he feels that uGermans vote Republican," he is not likely to switch to the
Democrats unless he is somehow persuaded that the German group is
switching. If the ethnic tie has kept him in one line of behavior, he will
not tend to vary his behavior unless this variation is reinforced by the
ethnic tie. All of this again assumes that the ethnic reference group is
primary, and this was generally the case in the period under study. There
were times when the variables of a given political situation served to
minimize ethnicity in favor of some other reference group, mainly socio-
economic. But such instances were rare. For the immigrant, nothing was
so close to him as his immigrant group: his strangeness from the rest of
American society was a function of his being a Pole, or German, or
whatever. His security came through his group; his communication was
through its language; his very survival, even his path to ttAmericani-
8 See Lee Benson, "Voting Behavior," in American History and the Social
Sciences, ed. Edward N. Saveth (New York, 1964), p. 301.
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zation," were through his ethnic group.9 As one contemporary historian
of the immigrants put it: UWhat sort of an American could be made out
of one able in any circumstances-worst of all under repressive compul-
sion, to turn his back upon the tongue, the traditions, and the associations
of his fathers. u1o It is quite clear that few immigrants indeed came to
America because of a desire to forsake their ancestral culture; this was
simply not an important reason for leaving the Old World. And these
same forces seem to apply to the non-national (Jewish and Negro)
ethnic groups as well.
While the individual ethnic group is most important, it is also
possible for the several ethnic groups together to form a single reference
group-that of non-Native-Americans (a majority numerically, but psy-
chologically a minority group). It took a particular congeries of circum-
stances to overcome the forces separating the various groups, but this did
come to pass on occasion. For instance, in the 1931 mayoralty campaign,
Mayor William Hale Thompson took an essentially nativist position
against his rival, Anton Cermak. This resulted in a virtually united ethnic
stand against him and the formation, briefly, of what could be considered
a reference group of ethnic minorities, from which Cermak profited. A
similar phenomenon obtained in the 1928 presidential election. Charles
E. Merriam pointed out at the time that if the several ethnic groups were
able more often to work together, they would be able to dominate
Chicago politics.11 This they seldom did, but the fact that they came closer
and closer to doing so during the 1920S explains the rise of the Demo-
cratic party.
There were many things dividing the various ethnic groups, however,
and this explains the slowness of their coming to political power propor-
tionate to their numbers. One of these factors was religion. The ethnics of
Chicago represented a wide variety of religious beliefs. The Scandinavians
were overwhelmingly Lutheran, while the Poles, Italians, Slovaks, and
Lithuanians were Roman Catholic. The Germans were fairly evenly
9 This has been noted by earlier and more recent students of the immigrants:
Robert Park, Old World Traits Transplanted (Chicago, I925); John P. Gavit,
Americans by Choice (New York, I922); Oscar Handlin, The Uprooted (New
York, I95I).
10 Gavit, Americans by Choice, p. 38.
11 Charles E. Merriam, Chicago.' A More Intimate View of Urban Politics
(New York, I929),P. I37.
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divided between Catholics and Protestants, and the Czechs between Cath-
olics, Freethinkers, and nonreligious. Among the Yugoslavs, the Croats
and Slovenes were Roman Catholic, and the Serbs were Eastern Ortho-
dox. The Negroes were divided among a variety of Protestant sects and
denominations, and the Jews professed varying philosophies of Judaism.
Clearly these divisions could lead to intragroup as well as intergroup
division.
There was a good deal of interethnic negative stereotyping (i.e.,
prejudice) on religious as well as cultural grounds. In part this was
carried over from the Old Country, as in Polish anti-Semitism, which was
common in Chicago.12 It also found a particularly New World expression
in rivalries within the Catholic Church. Both Italians and Poles, for
example, complained about Irish control of the churches to which they
contributed money, wherein they prayed, and where their children were
sent to school. They wanted parishes that were ethnic as well as Catholic,
and intergroup conflict resulted.13 Protestant religious missions to Catho-
lic and Jewish immigrant neighborhoods were sources of further division
and resentment.14
Religious conflict also divided ethnic groups internally. Part of the
lingering disharmony between Czechs and Slovaks stemmed from their
religious differences. And within the Jewish community, there arose
long-term conflict between the religiously liberal, assimilationist, Older
Immigrant German Jews, on the one hand, and the religiously orthodox,
particularist, newer immigrant eastern European Jews on the other.15
12 Na1'od Polski, Aug. 6, 1919, and Aug. 18, 1920, quoted in Works Projects
Administration, Chicago F01'eign Language P1'ess SU1'vey. (This survey, which
consists of 77 reels of microfilm translations of Chicago foreign language
newspapers from the 1880s to the 1930S, was done as a WPA project during the
New Deal. It contains much otherwise lost information; hereafter cited as WPA.
Dziennik Zwiazkowy, May 27, 1919, and June 27, 1919, WPA; Louis Wirth,
The Ghetto (Chicago, 1928), p. 229.
18 Francis J. Brown, "Italian-Americans," in One America, ed. Francis J.
Brown and Joseph S. Roucek (New York, 1946), p. 226; P1'ezebudzenie, Oct.
29, 1931, and Nov. 27, 1937, WPA.
14 See Rev. John Stuart Canning, "An Adventure among the Jews," Mission-
ary Review of the W01'ld 52 (July 1929): 539-42; Rev. Paul Fox, UAmong the
Poles of Chicago," Missionary Review of the World 48 (Aug. 1925): 610-11.
The missionaries had little understanding of the peoples with whom they were
dealing, nor had they much respect for their institutions. However well inten-
tioned their efforts, they were bound to be resented.
15 Bessie L. Pierce, A History of Chicago, 3 vols. (New York, 1937-1957),
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There were other reasons for interethnic and intraethnic division as
well. Shifting loci of population resulted in one ethnic group moving in
on another, and conflict; this reached its most sanguinary level when the
adolescents of the respective groups engaged in real warfare to establish
claims to a u territory.,,16 Varying rates of assimilation into American
society and of economic advance also produced suspicion and animosity
between groups. T'his was particularly evident among the Poles, who
were one of the slowest groups to assimilate, and the group most outspo-
kenly prejudiced against others.17
There was considerable anti-Negro prejudice among the white ethnic
groups, and it was reciprocated by Chicago's Negroes, who often resented
the gains made by Hnon-American" immigrants at the expense of the
still-oppressed Afro-American.18 Chicago experienced a race riot in 1919,
triggered when a Negro boy swam across the invisible line that separated
the implicit white and colored parts of a south side beach. Ultimately
thirty-eight people died in the riot, and much of its impetus came from
the social, economic, and residential conflict between Afro-American and
newer immigrant.19
Thus there were centrifugal as well as centripetal forces at work
within each ethnic group, and there was little natural intersympathy
among the several groups. But the forces which reinforced group integrity
were much greater than those which operated against it. It has frequently
been noted that many American nationality groups really developed their
sense of nationality only after arriving in the United States. The Sicilian
and the Tuscan, for example, had little in common in Italy and could
2:23-24; 3:38-42. Maintenance of separate clubs, hospitals, and other institu-
tions demonstrated the extent of this division by the early twentieth century. And
the rise of Zionism among the eastern European Jews furthered the conflict. See
Philip P. Bregstone, Chicago and Its Jews (Chicago, 1933), pp. 88-90.
16 Harvey W. Zorbaugh, The Gold Coast and the Slum (Chicago, 1929), p.
160.
17 Park, Old W01'ld T1'aits, p. 219; Na1'od Polski, Aug. 6, 1919, and June 8,
1921, WPA. Such intergroup rivalries, and some intragroup ones, point to the
applicability to ethnic group history of the concept of relative deprivation.
18 E.g., Chicago Defende1', Sept. 27, 1924, p. 12. See also St. Clair Drake and
Horace R. Cayton, Black Metropolis (New York, 1945), ch. 16.
19 Chicago Commission on Race Relations, The Neg1'o in Chicago: A Study
of Race Relations and a Race Riot (Chicago, 1922 ), pp. I, 3, and I-51 passim;
Drake and Cayton, Black Met1'opolis, pp. 65-69; The World's W01'k 45 (Dec.
1922): 131-34.
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hardly even understand one another; but in America they found that they
had, relatively speaking, a great deal in common, and they became
Italians. Czechs and Slovaks were better able to find common ground in
Pittsburgh than at home, and thus from afar played an important role in
the founding of Czechoslovakia. Irish-American nationalism flourished
in the United States, and the American Irish played an equally important
role in the quest for independence of their homeland. The sense of
uScandinavian"-denoting a common culture for Swede, Norwegian and
Dane-likewise flourished in the United States. And these are but a few
indications of the strength of the ethnic tie in America, and of the fact that
the American experience reinforced ethnicity.
Moreover, the forces arguing for interethnic cooperation also became
more and more powerful as time went by and as the ethnic conflict of
interest with the Native-American became more evident. The political
issues which most interested the ethnics, for example, found them largely
together in opposition to the Native-Americans. Their quest for political
power relative to their numbers required that they work together to suc-
ceed. Political leaders arose who understood this, and built upon it. Only
in this way could ethnic groups assert themselves in Chicago politics.
In dealing with the political behavior of ethnic groups, it is important
to understand how the individual ethnic voter arrived at his conception of
a given political situation. That is, we must inquire into the channels of
communication through which he was informed and his opinions influ-
enced. By and large these channels reinforced ethnicity, because they
consisted of ethnic group influentials and the ethnic press.
The ethnic press (foreign language except in the case of the Ne-
groes) was important in a number of ways. There has been little dispute
among scholars about its influence on the immigrant: it provided the
breadth and depth of his information and interpreted America to him.20
Even where the editorial views of the paper were not accepted by the
mass of readers, and this did happen, the readers were nonetheless
affected because the ethnic journal was often their only source of contact
with the world. Devotion to the mother tongue contributed to this
loyalty. As Robert Park, the first major student of the ethnic press, put it:
20 Oscar Handlin, "The Immigrant and American Politics," in Foreign Influ-
ences in American Life, ed. D. F. Bowers (Princeton, N.J., 1944), p. 88.
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HMother tongue is the natural basis of human association and organiza-
tion.,,21 Or, as an immigrant woman said to a social worker during the
anti-foreign language hysteria of the First World War, HWhy, Miss
McDowell, to take my language away from me is to snatch the cradle I
was born in from under me."22 Even those immigrants who had learned
English (or those whose first language was English, as with the Negroes)
continued to read the ethnic press because they had emotional ties to the
language and/or because this was the best source of news about the
group.23 This combination of linguistic and cultural ties resulted in a
closer feeling of mutuality between the ethnic press and its readership
than was the case with the metropolitan press.24
Whether or not the foreign language press contributed to or detracted
from the Americanization of the immigrant is moot. Assimilation did
require the ability to speak English, and since the foreign language press
reinforced use of the mother tongue it could be seen as retarding assimila-
tion.25 But in fact the ethnic press generally urged the immigrant to learn
English and become a citizen, and devoted much of its space to the
American news that helped the immigrant come to terms with America.26
A survey of readers of the Yiddish press in New York in 1920 found that
21 Robert E. Park, The Immigrant Press and Its Control (New York, 1922),
p. s·
22 Manuscript essay, "The Foreign Born," Mary McDowell Papers, The Chi-
cago Historical Society.
23 Mordecai Soltes, The Yiddish Press: An Americanizing Agency (New
York, 1924), pp. 39-40. Also, on the popularity and influence of the ethnic
press: Mary McDowell, uThe Foreign Press and Its Influence on Foreign Popula-
tions," Mary McDowell Papers; Drake and Cayton, Black Metropolis, pp. 4IO-
II; Reuel G. Hemdahl, UThe Swedes in Illinois Politics: An Immigrant Group
in an American Political Setting" (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1932),
p. 448; Giovanni Schiavo, The Italians in Chicago (Chicago, 1928), p. I04;
Denni Rlasatel, April 9, 1918, WPA; Alex Gottfried, Boss Cermak of Chicago:
A Study of Political Leadership (Seattle, Wash., 1962), pp. 4I-42. A contrary
view is expressed in Gustave R. Serino, UItalians in the Political Life of Boston"
(Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1950), pp. 191-93.
24 The Interpreter (Foreign Language Information Service), 3: 5 (May
1924) , pp. 3-8.
25 See Stanley Lieberson, Ethnic Patterns in American Cities (New York,
I963), pp. 8, I6; Handlin, "The Immigrant and American Politics," p. 88.
26 The Bulletin (Foreign Language Information Service), 1:8 (Nov. 1922),
pp. 3-10; Joseph S. Roucek, "The Foreign Language and Negro Press," in One
America, ed. Francis J. Brown and Joseph S. Roucek (New York, 1946), p. 371.
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over 86 percent were either citizens or had taken out their first papers.21
This did not indicate an antiassimilationist effect from reading the Yid-
dish press.
The period 1890-1936 was really the high point of the ethnic press,
especially for the Newer Immigrants. The 1920S saw the great majority
of them emerging from alien to citizen status and participating in Ameri-
can politics in unprecedented fashion; the ethnic press played a central
role in this process.28 One thousand and fifty-two foreign language news-
papers were published in the United States in 1920, in thirty-one lan-
guages, with between nine and ten million readers.29 The political world
of the ethnic in this decade was very much defined by the interests and
coverage of his native-language newspaper.
There was tremendous variety in the newspapers themselves, in terms
of professionalism, coverage, disinterestedness, 'and honesty. Many of
these papers were very marginal, and the mortality rate was high.sO They
were often personal, reflecting the interests and views of their owners;
and they could be bought or otherwise influenced.s1 Their political sophis-
tication varied considerably. The Older Immigrant papers, by the 1920S,
had already undergone a lengthy process of attrition, and those remaining
were fairly sophisticated, issue-oriented, and impersonal-in short, busi-
ness newspapers. Among the Newer Immigrant papers there was much
more variety; some were quite good and some very poor, with the
majority somewhere in between. For all ethnic groups, however, the
papers that succeeded were those which were the most ethnocentric,
which put the group and its interests first at all times. To lose sight of the
group and its goals was disastrous to an ethnic newspaper, while to think
and act always in terms of the group was the path to success. Most
Chicago ethnic newspapers clearly understood this.
21 Soltes, The Yiddish Press, p. 47.
28 E.g., Edmund G. Olszyk, The Polish Pl'ess in Amel'ica (Milwaukee, Wis.,
1940 ),P·76.
29 The Bulletin, 1:3 (May 1922), p. 8.
so Ibid.
S10ne of the most famous instances involved the American Association of
Foreign Language Newspapers, 1908-1918, under Louis L. Hammerling, which
apparently put economic pressure on foreign language papers as a uservice for the
national Republican Party" (Park, The Immigrant Press, ch. 16). There was also
an alleged effort by the Wilson administration to pressure foreign language papers
in the 1918 campaign (Chicago Tl'ibune, Nov. I, 1918, p. 6).
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Whether the ethnic press led or followed its readers is also moot.
Probably it did neither, or both; by anticipating correctly it could lead; if
it anticipated wrongly, it followed or left course. Its influence was greater
when it was able to feel its way ahead of its readers, and in that way it
led. But the ethnic press, like the metropolitan press, could not lead peo-
ple where they saw no advantage in going. It did playa stronger leader-
ship role in terms of interethnic cooperation. Well before the ethnics
themselves were cooperating, the ethnic newspapers had got together in
matters of mutual interest-in anti-Prohibition activity, for example.
There were feelings of mutuality among the papers of the several groups,
and the same people sometimes wrote for papers of more than one group.
In this sense of commonalty with other ethnic groups, the ethnic press did
playa leadership role in a most significant ethnic development.
The flow of information and of influence is not necessarily through
the printed word. Indeed, particularly in the realm of politics, participa-
tion and influence involve interpersonal interaction to a considerable
extent, and this interpersonal flow of influence is often more powerful
than that obtained in the relative isolation of reading.32 Personal influence
has been seen as moving through a Utwo-step flow of communication,"
wherein the mass of any group are influenced by vocal intercourse with a
relative few uinfluentials," who, in turn, have obtained their opinions
from the media or elsewhere.33 That is, the majority of people are less
influenced by what they read in the papers about rival political candidates
or parties, than by the spoken opinions of other people whose views they
respect. It is important for our purposes to understand that the influen-
tials for an ethnic group member would tend to be other members of his
own group: uFor leadership in political discussion people mainly turn to
others like themselves."34 uSocial distance" intervened between the ethnic
voter and a nongroup political worker, for example, while there was no
such separation with a member of his own group who was reputed to be
Uin the know" in a given area of interest.35
32 M. Rosenberg, "Dimensions of Political Apathy," in Political Behavio,: A
Reade, in Theo,y and Resea,ch, ed. H. Eulau and others (Glencoe, Ill., 1956), p.
161.
33 Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, Pe,sonal Influence: The Pa,t Played by
People in the Flow of Mass Communications (Glencoe, 111., 1955), chs. 14,15.
34 Berelson and others, Voting, pp. 109, 168-70.
35 Ibid.; and Zorbaugh, Gold Coast and Slum, pp. 216-17.
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Robert K. Merton's concept of ttlocal" and ucosmopolitan" influen-
tials is somewhat difficult to apply in the ethnic political context.36 The
same people and organizations tended to be active in all political spheres
among the immigrants of Chicago. Where purely local ethnic influentials
probably distinguished themselves was at the ward and precinct level, for
minor but important offices and jobs about which there unfortunately is
little information; this would conform with Merton's conclusion that
local influentials relied more on personal contact, and cosmopolitan
influentials on organizations.37 This particular concept, which is very
helpful in determining patterns of influence, cannot be helpful here, both
because of the nature of ethnic interpersonal relations and because of the
lack of documentation about interaction at the person-to""person level.
These concepts do reinforce the importance of the ethnic group per se
and help explain why I will devote considerable attention to the political
preferences and beliefs of leaders and leadership organizations among the
several groups. This is not, however, to minimize the importance of the
ethnic press. Indeed, the Utwo-step flow" hypothesis can be bent to allow
the ethnic press to fill the role of influential. That is, the very personal
ethnic press, upon which many ethnics for language reasons had to rely,
served often as the ((influential" to its highly related readers, interpreting
to them the metropolitan press and American life in general.
36 Merton, "Patterns of Influence: Local and Cosmopolitan Influentials," in
Social Theory and Social Structure, pp. 387-420.
37 Ibid., pp. 397-98.
II. Chicago~s Ethnics
& Their Politics to I9I7
Chicago, like other great American cities, is a city of immigrants. And
like other American cities by the onset of the twentieth century, it was no
longer Anglo-Saxon. Chicago's ethnic groups arrived at varying points in
time, and from different cultures, but their reasons for coming were
generally the same: a better life. As a later writer put it, Chicago was
"never a city of brotherly love. . . 'Chicago was born out of lust for furs
and land." And it was, ttlikeCarthage, founded by cheating the natives
out of the land."l
The first permanent settler in Chicago was a West Indian Negro,
Jean Baptiste Point de Sable, who resided there from 1779 to 1796. After
he left, more than a century passed before many more Negroes arrived.
But other groups did come in the interim. In the 1830s, when Chicago
was becoming a city, and its population was climbing from the dozens
into the hundreds, and then into the thousands, its citizens were largely
Anglo-Saxon, French-Canadian, and half-breed Indian. Even then it was
cosmopolitan. ttLong John" Wentworth, an early journalist and politi-
cian, said of the 1830s: HWe had people from almost every clime, and
almost every opinion. We had Jews and Christians, Protestants and
Catholics and Infidels. . . . Nearly every language was represented. Some
people had seen much of the world and some very little. Some were quite
learned and some were ignorant.,,2
Of the ethnic groups that would be important in Chicago's history,
the first to arrive in large numbers were the Irish, in the early 1840s. In
Chicago, as elsewhere, they were immediately active in politics.3 Shortly
thereafter, the Scandinavians began to trickle in. David Johnson, a Nor-
wegian, came to Chicago in 1834 to run the press of John Wentworth's
Chicago Democrat, the city'S first newspaper.4 In the late 1840S and then
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the 1850s, the Scandinavians continued to arrive; there were an estimated
1,000 Swedish families there by 1850. Chicago rapidly became the center
of things Swedish in the United States.5 The Germans, too, began to
arrive about this time, in a stream that grew steadily larger. They were
numerous enough to form their own societies in the mid-1850s and to
support their own press in the 1860s.6 German Jews also came. In 1847
Chicago's first synagogue was founded, and Chicago's Jews were numer-
ous enough to organize their own company for the Civil War.7
These are the groups generally referred to as the uolder" or Hearlier"
immigrants, as distinguished from the unewer" or urecent" immigrants
from southern and eastern Europe in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. With these early groups Chicago grew from a hamlet
of forty or fifty people in 1830, to a city of over 4,000 in 1837, and a
bustling young metropolis of 30,000 by 1850. In 1850 its population was
over 50 percent foreign stock (foreign-born or native-born of foreign or
mixed parentage), and that figure would increase as the century wore on.8
On the eve of the Civil War, 20 percent of the city's population had been
born in Germany, 18 percent in Ireland, and over 2 percent in the
Scandinavian countries.9 In Chicago, as elsewhere, the immigrants were
not always welcomed by Native-Americans (native-born white of na-
tive-born white parentage). The Catholicism of the Irish, and the liberal-
ism of the German uForty-Eighters," as well as the drinking habits of
both, led to a rise of Know-Nothingism in the mid-1850S; the nativists
swept the city elections in 1855.10 Their crusade soon died out, but its
sentiments and resentments lived on.
1 Edgar L. Masters, The Tale of Chicago (New York, 1933), pp. 13, 65.
2 Quoted in Lloyd Lewis and Henry ]. Smith, Chicago: The History of Its
Reputation (New York, 1929),P. 31.
S Bessie L. Pierce, A History of Chicago, 3 vols. (New York, 1937-1957),
1:179·
4 O. M. Norlie, History of the Norwegians in America, pp. 153-54, WPA.
li Pierce, A History of Chicago, I: 185; Hemdahl, UThe Swedes in Illinois
Politics: An Immigrant Group in an American Political Setting" (Ph.D. diss.,
Northwestern University, 1932), p. 152 n; Gustave E. Johnson, ccThe Swedes of
Chicago" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1940), p. 74.
8 Masters, Tale of Chicago, pp. 134, 157.
1 Pierce, A History of Chicago, I: 184; Lewis and Smith, Chicago, p. 142;
Louis Wirth, T he Ghetto (Chicago, 1928), p. 165.
8 Pierce, A History of Chicago, I: 179.
9 Ibid., 2:482. 10 Lewis and Smith, Chicago, pp. 7 1-73.
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TABLE 11:1 Time of Arrival and Peak Year of Immigration of Immigrants in
the united States in 1930 (Percentage of those coming by 1930)
Country Arrived Arrived Arrived Peak year of
of origin by 1900 1900-1914 1914-1920 innnigration
Germany 61 16 23 1882
Sweden 55 29 16 1882
Russia* 22 61 17 1913
Czechoslovakia 31 54 15 1921
Poland 19 66 15 1921
Lithuania 18 74 8 (n.a.)
Italy 18 56 26 1907
Yugoslavia 9 72 19 (n.a.)
Source: F. J. Brown, "Meaning and Status of Minorities,1I in One America,
ed. F. J. Brown and J. S. Roucek (New York, 1945), pp. 9, 636.
*Primarily Jews.
These same groups continued to dominate immigration into America
and Chicago until near the end of the century. Although they continued
to come after that time, their numbers paled beside those of the Italians,
Poles, Czechs, Lithuanians, Yugoslavs, Yiddish-speaking Jews, and others
from southern and eastern Europe. These groups arrived in ever-increas-
ing numbers from the 1880s to the onset of the First World War, and
then from the war's end to the coming of immigration restriction in the
19208. Table II: I indicates the relative times of arrival of most of the
ethnic groups which are included in this study.
It was in this late period, too, that Negroes began to pour into
Chicago, particularly during the Great War, when employment oppor-
tunities were unusually bright.11
In 1890, when Chicago first reached a population of one million, 78
percent of its population was of foreign stock, and 20 percent was
Native-American. Tables 11:2 and 11:3 give the numbers of foreign born
11 Roi Ottley, The Lonely Wa1'rio1': Life and Times of Robert S. Abbot
(Chicago, 1955), p. 9·
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TABLE 11:2 Ethnic Groups in Chicago, 1900 (Chicago population 1,698,575)
Total ethnic
Second group percentage of
Group Foreign born generation* city population
Austrians 11,815 19,369 1.7
Bohemians 36,362 76,480 6.6
Danes 10,166 16,563 1.6
Gennans 170,738 416,755 34.5
Hungarians 4,946 6,966 0.7
Irish 73,912 215,385 17.0
Italians 16,008 26,810 2.5
Norwegians 22,011 41,055 3.7
Palest 59,713 109,711 10.0
Russians 24,178 38,589 3.7
Swedes 48,836 100,176 8.8
Negroes 30,150§ 1.8
White Ethnics 585,254 727,341 77.3
Source: Twelfth Census of the U.S., 1900.
*Inc1udes native-born children with both parents born in same foreign
country, and with one parent born in a foreign country and the other native-
born; does not include children of two foreign-born parents born in different
countries. The figures for White Ethnics include all foreign-born and all
native-born with one or both parents born in foreign countries.
tInc1udes immigrants-and children thereof-who declared "Polish" as
nationality, though coming from Austria, Germany, Russia, or unknown country.
§Total Chicago Negro population. .
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TABLE 11:3 Ethnic Groups in Chicago, 1930 (Chicago population = 3,376,438)
Group Foreign born
Czechoslovakians 48,814
Danes 12,502
Germans 111,366
Hungarians 15,337
Italians 73,960
Lithuanians 31 J 430
Norwegians 21,740
Poles 149,622
Russians 78,462
Swedes 65,735
Yugoslavians 16,183
Jews 325,OOOt
Native-Americans§ 943,301
Negroes 233,903ll
White Ethnics 842,057
Second
generation*
73,725
16,193
266,609
15,090
107,901
32,488
30,968
251,694
91,274
75,178
16,108
1,332,373
Total ethnic
group percentage of
city population
3.6
0.8
11.2
0.9
5.4
1.9
1.6
11.9
5.0
4.2
1.0
9.6
27.9
6.9
64.3
Source: Fifteenth Census of the U.S., 1930, and Census of Religious
Bodies, 1926.
*rncludes native-born of foreign or mixed parentage.
tAll Jews, regardless of country of origin.
§Native-born white of native-born white parentage; figure is for all
Native-Americans in Chicago.
~AII Negroes.
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and second generation of the major ethnic groups in Chicago in 1900 and
1930 and their percentage of the city's population.
The balance among the ethnic groups changed over time. In 19°O,
for example, the Germans comprised over 34 percent of the city's popula-
tion, the Irish 17 percent, and the Scandinavians over 14 percent. By
1930 the Germans comprised only II percent and the Scandinavians 7;
while the Poles, Italians, and Negroes, who were respectively 10, 2.5, and
less than 2 percent in 1900, had risen by 1930 to 12, over 5, and 7 per-
cent of the city's population.
By the end of the First World War, Chicago was the third most
Uforeign" city in America, after New York and Boston. Seventy-two
percent of its people were foreign stock in 1920, and this would decline
only to 64 percent by 1930. Add to the immigrant groups the rising
number of Negroes, and it is clear that the number of Native-Americans
was slight indeed (about 24 percent in 1920, 28 percent in 1930; some
of whom were third generation and still quite uethnic"). Chicago was
also distinguished by the variety of immigrant groups in its population;
more than perhaps any other American city, Chicago had sizable colonies
of many different groups. It was the largest Scandinavian, Polish, Czech,
Serbo-Croat, and Lithuanian city in the nation; the second largest Ger-
man, Greek, Slovak, Jewish, and Negro city; and the third largest Ital-
ian.12
The ethnics of Chicago moved steadily, though not precipitously, to
citizenship and participation in the political process. There was some
intergroup and intragroup variation in this aspect of Americanization, but
the potential fruits of participation in the political system were obvious to
group leaders.18 As Table 11:4 indicates, once the ethnics became citizens
12 Paul F. Cressey, uThe Succession of Cultural Groups in Chicago" (Ph.D.
diss., University of Chicago, 1930), p. 209.
18 Harold F. Gosnell estimated that the naturalization process took about ten
years (''The Chicago Black Belt as a Political Battleground," Ame1'ican Jou1'nal of
Sociology 39 [Nov. 1933): 331). A study of the length of time between arrival
in the United States and filing of first papers, however, indicates a somewhat
longer period: Irish-9.6 years; Russians-9.6 years; Danes-Io.2 years; Scots-
10.6 years; Swedes-I3.1 years; GermanS-II.9 years; ItalianS-IJ.4 years;
English-I 1.7 years (John P. Gavit, Amel'icans b'Y Choice [New York, 1922),
pp. 24I, 245). This would indicate that although there were differences between
newer and older immigrant groups in terms of time taken for cultural assimila-
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TABLE II: 4 Nonvoting in Chicago Mayoral Election, 1923
Percentage of Chicago Percentage of
Group voting population nonvoters
Native Americans 25.0 25.0
Negroes 6.0 6.6*
Native White of
foreign parentage 39.0 25.0
Naturalized foreign
born: 30.0 37.0
Irish 3.0 2.3
German/Austrian 7.0 7.0
Scandinavian 4.0 5.7
Russian 3.0 5.2
Polish 3.2 5.4
Italian 1.3 5.0
Czech, Slavf 2.9 4.5Hungarian
Source: C. E. Merriam and H. F. Gosnell, Non-Voting: Causes and Methods
of Control (Chicago, 1924), p. 6. Based on a sample of 6,000.
*The Negro figure is not very reliable.
t The writers' definition of "Slav" is not clear.
they all tended to vote at roughly the same level of participation. The
many immigrants who had never voted before coming to America
learned the advantages of doing so here. There is no great difference in
likelihood to vote on the part of newer immigrant group citizens as
opposed to those of the more established groups; the second generation of
immigrant families were the most likely to vote of all groups of voters.
This table is based on one election only, however, and in fact rates of
nonvoting varied considerably from election to election. The majority of
ethnics were neither unduly optimistic nor unduly apathetic about the
tion, the same phenomenon did not prevail in terms of their awareness of the
advantages of citizenship.
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potentials of voting; when there seemed reason to do so, they voted, and
when not, they stayed home. These levels of participation could be
important.
Although differences in time taken for naturalization and in rate of
voting among citizens of the various groups were not large, the differ-
ences in time of arrival are very important for analytic purposes. Indeed,
in considering the voting of immigrant groups before the First World
War it is necessary to remember also the proportion of members of these
groups who were naturalized and thus able to vote. One could, for
example, find an area whose population was perhaps 60 percent Polish in
the 1890s, in which the majority of voters was non-Polish, because the
Poles were such recent comers. This is an important qualification for all
prewar voting studies of immigrant groups.
Table II: 1 showed the time of arrival and peak year of immigration
for major immigrant groups in the United States. There is no reason to
believe that Chicago's immigrants varied from the norm. If to these dates
of arrival we add a conservative minimum average time for naturalization
of ten years,14 it becomes obvious that several of the groups were voting
in small numbers before the War. For example, 81 percent of the Poles,
82 percent of the Lithuanians and Italians, 91 percent of the Yugoslavs,
78 percent of the Russians, and 69 percent of the Czechoslovakians
arrived only after 1900, some of them well after. Those who arrived at
the beginning of the century would be starting to vote only in its second
decade. And accepting the logical conclusion that most of these latecom-
ers arrived during the peak years of immigration (ca. 19°5-1913), it is
equally obvious that many, perhaps the majority, were not voting until
during or after the First World War.
In 1920, for example, over 70 percent of Chicago's foreign-born
Irish, Swedes, Germans, and Norwegians were naturalized; but only 57
percent of the Czechs, 34 percent of the Poles, 35 percent of the Italians,
45 percent of the Russians, and 25 percent of the Lithuanians were
naturalized.15 As that decade progressed, these differentials lessened con-
siderably.
14 Ibid.
15 Gosnell Materials (unclassified), Charles E. Merriam Papers, University of
Chicago.
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These figures cannot be ignored in studying ethnic political behavior
before the War, and explain the variant methodology and more general
approach I shall employ for these early years. Indeed, the simple facts of
time of arrival and naturalization preclude any definitive conclusions
about the political loyalties of the newer immigrants before the 1920S-
there were simply too few of them voting. Newer immigrant political
coalitions could be formed only in the 1920S, and thus I shall concentrate
on that period.
Data on 1890-1917, then, can only suggest the way in which the
ethnics of the time seemed to be leaning politically and the political
proclivities of the areas in which these groups settled. These suggestions
are significant, however. They tell us about the milieu of political origina-
tion of the several ethnic groups which influenced their earliest political
frames of reference and helped establish the political inertial forces which
would lead them to one party or another.
Chicago's voting behavior in the period of large-scale new immigra-
tion was a mixed one: the Republicans were more successful nationally
and the Democrats locally. Cook County, which consisted of Chicago and
its suburbs, was politically the least stable county in Illinois, partially
because of the fluctuating loyalties of its ethnic groups. New immigrants
tend to favor the party in power, since it is the organization most able to
minister to their needs. The county tended to be more Republican than
the rest of the state when the Republicans were winning, and more
Democratic when the Democrats were winning.16 Chart II: 1 pictures
national :and state voting for Illinois, Chicago, and the mean of seven
Chicago ethnic groups, 1890-1916.11
Of the twenty-five elections studied for 1890-1916, the Democrats
won ten, the Republicans nine, the two parties shared the victory in three,
16 Milton J. Bluestein, "Voting Tradition and Socio-Economic Factors in the
1936 Presidential Election in Illinois" (M.A. thesis, University of Chicago,
1950), pp. 60-61.
17 The "ethnic mean" used here consists of the mean voting percentage of the
mean voting percentages of each of the seven ethnic groups studied in this
chapter. Thus each group, regardless of its actual size or the size of the sample
studied, has equal weight in the ethnic mean. A complete description of the
sample can be found in the Appendix.
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and other parties won three.18 In presidential elections, the Democrats
carried the city only once, in 1892, while the Republicans carried it five
times, and Progressive Theodore Roosevelt had a plurality in 1912. The
Republican presidential victories were quite strong in 1896, 1908, and
especially 1904, but in 1900 and 1916 they were narrow. In two of the
Republican presidential years-1900 and 1908-the governorship went
to the Democrats; and in the Progressive-dominated election of 1912, the
Democratic gubernatorial candidate, rather than the Progressive, had a
plurality in the city.
In off-year elections, the office of state treasurer tended to foreshadow
the presidential and gubernatorial outcome two years later. The office
went Democratic in 1890, Republican in 1894, narrowly Democratic in
1898 (reflecting the 1900 Republican-Democratic division of presidency
and governorship), Republican in 1902 and 1906, and Democratic in
1910. The first popular vote for United States senator, in 1914, went to
the Democrat by a plurality. Overall, there was a consistent relationship
between state and national voting.
The Democrats were more successful at the local level (see Chart
11:2). Of eleven mayoralties held during this period (it was a two-year
office until 1907, when it became four-year), the Democrats won seven
times and the Republicans four. However, of the seven Democratic
victories, six were won by the Carter H. Harrisons, father and son (each
of whom won the office five times in his career), so that the party
element in this dominance may be less than first appears. For example,
elections for county sheriff, which were held every four years (in the fall,
to be followed by a mayoralty the next spring), were more evenly
divided: four Democratic victories and three Republican.
Chicago, then, was rather bipartisan in the years before America's
entry into the First World War. The new eastern and southern European
immigrants, who entered the city and its political life during this period,
did not enter a one-party situation and were subject to the conflicting
pulls of two relatively strong and relatively successful major parties. The
fact that the Democrats controlled the city political organization so much
of the time, however, was important; it gave them the advantage of being
18 In order not to confuse the reader with an unassimilable quantity of charts
and graphs, only some of the relevant data is included in the graphs here given.
For full data on all contests referred to in this chapter, see the Appendix.
Chart II: I
Chicago, Illinois, and Ethnic Mean National and State Voting,
I890-I9I6*
75 REPUBLICAN VOTE
DEMOCRATIC VOTE
YEAR '90 '92 '94 '96 '98 '00 '02 '04 '06 '08 'IO 'I2 '14 '16
---=Chicago
- - - - = Illinois
· · · · = Ethnic Mean
* Calculated on basis of Democratic and Republican percentages of two-
party vote, except for 1912 (four-party) and 1914 (three-party). For definition
of Uethnic meanU see note 17- For complete data, sample description, and contests
included, see the Appendix.
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Chart 11:2
Chicago and Ethnic Mean De1nocratic Voting for National/
State and Local Offices, 1890-19161
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1 For definition of "ethnic mean" see note 17. Calculated on basis of
Democratic percentage of two-party vote, except for 1891, 1897, 1912, and
1914-Democratic percentage of total vote. For complete data, sample descrip-
tion, and contests included, see the Appendix.
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in a stronger position vis-a.-vis groups whose major needs were best
responded to at the local level. This can be seen clearly in Chart 11:2.
Third parties exerted considerable effect in the progressive period. In
1912, Theodore Roosevelt had a plurality in the city, with 38 percent of
the total vote, while Eugene Debs received 13 percent, to 31 percent for
Wilson and 18 for Taft. In the gubernatorial race of the same year, the
Democratic candidate had a plurality (40 percent), while the Republican
and Progressive candidates had 24 percent each, and the Socialist 12
percent. For state's attorney, the Democrat had a narrow plurality (at 29
percent), with the Socialist running second (26 percent), and then the
Republican and the Progressive. That there was some sort of revolt is
clear, but it lacked any clear direction.
The Progressive vote continued significant in 1914 (24 percent),
when the Democratic candidate for United States senator won with a
plurality of 47 percent. By 1916 the Progressives had ceased to be a factor
in Chicago politics, allowing the Republican presidential and guberna-
torial candidates to win with slim majorities; but another strong Socialist
vote for state's attorney resulted in another Democratic plurality.
Thus at both the national and state levels it is quite apparent that
most Progressive and even Socialist votes came from Republican voters,
and that were it not for this revolt within the Republican party, the
Republicans would have dominated Chicago voting in the second decade
of the century as they had in the first. The Democratic victories at the
state and national level were almost by default in these years; the Demo-
crats did not assert themselves at these levels in anything like the fashion
they did in local politics.
Chart II: I clearly shows that both Chicago and Illinois followed the
national pattern to Republicanism in 1894-1896, remaining rather con-
sistently on that side of the ledger through the Taft election of 1908.19
19 Although the primary concern in this monograph is ethnic political
behavior, and not elections as such, I shall nonetheless consider the idea of
"critical" elections or periods of voting change, as first enunciated by V. O. Key,
Jr. (UA Theory of Critical Elections," Journal of Politics 17 [Feb. 1955]: 3-19),
and reiterated by many others, including Duncan MacRae and James A. Meldrum
("Critical Elections in Illinois, 1888-1958," American Political Science Review
54 [Sept. 1960]: 669-83).
Key's definition of a ucritical election" was one wherein the electorate was
"unusually deeply concerned, in which the extent of electoral involvement is
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Nineteen ten and the Progressive-dominated elections of 1912-1914
broke this Republican hegemony, but Democratic percentages did not
benefit. But the 1916 presidential returns seemed to indicate that the
Republicans were overcoming their insurgency problems without having
lost serious ground to the Democrats. As the country went to war, the
Republican party seemed likely to maintain in Chicago and Illinois the
dominance it had held since the depression of the 1890s. The proof of
this remained to the postwar years.
Charts II: 1 and 11:2 compare Illinois' and Chicago's voting with the
mean vote of the seven ethnic groups studied in this chapter. Overall the
ethnic mean seems to respond to the same forces and move in the same
direction as the city and state vote. The ethnic mean was consistently
more Democratic, however, and while it, too, went Republican in
1894-1896, this was less permanent than for city, state, and national
voting patterns. Ethnic groups on the whole did not, therefore, exhibit
any crucial political change as a result. But neither did the ethnic mean
show firm allegiance to either party. Indeed, for the seven presidential
elections through 1916, the ethnic mean majority was as often Republi-
can as Democratic (and Progressive, by plurality, in 1912). The critical
elections of 1894-1896, that led to a generation of Republican hege-
mony, took place without major ethnic influence one way or the other.
And this is quite congruent with our data on time of arrival and natural-
ization for the immigrants: the ethnics were simply not a major political
factor in the 1890s.
Equally interesting is the fact that, while the Illinois Democratic vote
increase from 1914 to 1916 was about ten percentage points, that of
relatively quite high, and in which the decisive results of the voting reveal a
sharp alteration of the pre-existing cleavage within the electorate. Moreover ...
the realignment made manifest in the voting in such elections seems to persist for
several succeeding elections" (ibid., p. 4).
Using this definition, or an expanded idea of a critical period rather than a
single election, Key and others have concluded that 1894 and 1928 were major
critical elections and important turning points in American voting behavior.
Some scholars are beginning to apply Key's model to other areas, in an effort to
see if it is universally applicable throughout the United States, and at least one
has raised serious question to Key's findings (John L. Shover, "Was 1928 a
Critical Election in California?" Pacific N01'thwest Qua1'te1'l'Y 58 [Oct. 1967):
196-204). The present study includes an ethnically oriented test of the model,
on somewhat different quantitative measures, for Chicago.
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Chicago and the ethnic mean was almost nil. Chicago Progressive voters
were returning to the Republican party; for Chicago and its ethnic groups
as a whole 1916 was not ·a critical election since it led to no new
coalition.20
What was true for the city and the ethnic mean, however, was not
necessarily true for each individual group. Indeed, individual group varia-
tions can be most significant for understanding voting patterns. Chart
II: 3 portrays local and national/state Democratic voting for each of the
seven groups.21
In their voting for national and state offices there is a clear separation
between older immigrant group and Negro areas, on the one hand, and
newer immigrant ones on the other. Only the Negro areas were always
Republican; no group was always Democratic. Moreover, these ethnic
area graphs reiterate my earlier conclusions about ethnic groups not
contributing to the lasting political changes of 1894-1896. Each group
did show a clear Democratic dropoff in 1894-1896, but only the Swedish
and German areas can be considered as demonstrating any crucial change.
One of the most striking things suggested by these graphs is the
strength of Theodore Roosevelt, who had majorities among all groups in
1904 and pluralities among the three most Republican ones in 1912.
Thus again, the basic Republicanism of the Progressive party is made
clear, although the graphs also show that Roosevelt was supported by
many Democratic voters as well. The newer immigrants responded only
to the man, however, as is made clear by their return after I9I2 to their
previous political stance. If we look only at presidential elections-disre-
garding the 1910 state treasurer race which sawall but Negroes voting
20 Cf. Shover's suggestion that 1916 created a greater change in California
politics than did 1928 (UWas 1928 a Critical Election in California?" p. 203).
I would suggest that a better picture of criticality can be drawn by looking at
ethnic groups rather than cities, counties, etc., because what can be a very critical
election for some groups can be unimportant for others; reference group theory
clearly points toward this kind of orientation.
21 On the voting traditions of these groups, see Andrew J. Townsend, uThe
Germans of Chicago" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1927); Hemdahl,
"The Swedes in Illinois Politics"; Johnson, "The Swedes of Chicago"; Alex
Gottfried, Boss Cermak of Chicago: A Study of Political Leadership (Seattle,
Wash., 1962); Serino, Ultalians in the Political Life of Boston"; Lawrence J.
Fuchs, The Political Behavior of American Jews (Glencoe, Ill., 1956); Philip P.
Bregstone, Chicago and Its Jews (Chicago, 1933); Chicago Defender, Oct. 30,
1920, p. 12.
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Chart 11:3
Ethnic Grottp Democratic Voting /0" National/State and Local
Offices, 1890-19161
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Chart II: 3 (continued)
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Chart II: 3 ( continued)
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Chart II: 3 ( contintted)
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Democratic-the Democratic dropoff to Roosevelt becomes somewhat
less dramatic. The impermanence of progressivism as a national political
movement is clear; and it certainly was not built upon large-scale support
from lower-class urban ethnic groups.22
The graphs show clearly that Bohemian, Polish, and Italian immi-
grants were settling in areas which tended to be Democratic in national
and state elections, whereas the opposite was true for settlers in German,
Swedish, and Negro areas. The Jewish ghetto exhibited the most mixed
tradition. What effect these phenomena would have on the building of
permanent political loyalties when the majority of each group would be
voting would be demonstrated only after the Great War.
22 A somewhat contrary view to this generalization can be found in J. Joseph
Huthmacher, "Urban Liberalism and the Age of Reform," Mississippi Valley
Historical Review 49 (Sept. 1962): 231-41 •
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Most ethnic groups were overall on the same side of the political
ledger in local voting as in national and state, following the ethnic mean,
which stayed consistently more Democratic than the Chicago vote. The
German, Swedish, and Negro areas showed an interesting similarity in
voting at all levels; Democratic voting tended to rise and fall at the same
time locally and nationally. This suggests that these groups were more
party-oriented than the newer immigrants. Voting patterns among the
latter groups were more volatile, suggesting that their voting was influ-
enced by personalities, and perhaps issues, rather than comprising a
long-term party commitment.23
The graphs also point to the popularity of the Carter H. Harrisons,
father and son; their popularity was considerable with all ethnic groups
(for example, the low Democratic vote in 1891, when the senior Harri-
son ran as an independent; and the Democratic majorities among all
seven groups in 1911, when the junior Harrison reentered local politics
for the last time). More significant for the future, however, was the
general popularity of William Hale Thompson in his first mayoral race
in 1915. He carried not only the traditionally Republican ethnic groups
but also the Jews and Bohemians, and had considerable support among
the remaining two groups as well. On the whole, Thompson received one
of the largest ethnic votes for mayor of the period; his career as mayor
was starting strong.
As the United States entered the First World War, Chicago's political
future was unclear, reflecting the developing nature of ethnic group
political loyalties. Large numbers of recent immigrants and Negroes, as
well as some latecoming members of older immigrant groups, were only
beginning to vote at the time of the War, and many not until the start of
the 1920S. Thus we must be wary in generalizing about voting traditions
23 One explanation for the relatively high local Democratic voting among
Swedes-which might apply to other groups as well-was that the most impor-
tant Swedish-American political organization, the John Ericsson Republican
League of Illinois, while very active and always Republican in state and national
politics, had a policy of nonparticipation in local politics (Hemdahl, UThe
Swedes in Illinois Politics," p. 220). The relative independence of Jewish voting
may well reflect the Jews' being less reliant on political organizations for relief,
etc., because of unusually well-developed intragroup charitable organization.
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in the period 1890-1917. The next decade would in good part provide
the milieu for cohesion and coalition, when firm mass group loyalties
would be established for the first time.
This phenomenon is further emphasized by the nature of party
organization in Chicago at this time. By and large the parties were not
well integrated on a citywide basis. Rather, Chicago politics was charac-
terized by personal and group factions within parties, which tended to
dominate given regions of the city. Citywide organization among either
the Democrats or Republicans was short-lived when it did occur. The
Democrats had the Harrison, Edward Dunne, Roger Sullivan, and other
groupings, each with its own areas of support. The Republicans had
Lorimer-Thompson, Charles Deneen, and several other factions. Thus
voter loyalties-including those of ethnic groups-were often more Har-
rison, or Deneen, or Lorimer loyalties than truly partisan ones.24 This
helps explain variant voting among two or more wards dominated by the
same ethnic group. Whether any of these factions could be built into
truly citywide party organizations, which could be effective at local, state,
and national voting levels, was a question for the 1920S to answer.
It remained to be seen if the Republicans, who would emerge from
the War as the dominant national party, would also be able to build a
united local organization with committed ethnic support. Likewise, the
possibility existed that the Democrats could, in a period of national
adversity, build a local organization strong enough to prevail among the
ethnics locally even while their party was out of power at the national
and state level. The latter is eventually what did happen in Chicago, as
the Republicans remained divided and the Democrats united; but this was
not easy to foretell in 1917.
The Democrats had a good chance to hold the support of the new
immigrant groups, if they were able to meet the needs of their increased
numbers in the 1920S. But could this really be done if the Democratic
party was out of power nationally and/or continued to be dominated by
nonurban groups and values? The Democratic hold on these groups was
seriously strained, and in some cases broken, in the ensuing decade; the
tenuousness of newer immigrant Democratic loyalty became apparent
24 E.g., Charles N. Glaab and A. Theodore Brown, A History of Urban
America (New York, 1967), pp. 208-209.
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immediately after the War. Likewise the strong ethnic support in the
election of Thompson as a Republican mayor in 1915 did not augur well
for the Democrats.
The Republicans, for their part, seemed to be in a pretty good
position with older immigrants and Negroes, and to some extent the
Jews, in 1917. And developments in national politics during the War
would of course help them. But the similarities between these groups and
the newer immigrants-in values, aspirations, and behavior-were
greater than the differences. Could the members of a factionalized Repub-
lican party maintain their loyalties as the wartime issues receded in
importance?
Thus the period 1890-1917 raises more questions than it answers, in
terms of the political loyalties and interests of Chicago's ethnic groups.
The next fifteen years would provide answers to these questions that
would hold for at least another generation.
III. Ethnic VOting
Behavior., I9I8-I936
This chapter will begin the study of postwar political behavior with an
intensive look at the voting behavior of nine ethnic groups. For the
decade of the 1920S a number of problems attendant upon the earlier
period are no longer present: far higher proportions of the newer immi-
grants were citizens and able to vote; methodological problems are fewer,
permitting analysis at the precinct level; thus the ethnicity of political
areas is clearer and one can more confidently generalize about the voting
behavior of individual groups. The nine groups included are Poles,
Czechoslovaks, Yugoslavs, Lithuanians, Italians, Germans, Swedes, Jews,
and Negroes. And for all but the Lithuanians and Yugoslavs comparisons
can be made to 1890-1916. Native-American voting patterns will serve
as another basis for comparison.
Overall, the period saw considerable voting change. In 1932, as in
1920, there were races for president, senator, and governor. These races
for the nine ethnic groups comprised twenty-seven contests for each
election. In 1920, only three of the twenty-seven resulted in Democratic
majorities; in 1932, twenty-three of the twenty-seven did SO.l Since the
pattern of 1932 would continue thereafter, it is clear that the period saw
some important voting developments.
The trend at the local level was less pronounced, since the ethnic
groups were traditionally more Democratic in local races than in na-
tional. Six of the nine voted Democratic in 1919, and seven of the nine in
1931. These patterns are portrayed in Charts III: I and 111:2. Chart III: I
shows the Democratic presidential vote, 1892-1932, for the mean of the
ethnic groups, and for Chicago as a whole. Chart 111:2 shows the mean
ethnic Democratic vote for the national/state offices (every two years)
and the mayoral vote, 1890-1936.
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These charts provide a more complete look at the developments of
the decade, and the generation preceding it, than the synopsis above. The
mixed ethnic tradition in presidential elections before the First World
War was supplemented by one of unparalleled Republicanism in the first
two elections of the I920S. The 1924-1928 change comprises the largest
interstitial jump of the whole period and, for the first time, was not
followed by a Republican majority in the next presidential election
(indeed, the Democratic majority would continue through the I930S and
beyond). Thus, while the ethnics could be confidently labeled neither
Democratic nor Republican in presidential voting before the I920S, from
1928 on they were clearly Democratic. In Chart 111:2, where we consider
off-year national (United States senator) and state (state treasurer-in
the years there was no senatorial election) elections as well as the
presidential, a similar pattern emerges, but with even more variation.
There is a general-though not universal-tendency for a higher ethnic
Democratic vote in off-year elections, especially from 1910 on. This is
1 Insofar as we shall spend a good deal of time considering the ucriticality" of
1928 and suceeding elections, we should here consider the problem of udeviant"
or unusual elections. Recent studies of the 1928 election and its role as a turning
point have tended to qualify if not dismiss the importance of the 1928 vote
because of this question of "deviance" (e.g., Jerome M. Clubb and Howard W.
Allen, "The Cities and the Election of 1928: Partisan Realignment," Ame1"ican
Historical Review 74 [April 1969J: 1205-20, esp. pp. 1207-1209; John L.
Shover, uWas 1928 a Critical Election in California?" Pacific Northwest Quart-
erly 58 [Oct. 1967J: 196-204, esp. p. 198). These suggestions do not seem
reasonable, however, at least for the period from the First World War through
the Depression. Perhaps no election is truly ordinary, and all have some measure
of deviance. The 1928 election is no exception here (Clubb and Allen, "The
Cities and the Election of 1928"), nor, as a basis of comparison, are 1920 or
1924 (Shover, uWas 1928 a Critical Election in California?"). The presidential
election of 1916 took place in a fervor of war-fears and the vote for Wilson was
an unusual (because infrequent in terms of situation) phenomenon. The 1918
vote came hard on the heels of a successful war effort, with unusually great
sympathy for the administration that had pursued that effort. Indeed, the pro-
administration feelings of 1918 were very similar to the antiadministration feel-
ings of 192o-after the tragedy of Versailles had been played out. And the un-
usualness of that election was matched by that of 1924 when a major third party
was again in the running. One could go on and on, the point being that we have
to take elections as they come; each has some measure of udeviance," at least in
this period of American history. Perhaps that is in the very nature of the electoral
process; varying rates of "deviance" do not seem meaningfully measurable, and
the concept is probably more obstructive than anything else.
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Chart III: I
Chicago and Ethnic Mean Democratic Presidential Vote, I892-I9361
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1892-1916; 9, 1920- 1936 ); see Appendix. Calculated on basis of Democratic
percentage of two-party (1912, 1924: three-party) vote.
perpetuated, although in diminished form, in the 1920S. There is a major
break in the cycle in 1928, when the Democratic presidential vote is
actually higher (by one percentage point) than the senatorial vote of
192 6; from this point it moves on to unprecedented highs. Thus in
off-year elections as well as presidential ones,2 there is a rather mixed
tradition up to 1928, but a clearly Democratic one thereafter.
2 This will perhaps meet the reasonable qualification raised by some scholars
about the unreliability of using data for presidential elections only (e.g., Clubb
and Allen, "The Cities and the Election of 1928," pp. 1209-12). It is arguable
whether presidential elections should be compared only to other presidential
elections, or to off-year ones as well. In seeking the clearest possible indications of
ethnic voting behavior, and its contribution to political coalitions, I have tried
here to use both measures.
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In local voting, on the other hand, the ethnic mean is generally
Democratic from the mid-1890s. It does go Republican in the mayoral-
ties of 1915 and 1927 (two of William Hale Thompson's campaigns),
and only very narrowly Democratic in 1919 (also a Thompson cam-
paign, as was 1931). There does not appear to be any direct relationship
between voting for local office on the one hand, and for state and
national on the other.
All of this is based on the mean vote of the means for the nine
groups. Table III: 1 gives the Democratic vote of each of the nine groups
for the major national/state and local elections of 1918-1932; and Chart
III: 3 pictures the vote for 1890-1936 for those seven groups for which
data are available for this whole period.
The nine ethnic groups can reasonably be divided into four categories
to facilitate the study of their voting: older immigrants (Germans and
Swedes); newer immigrants (Poles, Czechoslovaks, Lithuanians, Yugo-
slavs, Italians); Jews; and Negroes. Despite variations in voting within
the first two categories, they have some real unity: time of immigration
into the United States, degree of assimilation into the American value
system, religion ( in large part), general socioeconomic status, and
general political sophistication and behavior.
The newer immigrants tended to be more Democratic than the other
ethnics and the Native-Americans. All five groups were strongly Demo-
cratic in the senatorial election of 1918 (over 60 percent) ; by 1920, they
were still somewhat more Democratic than the older immigrants, but
only the Lithuanians gave a Democratic majority for any of the three
major contests. Comparing the senatorial vote of 1918 with the presiden-
tial vote of 1920, the Czechs, Italians, and Yugoslavs all decreased their
Democratic support by about forty percentage points. The Poles dropped
by thirty-one points and the still-Democratic Lithuanians by twenty-four.
The Republican vote for senator and governor in 1920 was smaller than
that for president, but among none of the groups was the variation for
the three offices more than seven points, a relatively narrow range.
Between these two elections was the 1919 mayoralty. All five newer
immigrant groups were Democratic in that election, with percentages
ranging from fifty-two to seventy-six (mean == 63 percent). Between the
national elections of 1920 and 1924, in the 1923 mayoralty, all five were
again Democratic, and a little more so than in 1919 (mean == 73 per-
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data, sample description, and contests included, see Appendix.
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TABLE III:l Derrr;cratic Vote of Nine Ethnic Groups and Native-Americans in
Chicago Elections, 1918-1932 {Percentage Deoocratic} *
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1918:
Senator 84 71 77 61 71 54 44 60 35 46
Congressman 79 64 76 51 65 46 32 45 28
Sheriff 86 66 75 57 65 47 36 54 30
1919:
Mayor 73 55 76 52 61 51 35 40 22 42
1920:
President 43 39 53 22 31 18 17 15 11 20
Senator 44 41 54 23 28 23 22 20 12 23
Governor 49 46 57 25 36 31- 34 31 19 45
1923:
Mayor 76 76 82 52 80 45 42 57 53 43
1924:
President 40 35 48 20 31 14 15 19 10 16
Senator 59 49 58 36 39 37 33 39 20 35
Governor 51 42 54 28 35 30 37 41 19 50
1927:
Mayor 59 54 57 36 42 37 38 39 7 5S
1928:
President 73 71 77 54 63 58 34 60 23 40
Senator 82 75 77 58 62 64 41 64 21 43
Governor 70 66 71 49 52 52 34 53 19 40
1930:
Senator 89 85 85 74 68 85 73 83 24 68
Congressman 82 78 61 70 59 72 52 70 19
Pres.-Cnty. Bd. 85 81 67 73 63 75 54 77 20 56
1931:
Mayor 84 70 62 64 47 58 53 61 16 61
1932:
President 83 80 84 67 64 69 51 77 21 43
Senator 81 76 80 62 59 65 42 73 19 39
Governor 81 75 78 59 57 67 53 83 20 63
*Percentage Democratic of the two-party vote except for 1924--0£ the three-
party vote.
Chart 111:3
Ethnic Group Democratic Voting for National/ State and Local Offices,
1890-19361
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1891, 1897, 1912-1914, and 1928-Democratic percentage of total vote. For
complete data, sample description, and contests included, see Appendix.
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Chart III: 3 ( continued)
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Chart III: 3 ( continued)
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Chart III: 3 ( continued)
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2 Bohemian-area vote to 1916; Czechoslovakian vote from 1918.
cent). Thus the 1920 national vote did not carry over to the local
election of 1923. It was, however, repeated in 1924, where Democratic
voting decreased from 1920 levels. The Italians voted the same as in
1920, but the other groups were two to six points less Democratic. Thus
even the Lithuanians failed to return a Democratic majority for president.
The Czechs and Lithuanians did vote Democratic for senator and gover-
nor (between 51 percent and 59 percent), while the other three groups
were Republican for all offices.
There was a significant difference from 1920, however, in the effect
of the Robert M. La Follette candidacy for the Progressive party. Thus,
while none of the five groups voted Democratic for president, three of
them failed to vote Republican either; and among the more Democratic
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Czechs and Lithuanians, the Democratic presidential candidate received
more votes than the Republican. Consequently, both Republican and
Democratic presidential voting declined among the newer immigrants in
1924. This does not mean that La Follette ran strongly among the newer
immigrants; he simply attracted enough votes to decrease major party
totals from the 1920 levels. He received an average of 18 percent among
them (from 15 percent to 20 percent), which was his average in the city
at large, and well below that among some other groups. Since the
Democratic total decreased only very slightly from 1920 at the presiden-
tiallevel, the La Follette vote among newer immigrants seems primarily
to have come from 1920 Republican voters. But there were no significant
differences in La Follette voting between groups which were relatively
more or less Democratic before 1924. And therefore Progressive voting
in 1924 hinged on reasons other than previous party identification.
The 1927 mayoralty saw a continuing decrease in Democratic voting
among newer immigrants: only three of the five groups voted Demo-
cratic, and in each case by less than 60 percent. The average decrease
from 1923 Democratic totals was twenty-four percentage points (varying
from fifteen to thirty-eight points-a rather wide range). Again the
degree of decrease is not explicable in terms of previous level of Demo-
cratic or Republican voting. The five groups together voted 49.6 percent
Democratic, and thus overall local voting had reached the same side of
the balance as national.
In the 1928 presidential election all five groups went strongly Demo-
cratic, with a combined average of 68 percent. Increases over 1924
Democratic voting were very large, averaging thirty-three percentage
points (and varying little: from twenty-nine to thirty-six points). As
compared to 1920, Democratic presidential voting increased thirty points.
The vote for senator and governor was essentially the same as that for
president, and Democratic senatorial candidate Anton Cermak led the
ticket with 71 percent. The Yugoslavs, with the lowest Democratic vote
for president, comprised the only group that failed to produce a Demo-
cratic majority for any of the three offices (49 percent for governor).
This 68 percent Democratic vote was still six points under the 1918
level, but was nonetheless probably the highest Democratic presidential
vote these groups had ever delivered. The increase in Democratic voting
over 1920 was only four points less than the decrease from 1918 to 1920.
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Interestingly, the five newer immigrant groups voted closer together in
1928 (a range of nineteen points) than in any other election of the
period.
This strongly resurgent Democratic voting did not flag in succeeding
elections. In the 1930 national elections each of the groups increased its
Democratic vote in each of the three major contests. Their average in the
senatorial election was 80 percent Democratic (the Republican candidate
was female), and in the congressman-at-large race the Democratic vote
was 70 percent. In the locally important race for president of the Cook
County Board of Commissioners, Anton Cermak received 74 percent of
the newer immigrant vote. Thus the new Democratic voting strength
was becoming increasingly firm.
The 1931 mayoralty also contributed to this trend. Four of the five
groups went Democratic, the exception being the Italians. The five
groups averaged 65 percent Democratic, fifteen points more than in
1927. This ranged from the Italians' low of 47 percent to the Czechs'
high of 84-again demonstrating the greater similarity to be found in
national than in local voting behavior. All the groups, however, increased
their Democratic voting materially from the levels of 1927, and for all
except the Italians the 1931 mayoralty marked the third straight Demo-
cratic voting majority.
Finally, the national elections of 1932 and beyond continued the
Democratic trend. The newer immigrants voted 76 percent Democratic
for president in 1932 and only slightly less for senator and governor.
Each of the groups was more Democratic for president than in 1928, and
all but the Czechs, who dropped only one point, exceeded their 1931
Democratic vote as well. Variations between the groups were about the
same as 1928 and the fact that all went Democratic in landslide propor-
tions further minimizes the significance of the range.
By 1932, then, the newer immigrant groups had already voted
Democratic through four successive elections. And the indecisive pattern
of their voting at the beginning of the period had given way to an
ever-growing Democratic allegiance, which continued into 1934-1936
and beyond.
The Germans and Swedes of Chicago, as older immigrants, had
much in common: socioeconomic status, assimilation into the general
population of the city, participation in the prevailing value structure,
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place of residence, and a political tradition of firm Republicanism. The
Swedes were traditionally somewhat more Republican than the Germans,
however, and they would be less affected by the political forces of the
time.
In the wartime elections of 1918 the Germans went Democratic for
senator, at 54 percent, while the Swedes went Republican (44 percent
Democratic). For congressman-at-large and sheriff both groups went
Republican. And in all three contests the Germans were about ten points
more Democratic than the Swedes.
This difference between the two groups continued into the 1919
mayoralty, with the Germans at 51 percent Democratic and the Swedes at
35. But in the Republican sweep of 1920 the difference virtually disap-
peared: the Germans voted only 18 percent Democratic, and the Swedes
17 percent. The same difference obtained in the senatorial vote, and in
the gubernatorial the Germans were three points less Democratic (at 31
percent) than the Swedes. Most important, both groups voted over 66
percent Republican in all three contests.
Democratic strength increased slightly in the 1923 mayoralty-the
Germans at 45 percent and the Swedes at 42. But in the 1924 national
elections Democratic voting dropped even below 1920 levels. The Ger-
mans voted 14 percent Democratic for president, and the Swedes 15; for
senator and governor the two groups voted between 30 and 37 percent
Democratic, about the same as in 1920. There was an important differ-
ence between the two groups in 1924, however, in ter~s of their re-
sponses to La Follette. Thus while the Germans and Swedes were only
one point apart in Democratic presidential voting, they were twelve
points apart in Republican (53 percent for the Germans, 65 percent for
the Swedes) since the Germans gave La Follette 33 percent, his highest
total among all groups, while the Swedes gave him only 19, his fifth
highest.
Since Swedish and German voting for senator and governor were
about the same, it appears that German voters for La Follette were
essentially Republican at the presidential level. But they were less firmly
attached to that party than the Swedes; this would be seen again in the
future. La Follette's appeal was not constant or universal to all middle-
class ethnics.
In the 1927 mayoralty the two groups voted together again, and
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again were firmly Republican: the Germans voted 37 percent Democratic
and the Swedes 38. But in the 1928 presidential contest they were wider
apart than at any other time. The Germans gave Smith 58 percent, the
Swedes 34. This divergence was slightly smaller in voting for senator and
governor. And in the former, the Germans gave Democrat Anton Cer-
mak an even higher vote (64 percent) than they gave to Al Smith.
Comparing the 1928 presidential vote with that of 1920 (to eliminate
the La Follette factor in 1924), German Democratic voting increased by
forty percentage points, more than any other group except the Jews. At
the same time, Swedish Democratic voting increased by only seventeen
points, less than any other group except the Negroes.
This Democratic trend increased among the Germans in 1930, and
even the Swedes participated in it, although to a lesser extent. The
Germans voted 85 percent Democratic in the male-female senatorial
contest, the Swedes 73 percent. And the Germans voted over 70 percent
Democratic for congressman-at-large and president of the County Board
as well. In these two contests the Swedes were just over 50 percent
Democratic-probably the first time they had ever voted so generally
Democratic. Thus it appeared in 1930 that the Germans had entered the
new Democratic coalition, and that the Swedes were flirting with it as
well.
In the 1931 mayoralty both groups continued Democratic, now at the
local level. German voters gave Anton Cermak 58 percent of their
mayoral vote, and Swedes gave him 53 percent; respective increases over
1927 were twenty-one and fifteen percentage points. And in the 1932
national elections the Germans once again delivered a landslide Demo-
cratic vote: between 65 and 69 percent for president, senator, and
governor. The Swedes, as in 1928, were well behind; they gave Roosevelt
51 percent, and 51 percent to the Democratic candidate for governor, but
voted only 42 percent Democratic for senator.
Thus by 1932 the Germans had joined with the newer immigrants
in moving strongly since 1928 into the Democratic column. And they
seemed there to stay, as 1934 and 1936 voting indicates. The Swedes, at
the same time, had continued to be more Republican, and their future
political course was unsure. Even they, however, had voted Democratic in
six of seven contests from 1930 to 1932 and if they could not be called
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Democrats, neither was their traditional Republicanism any longer se-
cure.
Chicago's Jews remained a distinct group in this period for a number
of reasons: although some had been in the city for a long time, most were
recent immigrants; there were relatively great divisions and animosities
within the group, between the older and newer immigrant Jews; despite
their recent immigration, the Jews were among the socioeconomically
most advanced of the groups; and finally, they made a more complete
political change in this period than any other group in the city.
Like other Chicago ethnic groups, the Jews leaned toward the incum-
bent Democratic party in the wartime election of 1918; this was a
deviation from their traditionally strong Republicanism. They voted 60
percent Democratic for senator and S4 percent Democratic for Anton
Cermak for sheriff, but only 4S percent Democratic for congressman-at-
large. The next year they voted only 40 percent Democratic for mayor.
In 1920 the Jews voted 15 percent Democratic for president and
were, after the Negroes, the most Republican ethnic group in the city; for
governor and senator their Democratic vote was slightly higher, but still
second most Republican. In 1924 Jewish Democratic voting rose slightly,
to 19 percent, at the same time that all other ethnic groups were slightly
decreasing their Democratic vote; there were three groups more Republi-
can than they. And in the voting for senator and governor, the Jews-at
40 percent Democratic-were among the least Republican. Here, as
always, the Jewish vote showed considerable selectivity and intragroup
variation. The Jews voted 27 percent for La Follette, his second best
showing in the city. Thus a bare majority of S2 percent went to the
Republican presidential candidate.
This selectivity had been demonstrated the year before, in the 1923
mayoralty. Here the Jews had voted 57 percent Democratic, almost as
Democratic as they had been Republican four years earlier. But in the
mayoralty of 1927, when Republican Thompson was again a candidate,
Jewish Democratic voting reached a new locallow-39 percent. By no
means, then, had the Jews made any party shift by 192 7.
In the presidential election of 1928 Chicago's Jews voted 60 percent
Democratic, an increase of forty-one percentage points over 1924, and
forty-five over 1920. With the Germans, they showed the largest such
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increase of all Chicago ethnic groups (thus the highest La Follette voters
made the greatest pro-Democratic shifts in 1928). Jewish Democratic
voting in 1928 was even greater in the senatorial race, where Anton
Cermak received 64 percent; but for governor it was smaller, at 53
percent. This trend continued in 1930: 83 percent Democratic for sen-
ator, 77 percent for president of the County Board, and 70 for congress-
man-at-large. Local voting came into alignment in the 1931 mayoralty;
the Jews deserted Thompson and gave Cermak 61 percent (precisely the
total they had given Thompson four years earlier). In the 1932 national
elections the trend continued: 77 percent Democratic for president, 73
percent for senator, and 83 percent for the Jewish Democratic candidate
for governor.
The voting behavior of Chicago's Jews, then, rivaled that of the
Germans in the dramatic nature of its development: almost universally
Republican in the first half of the 1920S, and from 1928 progressively
more and more Democratic, with national and local allegiance becoming
quite close by 1932.
Chicago's Negroes were an even more distinctive ethnic group in
politics. They were the oldest in terms of residence in the nation, but the
newest in Chicago; yet, as with the Jews, there were some among them
who had been in the city for generations. Socioeconomically, they were
the lowest of the ethnic groups, and politically they were the most
Republican. Their political behavior changed less during this period than
that of any other group, and the very fact that they were largely unaf-
fected by the forces affecting the other groups is significant.
In all but one of the elections considered here, the Negroes were the
least Democratic of all voters. They were not much affected by the
general proadministration wartime sentiment in 1918, voting only 35
percent Democratic for senator and 30 percent or less for governor and
congressman-at-large. Even this, however, was somewhat above their
usual Democratic level, which suggests that no group is totally immune
to the forces operating in American politics.
In the 1919 mayoralty Negroes voted strongly for Republican
Thompson and gave his opponent only 22 percent. (Thompson had
received about ten points less in 1915.) In the 1920 presidential election
Negro Democratic voting decreased: 11 percent for president, 12 percent
for senator, and 19 percent for governor (James Hamilton Lewis, the
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same man to whom they had given 35 percent for senator in 1918). The
Democratic presidential vote, low as it was, fell by another percentage
point in 1924, to 10 percent; the gubernatorial vote remained the same
as in 1920 and the senatorial vote rose slightly, to 20 percent. All in all
this was an overwhelming commitment to the Republican party. Ne-
groes were not attracted to La Follette and gave him a lower vote (10
percent) than any other ethnic group in Chicago.
Between these two national elections came the only instance of Negro
Democratic voting in the entire period, in the 1923 mayoralty. The 53
percent Negro Democratic vote was not, however, a sign of disaffection
from Republicanism; rather it was a sign of loyalty to former Mayor
Thompson. In 1927, when Thompson ran for and won his third term as
Republican mayor, Chicago's Negroes gave him an almost unbelievable
93 percent of their vote.
Negroes were not entirely unaffected by the Al Smith candidacy.
They voted 23 percent for him, and a little less for his running mates.
This was obviously not large, but compared to preceding elections it did
show some attraction to the Democratic candidate. The same level of
Negro Democratic voting was maintained in 1930, when Democrat
James Hamilton Lewis received 24 percent for the Senate, and his
running mates slightly less. This 1930 senatorial vote showed a real
alliance with Republicanism, since Mayor Thompson was supporting the
Democrat.
In the 1931 mayoralty, Negroes again supported Thompson, this
time with 84 percent of their vote. And in the 1932 national elections
Negro Democratic voting decreased slightly from the levels of 1928-
1930. Franklin D. Roosevelt received 21 percent, and his running mates
a point or two less.
Thus with the exception of the 1923 mayoralty, where a very unusual
situation prevailed, Negroes never voted more than 35 percent Demo-
cratic through 1932, and in eighteen of the twenty-one contests were
below 25 percent. They remained relatively unaffected by the forces of
change in Chicago politics in the 1920S, and at the end of the period were
outside the Democratic consensus. However, the figures for 1934 and
1936 (Chart 111:3) show the steady increase in Negro Democratic
voting that led to solid Democratic majorities in the second half of the
decade.
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In summary, while there were variations among the groups, almost
all underwent important voting changes during the period 1918-1932,
and these changes overall were in the same direction. Averaged together,
they tended to support the party in power in the wartime elections of
1918 and to be fairly evenly divided in the 1919 mayoralty. In the
national elections of 1920 and 1924, however, they were strongly Repub-
lican, but both less Republican and less Democratic in 1924 than in
1920, due to an average La Follette vote of 19 percent. Meanwhile, they
had delivered a strong Democratic majority in the 1923 mayoralty, but
would turn around and vote a Republican majority almost as strong in
192 7.
In the 1928 national elections the ethnics greatly increased their
Democratic voting to a position about the same as that of 1918, in what
was probably the highest Democratic vote they had ever delivered in a
presidential contest. This uptrend continued in the first Depression-time
election of 1930, the defeat of Thompson in the 1931 mayoralty, and the
national elections of 1932, creating in the process a Democratic tradition,
which expanded in 1934 and 1936.
The overall trend of the 1920S is clear: starting in 1928 a switch in
ethnic voting behavior began; it was reinforced by the succeeding elec-
tions of 1930, 1931, and 1932 and resulted in the ethnic Democratic
consensus that provided the crux of Democratic voting strength from that
time forward. None of these groups, it should be noted, followed a
consistently predictable pattern. Just as politics combines rational and
irrational factors, so too does political behavior. That the patterns are not
neat or completely comprehensible reflects the fact that voters, as people,
operate under conflicting and not always decipherable motivations.
These tendencies can be made clearer, perhaps, by comparing the
voting of the nine groups with that of a sample of Native-Americans (see
Table 111:2). By and large the ethnics were consistently more Democratic
than were the Native-Americans (the exceptions being instances where
Thompson or his ally Governor Len Small were running on the Republi-
can ticket). But the extent of this difference varied from election to
election. The ethnics were sixteen percentage points more Democratic in
the 1918 senatorial contest, but only seven and nine points more Demo-
cratic in the presidential elections of 1920 and 1924. This rose to a
seventeen point differential in 1928 and twenty-three points in 1932, as
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TABLE 111:2 Ethnic and Native-American Voting Patterns, 1918-1932
(Percentage Democratic) *
Nine ethnic Native-
Election groups Americans
1918: Senator 62 46
1919: Mayor 51 42
1920: President 27 20
1923: Hayor 62 43
1924: President 25 16
(1924: La Follette 19 11)
1927: Mayor 41 55
1928: President 57 40
1930: Senator 74 68
1931: Mayor 57 61
1932: President 66 43
*Percentage Democratic of the two-party vote, except for 1924--the three-
party vote. Figures in parentheses are La Follette's percentages of the three-
party vote.
the ethnics entered the Democracy and drew further and further away
from the Native-Americans. Locally, the ethnics were nine points more
Democratic in the 1919 mayoralty and nineteen points more Democratic
in 1923- But in 1927, when Thompson sought his third term as Republi-
can mayor, the ethnics supported him and were fourteen points less
Democratic than the Native-Americans. The weakening of Thompson's
ethnic attraction in the next four years is seen in the 1931 vote, where the
ethnics were only four points less Democratic than the Native-Americans.
To summarize the individual groups, the traditionally more Demo-
cratic Czechs, Poles, Lithuanians, and Yugoslavs tended to vote Republi-
can in the early 1920S, but were pulled strongly into the Democratic
party in 1928, and from that time forward steadily increased their
Democratic voting and stayed Democratic at all levels. The primarily
Republican Italians followed a less rational course and were less firmly
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Democratic in 1932; but they nonetheless demonstrated a felt effect of
the same forces from 1928 on. The Germans and Jews made the clearest
shifts of all: traditionally strong Republicanism through 1927, a very
strong pro-Democratic shift in 1928, and Democratic voting from that
time forward. The Swedes, on the other hand, were less affected by these
forces and made no significant shift in 1928. They did become more
Democratic in 1930-1931-1932, but their party allegiance was not clear
at the end of the period. And the Negroes were least affected of all by the
forces of the time; they were about as Republican in 1932 as they had
been in 1918.
Voting patterns clearly point to 1928 as the most significant election
of the period. Here came the largest break with recent past voting
behavior among the ethnics. Before this election one could not really
generalize about an uethnic vote"; but from this election forward the
concept had real meaning. This was the real significance of the 1928
election-in creating an ethnic vote. And because these new patterns
continued into succeeding local and national elections, 1928 is a major
political turning point.
Finally, the question of the one important third-party movement of
the decade remains: what if any effect did the 1924 La Follette candidacy
have on later political changes? On the whole its effect was not great.
There is no meaningful overall relationship between the La Follette
voting and the Al Smith voting, for example. But if the phenomenon was
not generally important, it does appear to have been selectively impor-
tant among the traditionally Republican groups which did vote strongly
Progressive in 1924. Thus the Jews and Germans were the highest La
Follette voters and also the two groups which made the strongest Repub-
lican-to-Democratic switch when comparing 1920 or 1924 with 1928.
For these basically middle-class ethnic groups (but not for the equally
middle-class Swedes) the LaFollette movement played a role in breaking
their allegiance to the Republican party and was a kind of steppingstone
to Democratic voting. There is some evidence against overstressing this
factor in data on party membership among Jews and Germans.
The Uvoting" of the ethnic press is another indicator of changing
ethnic political allegiance. The ethnic press and ethnic voters were to
some extent in political accord. The ethnic press, like its readers, was
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TABLE 111:3 Election Recommendations of Chicago Ethnic Newspapers for
Leading Contests, 1918-1932 (Party of leading candidate)*
eu
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ttI-I-l .Q
'J:: ~'r; ~ ~ B ::s~~ ::l\ ,..... ..j.J 8 ~~ ~ eu o-U til I N
.r-! 0 .r-! 0 .r-! .Q~ 0 eu ~ ~a~ §~ I""i 'r-! I ~ ~ Q) ..c: ..c:ttl t: ~ tIl-IJ til fI) s::Q) U Q) eu -I-l s::: s::: Q) .~ .~ ~Or-! 'r-! ......... I-f eu Q) ~~~t3 ~~ eu N ~ ~ ~ aElection t4 14E-f tfl:;::;
1918: Senator D N R D D S R
1919: Mayor D R (R) D S R
1920: President D (R) R R R R D S R
1923: Hayor D D R D S N
1924: President D N R R (p) R D P R
1927: Mayor D N R D N D S R
1928: President D N N D D R D S D
1930: Senator D N R D D S N
1931: Mayor D D R R D D S N
1932: President D (D) R D D S (R)
*D = Democratic
R = Republican
P = Progressive
S = Socialist
N = Neutral
no interest or missing
() = leaned but did not specifically endorse
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often more interested in individual candidates than in parties. Of interest
here is the party affiliation of the major candidates supported by the press
-generally, the men who topped the ticket3 (Table 111:3).
For the newer immigrants, two Polish-language newspapers were
studied throughout. The Dziennik Chicagoski was always Democratic
when it was interested at all in an election. Dziennik ZwiazkowYJ the
official organ of the Polish National Alliance, was generally neutral and
often uninterested in politics; by the end of the period, however, it grew
more political, definitely endorsed Democrat Cermak for mayor in 1931,
and clearly leaned Democratic in 1932. The leading Italian-language
paper, L'Italia, was never Democratic, but was sometimes significantly
neutral, as in the election of 1918 and the presidential contest in 1928. La
Tribuna Italiana Trans-Atlantica pursued a less predictable course. It was
Republican in all national elections (1932 missing) except 1928, where
it endorsed Smith. On the local level it wavered considerably, for example
opposing Thompson in 1927 and supporting him in 1931-and thus
bucking the trend in both elections. In this respect the paper reflected the
enigmas of Italian voting behavior; both the paper and the people were
probably affected by outside, nonpolitical forces. By the end of the period,
however, the Italian and Polish press were both pretty well in accord with
the Democratic leanings of the groups they represented.
For the older immigrants, the only major German-language paper in
Chicago was the Abendpost (on Sundays called the Sonntagpost) , and it,
too, seemed to follow the same process of development as its readers.
Generally Republican at the outset, it leaned toward La Follette in 1924,
supported Smith in 1928, and then became strongly Democratic at all
levels. The Scandinavian press was not systematically studied, but one
leading Swedish-language paper, the Svenska-Tribunen-Nyheter, was
found to remain Republican in the presidential elections of 1920, 1924,
and 1928, as did Swedish voters (the owner of this paper, however,
personally supported Smith in 1928).
The Yiddish-language press seemed more independent of its reader-
ship. The two major Yiddish papers in Chicago were the Jewish Courier
and the Forward (a Chicago edition of the New York Forward). The
Jewish Courier was always Democratic and the Forward was always
3 A more complete and systematic study of the ethnic press will be found in
succeeding chapters.
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Socialist; neither ever varied, except that the Forward followed the
Socialist party in supporting La Follette in 1924. But it is worth noting
that the Forward .was the most widely circulated Yiddish paper in Chi-
cago and the United States, and its inculcation of liberal, democratic-
socialist ideas probably had an overall effect moderately helpful to the
Democratic party.
The leading Negro paper, the Defender, was by no means Demo-
cratic at the end of the period, but it was less firmly Republican than
before. Through 1927 it was always Republican, except for its neutrality
in the 1923 mayoralty when Negroes supported the Democratic candi-
date. But it was strongly anti-Republican and pro-Smith in 1928. It
ignored the 1930 election and was neutral in 1931, but leaned Republi-
can in 1932. The Defender did not become really Democratic at the local
level until 1935, and at the national until after the election of 1936.
Thus, although its Republicanism was weakened after 1928, it was like
its readers in its reluctance to leave traditional political loyalties.
The ethnic press, then, did follow the same pattern and was suscepti-
ble to the same influences as its readers. In the press, as among the voters,
there was a greater change, and a more permanent one, in 1928 than in
any other year. Despite exceptions, the general trend of press-reader
accord is clear. Whether leading or following, or both, the ethnic press
reacted to the political forces of the time in essentially the same manner
as its readers.
IV. Some Measures of
Ethnic Voting Behavior
This chapter will endeavor to clarify and systematize the data already
presented through the use of additional statistical measures. The models
used should be testable and replicable, and thus contribute to the search
for measures for the comparative study of voting behavior. The search for
the most ucritical" elections, i.e., those that led to the greatest change,
cannot follow Key's model, as MacRae and Meldrum, Shover, and others
have done.1 This is because the data in this study concentrate not on the
most Republican and most Democratic areas, but on ethnic areas and
groups; thus the problem of criticality or significance is approached from
a different subject-specific angle. What should emerge from this concern
with the elections which most affected ethnic voters is an ethnic variant of
the Key model.
The data in Table IV: I present the coefficients of correlation (Pear-
son's r) 2 for every presidential election with every other presidential
election, 1920-1936, in terms of Democratic voting of the nine ethnic
groups. Here is a clear ethnic model of a major part of Key's definition of
criticality for 1928: it produces a change in pattern and correlates at a
higher order with succeeding elections than with preceding ones. More-
over, again following Key, the changes appear to be long-lasting, insofar
as 1928 correlates at as high an order with 1936 as with 1932 (and
studies of the Roosevelt coalition suggest that this continued into later
elections as well).
Table IV:2 expands these presidential election correlations over the
period 1892-1936 for the seven groups for which there is data for this
entire period. This supports the above model when the relationships
between 1928 and the pre-192o elections are compared; not until as far
back as 1900 is there a coefficient as high as 1928-32/36 (although it
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comes close in 1916). Thus in terms of this important statistical measure
of association, this ethnic model points to 1928 as a ucritical election," or
as part of a critical period of voting change for the ethnic groups of
Chicago.
A couple of other points are salient here. First, there is considerable
consistency in waxing and waning of the Democratic vote of the seven
groups over this forty-four-year period. Almost every election correlates
significantly (i.e., over +.75) with every other, and there are no negative
correlations. The major exception to this generalization is a second point
of interest: the progressive era elections of 19°4-19°8-1912, which
comprise a block that correlates relatively less highly with the rest. This is
especially true of 1912, where Roosevelt's third-party popularity certainly
affected general voting patterns. But while these elections are interesting
they cannot be described as critical, since they had no long-term effects, as
seen by the high order of correlation between the elections before 1908
and those after 1912.
Table IV: 3 concentrates again on the 1920S and adds to presidential
elections the top contest in off-years, so that the measure is biennial and
1 v. O. Key, Jr., UA Theory of Critical Elections," Journal of Politics 17 (Feb.
1955); Duncan MacRae and James A. Meldrum, "Critical Elections in Illinois,
1888-1958," American Political Science Review 54 (Sept. 1960); John L.
Shover, "Was 1928 a Critical Election in California?" Pacific Northwest Quart-
erly 58 (Oct. 1967); Bruce M. Stave, uThe cLa Follette Revolution' and the
Pittsburgh Vote, 1932," Mid-America 49 (Oct. 1967).
2 Pearson's 1', or the product-moment correlation is one of the most useful and
popular of the correlation coefficients and is ideal for the kind of data used here,
where all variables are interval in nature. The coefficient in fact measures the
amount of spread around a linear least-squares equation and indicates the
strength of a relationship between two variables (in this chapter: voting Demo-
cratic in one election and voting Democratic in another, for ethnic groups).
Pearson's 1', like other correlation coefficients, is a measure of relationship and not
of causation. It varies between - 1 (perfect negative correlation) and +1
(perfect positive correlation). It is most simply expressed by the formula:
N};XY - (};X)(};Y)
r = -V-;:::[N===};X===2=-=(;::::};=X:;::::)2::;::;][;:=:N:;::::};=Y=2=_=(:;=::::;};=Y:;::::)2]
Calculations of Pearson's l' throughout this book were done on an Underwood-
Olivetti Programma desktop computer, using the program instructions provided
by the manufacturer. See Hubert M. Blalock, Social Statistics (New York, 1960),
pp. 285-92, and Richard Jensen, "Methods of Statistical Association for Histor-
ical Research," Mimeo. (St. Louis, Mo., 1968), pp. 8-14.
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TABLE IV:1 Coefficients of Correlation of Presidential
Elections, 1920-1936, for Nine Ethnic Groups*
1920
1924
1928
1932
1936
1920 1924
.99
1928
.82
.84
1932
.69
.72
.95
1936
.65
.71
.95
.96
*Calculations of Pearson's ~ for percentage Democratic
of vote of each of nine ethnic groups for each election with
each other election. For clarity only one side of table is
given, since the two sides are identical.
relates different types of elections to one another. This does confuse the
picture somewhat, especially since 1928 correlates at a higher order with
the off-year elections of 1926 and 1922 than that of 1930, contrary to
expectations, especially since 1930 has a high order correlation with
1932. On the other hand, though, there is a near-perfect relationship
between 1928 and 1934. There is no ready explanation for these figures,
except to note that the constituencies and situations of off-year elections
are not the same as those of presidential years and that we are probably
on firmer footing when we compare elections of the same type. For
example, with the exception of 1930 (where the contest pitted a male
against a female for the United States Senate, a quite unusual situation),
every off-year election correlates at .90 or higher with every other off-year
election, while the relationship to presidential elections is generally
lower, until 1928, which has an overall closer relationship to off-year
Democratic voting than any other presidential election of the time.
Correlation coefficients can be used to illuminate the La Follette
phenomenon of 1924, particularly to determine whether levels of La
Follette voting bear any relationship to Democratic voting among the
nine ethnic groups. The coefficients are: 1918: .09; 1920: -.19; 1922:
TABLE IV:2 Coefficients of Correlation of Presidential Elections, 1892-1936, for
Seven Ethnic Groups*
1892 1896 1900 1904 1908 1912 1916 1920 1924 1928 1932 1936
- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
1892
-
.96 .98 .79 .87 .74 .93 .90 .94 .94 .87 .88
1896 - .95 .85 .85 .75 .83 .92 .94 .83 .73 .73
1900
-
.73 .82 .76 .93 .90 .94 .95 .83 .87
1904 - .94 .82 .72 .60 .67 .61 .61 .61
1908 - .90 .88 .64 .73 .75 .76 .80
1912
-
.83 .52 .67 .62 .53 .66
1916 - .73 .84 .92 .86 .95
1920 - .99 .82 .69 .65
1924
-
.84 .72 .71
1928
-
.95·
.95
1932
-
.96
1936
*Ca1culations of Pearson's r for percentage Democratic vote of each of seven ethnic
groups for each election with ea~h other election. For clarity only one side of table
is given, since the two sides are identical.
TABLE IV:3 Coefficients of Correlation of National/State Elections, 1918-1936, for
Nine Ethnic Groups*
1918 1920 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 1936
- -- -- -- -- -- -- -
1918 - .87 .94 .90 .93 .95 .71 .87 .93 .88
1920
- .94 .99 .80 .82 .53 .69 .81 .65
1922
-
.95 .91 .94 .71 .86 .93 .83
1924
-
.84 .84 .54 .72 .85 .71
1926 - .93 .84 .91 .94 .88
1928
-
.81 .95 .99 .95
1930
-
.94 .77 .84
1932
-
.92 .95
1934 - .94
1936
--
*Calculations of Pearson's ~ for percentage Democratic of vote of each of nine
ethnic groups for each election with each other election. For clarity only one side
of table is given, since the two sides are identical.
Measures of Voting Behavior 6.5
TABLE IV:4 Coefficients of Correlation of
Mayoral Elections, 1919-1931,
for Nine Ethnic Groups*
1919
1923
1927
1931
1919 1923
.75
1927
.87
.64
1931
.72
.35
.89
*Ca1cu1ations of Pearson's £ for percentage
Democratic of vote of nine ethnic groups for each
election with each other •
.08; 1924: -.18; 1926: .32; 1928: .31; 1930: .62; 1932: .46. The
answer is negative; there are no statistically significant relationships
between Democratic voting among the nine ethnic groups and voting for
La Follette in 1924. The increasing high order after 1924 is suggestive,
but the figures are too small to merit any conclusions about meaningful
relationships between voting for La Follette in 1924 and voting Demo-
cratic in any ensuing election. This again would tend to deny that the La
Follette candidacy was important in breaking the ethnic groups as a
whole out of the Democratic party; it does not deny, however, that this
might have applied to individual groups.
Finally, the coefficient of correlation for the seven groups voting for
Roosevelt in 1912 and La Follette in 1924 is -.25, both statistically
insignificant and negative. In the ethnic model, and to Chicago's ethnics,
the Progressive movements of 1912 and 1924 were totally unrelated.
Tables IV:4 and IV:S, which deal with the relationships of mayoral
elections to one another and to presidential elections, show perhaps most
clearly the difficulty of comparing different types of elections with one
another. Table IV:4 gives the coefficients for the four mayoral elections
of 1919-1931 with one another, in terms of percentage Democratic of
the vote of the nine ethnic groups. The highest order correlations are
66 A House for all Peoples
TABLE IV:5 Coefficients of Correlation of Mayoral with
Presidential Elections, 1919-1932, for Nine
Ethnic Groups*
Presidential Elections
1920 1924 1928 1932
1919 .90 .90 .91 .82
U)
Q.)
°rl 1923 .86 .91 .74 .53+J
M
C'd
~ 1927 .84 .85 .90 .920
C'd
~ 1931 .59 .60 .79 .91
*Calcu1ations of Pearson's r for percentage Democratic
of vote of nine ethnic groups for each mayoralty with each
presidential election.
between the various elections when William Hale Thompson ran as the
Republican candidate: 1919, 1927, and 1931; although between the first
and last of these the correlation is not quite significant. The table does
suggest that the ethnics tended to vote similarly when Thompson was a
candidate in a mayoralty. It also points to the unusual character of the
1923 campaign. Beyond this, the data do not indicate much; mayoral
elections were on the whole less closely related to one another than state
and national contests.
Table IV: 5 seeks relationships in Democratic voting for the nine
groups between mayoral and presidential elections. It suggests nothing
spectacular, but does reinforce the logical assumption that mayoral results
are nearer in nature to the presidential elections closest to them in time.
The 1931 mayoral Democratic vote correlates at a higher order with the
1928 and 1932 presidential elections than with the earlier ones. Even the
.79 correlation between 1928 and 1931 indicates that Democratic voting
for Al Smith in 1928 uexplains" 62 percent of the ethnic vote for
Cermak in 1931. Although the high order 1928-1919 correlation fuzzes
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the pattern, the data to a degree do supplement my previous conclusions
about the change effected by 1928; the pattern is by no means indisput-
able, however.
In addition to correlation coefficients, which measure association be-
tween pairs of elections, a couple of other measures can be used to
indicate the extent of agreement between and within ethnic groups for
each election. To say, for example, that the ethnics voted 57 percent
Democratic for president in 1932 infers two things: I) this is a mean, the
arithmetic average of the Democratic vote of each group divided by the
number of groups; and 2) the percentage Democratic for each individual
group is also a mean, the arithmetic average of the Democratic vote of
the sample areas for each group. These means are standard measures of
central tendency; it is also worthwhile to look into measures of disper-
sion.
The range between the voting of the various groups is an example of
such dispersion. Some groups were consistently more Republican and
some more Democratic, and changes in this measure could be significant.
This can be regularized by using the standard deviation, which is the most
widely used measure of dispersion and one quite well suited to these data.
The intuitive meaning of the standard deviation's numerical expression is
not too important here; it can be used as an abstract number, which is a
function of the range, which makes for ready comparisons of one election
to another.3 What is important is that the smaller the standard deviation
(s), the less the dispersion, or greater the agreement, between voting
units.
3 The standard deviation (s) is defined as the square root of the arithmetic
mean of the squared deviations of each score from the mean. It can be expressed
algebraically as follows:
s = ~~~2 _ X2
While extreme values can give a misleadingly high s, the picture is less distorted
and more useful than its alternatives. In conjunction with the means, given in
Chapter 3 and the Appendix, s provides much useful information. Calculations of
s were done on an Underwood-Olivetti Programma desktop computer, using the
program instructions provided by the manufacturer. See Blalock, Sociat Statistics,
PP·67-7 0 •
TABLE IV:6 Standard Deviation for Ethnic Group DelOOcratic voting,
1890-1936
s for all ~ for five recent
Election -groups* immigrant groups
1890: State Treasurer 10.0
1892: President 9.7
1894: State Treasurer 7.2
1896: President 8.1
1898: State Treasurer 8.2
1900: President 10.0
1902: State Treasurer 9.7
1904: President 6.8
1906: State Treasurer 11.4
1908: President 8.9
1910: State Treasurer 14.3
1912: President 5.0
1914: Senator 15.4
1916: President 17.7
1918: Senator 15.8 8.5
1920: President 14.6 11.8
1922: State Treasurer 18.0 14.5
1924: President 12.4 10.6
1926: Senator 15.2 11.8
1928: President 18.0 9.2
1930: Senator 20.0 8.8
1932: President 20.0 9.4
1934: State Treasurer 17.6 11.4
1936: President 14.8 4.9
TABLE IV:6 (continued) :
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Election
MAYORALTIES:
s for all
-groups*
~ for five recent
immigrant groups
1891
1893
1895
1897
1899
1901
1903
1905
1907
1911
1915
1919
1923
1927
1931
8.7
9.6
7.6
9.4
7.2
9.1
7.9
10.6
11.2
8.4
11.7
17.5 8.5
15.8 12.1
15.6 10.1
18.6 13.4
*Computed for seven ethnic groups, 1890-1916, and for nine ethnic
groups, 1918-1936; s computed for the Democratic vote percentage of each
of the groups per election.
TABLE IV:7 Standard Deviations of Democratic Vote of Individual Ethnic Groups, 1918-1936*
CI)
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- -- -- -
1918: Senator 6.4 12.6 17.6 12.1 11.0 15.5 11.6 7.0 16.0
1920: President 9.3 18.2 15.5 4.0 4.7 6.6 9.7 2.9 8.2
1922: St. Treas. 8.0 18.0 16.7 8.5 3.6 22.3 9.8 13.8 14.7
1924: President 9.0 14.6 12.8 7.0 19.8 8.4 8.3 11.5 3.5
1926: Senator 5.6 17.9 18.2 3.8 6.2 19.1 9.4 16.5 10.3
1928: President 4.2 10.4 9.5 5.8 7.6 22.8 7.6 8.5 6.4
1930: Senator 2.9 6.8 11.4 14.6 10.8 5.4 8.4 4.7 8.8
1932: President 1.9 5.6 10.2 6.6 3.3 14.4 6.0 3.2 6.2
1934: St. Treas. 7.1 6.3 10.2 5.0 4.8 7.4 5.7 6.6 11.2
1936: President 1.5 2.9 6.7 1.2 2.9 8.5 9.9 5.3 5.5
MAYORALTIES:
1919
1923
1927
1931
6.4
12.5
6.3
5.5
18.9
18.4
9.1
8.3
12.3
12.3
13.3
7.0
5.6
7.5
5.5
1.0
5.4
7.4
8.8
8.0
20.4 11.4
24.1 12.5
22.4 14.6
11.7· 8.0
6.6
22.0
16."7
15.2
14.2
17.3
3.6
f? '-3
*Three areas (Czech El, Polish El, and Jewish Cl~see Appendix) were excluded
from computation because they are not usable for the entire eighteen years and thus
would throw calculations off if used here. .
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Table IV:6 gives s for the voting of the ethnic groups I890-I936,
plus s for the five recent immigrant groups (excluding Germans, Swedes,
Jews, and Negroes from the computation) for I9I8-I936. The figures
for all groups do indicate the elections where the greatest changes seem, to
have taken place: disagreement increases and dispersion is greater. Thus s
for state and national elections tends to be higher in the period
I9I8-I932 than in the prewar period; and within the former period s is
at its highest in I928-I932. This is logical, since it was at this time that
most groups were greatly increasing their Democratic vote, pulling away
from more Republican groups such as the Negroes and Swedes.
For this reason I have separately computed s for the five newer immi-
grant groups for I9I8-I936. Here there is a drawing together in the
later elections for national office. Interestingly, s is lower for I928 than
for any other presidential election of the period through I932; the Smith
election served to draw recent immigrants closer together in their voting
behavior. So if I928 and succeeding elections saw increased voting
division between ethnic groups as a whole, they also saw increased voting
agreement between the newer immigrant groups on whose allegiance the
New Deal coalition would be built.
The s pattern in local elections is less clear. Again, s does increase
over time, and there is a direct similarity to the national election picture
of I928-1932 in the I93I mayoralty, where ethnic Democratic voting
and s both reach new highs. This tends to support our data and assump-
tions in Chapter 3. But the figures for s of recent immigrant groups only
do not decrease as might be expected; this reflects the strength of
Republican ««Big Bill" Thompson's hold on some newer immigrants, espe-
cially the Italians, all the way through the I931 election.
Our dispersion measure can be carried to a more intensive expression
by showing s for each individual ethnic group's Democratic voting. This
is done in Table IV:7. These figures give the dispersion in Democratic
voting between the several areas that make up the sample for each group.
Generated here is a considerable increase in data. The figures are useful
both to illuminate voting agreement over time of each group, and to
permit a more ready remanipulation of the data by those who would care
to do so.
For the five newer immigrant groups, I928 does see more agreement
within groups than was usual in the decade preceding it, thus reinforcing
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my conclusion from Table IV:6. This is also true for Jews. But quite the
contrary prevails among the Germans, suggesting that the great increase
in German Democratic voting in 1928 came from only parts of the
German-American community; the difference was socioeconomic, and
perhaps also religious. By and large s continued to diminish after 1928,
particularly in presidential years. Indeed, several of the groups show con-
sistently higher s in off-year elections. This does not necessarily suggest
that such elections were more controversial; rather, interest was often
considerably less, and interest groups less active, so that constituencies
likely varied in off-year elections. This points again to the difficulty of
comparing different kinds of elections.
The mayoralties show a general decrease in s over time, especially in
comparing 1931 to its predecessors. Thus while the 1931 mayoralty did
not diminish intergroup dispersion among recent immigrant groups
(Table IV:6), it did see a real decrease in intragroup dispersion and in
that respect corresponds to the national/state elections of 1928-1932.
Overall, then, it shows further support for the contention that the period
of increased Democratic voting starting with 1928 was also a period of
increasing agreement both within and between ethnic groups, particularly
the recent immigrants.
Another way of seeking the same kind of information found with
standard deviations is through the use of a success score or measure of
cohesion. Table IV:8 is based on the Rice Index of Cohesion, a very
convenient and straightforward measure of agreement/disagreement. C
(cohesion) is computed by subtracting the number of areas with a
Democratic majority (plurality in cases of the three-party race of 1924)
from those with a Republican majority (or vice versa, whichever yields a
positive result) and dividing the result by the total number of areas. The
index produces a number between zero and one, wherein a score of one
would mean that all the areas voted the same way. We thus have either a
Democratic or a Republican C, in an index which portrays very simply
the extent of agreement of more than forty areas (precincts and groups
of precincts) which comprise the sample of the nine ethnic groups.4
4 The Rice Index of Cohesion, as used here, is by no means a perfect measure,
since I have engaged in no weighting to compensate for the fact that there are
more areas for some ethnic groups than for others. Thus Poles (seven areas) will
have more weight in the index than Yugoslavs (three areas). But since I am
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TABLE IV:8 Rice Index of Cohesion for Voting of Nine Ethnic Groups,
1918-1936*
Number of Number of Index and
Democratic Republican party of
Election areas areas cohesion
1918: Senator 30 11 .46 Democratic
1920: President 7 34 .66 Republican
1922: State Treasurer 22 21 .02 Democratic
1924: President 10 33 .54 Republican
1926: Senator 27 17 .23 Democratic
1928: President 29 15 .32 Democratic
1930: Senator 39 5 .77 Democratic
1932: President 37 7 .68 Democratic
1934: State Treasurer 35 9 .59 Democratic
1936: President 39 5 .77 Democratic
MAYORALTIES:
1919 24 17 .17 Democratic
1923 31 12 .44 Democratic
1927 19 25 .14 Republican
1931 31 13 .41 Democratic
*Tota1 number of areas varies from 41 to 44 because of three areas which
are added to sample during the period.
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Unfortunately, methodological limitations on the data for 1890-1916
preclude their inclusion in this measure; but this index can be used to
make another inquiry into the 1918-1936 period.
The data in Table IV:8 are self-explanatory. They reinforce the
conclusions of my other measures and are particularly congruent with the
percentage figures in Chapter 3. The data indicate the fairly high wartime
Democratic support, followed by strong Republican cohesion in the early
1920S. The cohesion index does indicate the questionable nature of
stressing 1928 as a sole turning point, although-as with percentage
figures-1928 does end the cycle of off-year Democratic voting followed
by presidential-year Republican voting. This points to a critical period of
voting change, wherein 1928 plays the single largest role. And if this
measure points somewhat less to the influence of 1928 than others do, it
also points somewhat more to the influence of the 1931 mayoralty in
bringing local ethnic voting behavior into line with state and national.
My main concern, obviously, is with the extent of congruence of the
several measures, and this is reasonably clear.
using the index for comparisons within the same data, and the universe remains
the same, the measure is certainly valid. See Jensen, CCMethods of Statistical
Association," p. 65.
v. Ethnic Group
Party Identification
Voting returns comprise the best but not the only data source for studying
changes in political behavior among ethnic groups. Party membership or
identification of the ethnic masses and their leaders is another significant
indicator. Did ethnic attachments to political parties, either in terms of
mass party identification or that of group political leaders, change from
1920 to 1932? Were those changes consistent with changes in voting
behavior?
Registration records provide information about party identification.
In 1928 and thereafter Chicago had closed primaries; voters were obliged
to register in advance and declare their party membership in order to vote
in the primary. Here, then, was a positive act, a commitment, on the part
of the voter, and a definite indication of his party identification. Unfortu-
nately, we are obliged to use a less exact measure prior to 1928.1.
The major difference between ethnic voting returns and data on party
identification is that according to the latter the ethnic switch to the
Democratic party came later and was less dramatic. Thus while only the
Negroes-and, in part, the Swedes-delivered Republican voting majori-
ties in 1932, these two groups and two others still had Republican
registration majorities in that year.
There was a reasonably strong similarity between a group's voting
and its party identification (see Table V: 1). The newer immigrants
were more Democratic in both; and those groups which voted most
Democratic were also most Democratic in party identification. The Lith-
uanians, for example, showed strong Democratic identification from 1918
to I924-more than 67 percent in each year. But they were the only
group with Democratic identification majorities over all five elections to
1924. The Czechs and Poles, predictably, were next most Democratic, but
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neither showed Democratic majorities in 1920. The Italians were Demo-
cratic in 1918 and 1919, but then switched dramatically. And the Yugo-
slavs were strongly Republican throughout.
Generally, newer immigrant Democratic identification, like voting,
decreased steadily in the early 1920S. Thus highs in Republican voting
and identification occurred at the same time many newer immigrants
were just starting to vote, and many were beginning their participation in
American politics with Republican allegiances. By the primary of 1927
all the newer immigrant groups (indeed, all ethnic groups) showed
Republican identification majorities. The Czechs, Lithuanians, and Poles
were above 40 percent Democratic then, and the Yugoslavs and Italians
were well below. In the spring of 1928 (the first year for which the data
become more accurate) every group except the Czechs fell even further
in Democratic party identification. Thus, on the eve of their major voting
shift into the Democratic party, Chicago's newer immigrants reached
new lows in terms of identification with that party. This makes the 1928
pro-Democratic switch even more impressive.
The 1928 election produced some change in this: total percentage
strength of newer immigrant Democratic registration rose thirty-three
points in the 1930 primary. Even so, only the Czechs showed Democratic
majorities at that time. The election of 1930, despite the highest Demo-
1 The City of Chicago was not completely consistent in the way it kept its
records during this period. Through the election of 1927, the official election
returns for primaries did not list the number in each ward and precinct registered
in each party; rather, they listed the total number voting in each primary contest.
This is not as accurate a figure as the total registered (which was given from the
1928 primary on), but represents what was generally the same thing, so is being
used. However, data from 1928 on are clearly more reliable. Both of these figures,
but particularly the former, were affected by the amount of interest in a given
primary election, and since Democratic primaries during the period tended to be
cut-and-dried affairs, while Republican factionalism made their primaries always
hotly contested, there is a certain prejudicing of the data in favor of unrepresenta-
tively high Republican party membership on the part of all ethnics. I decided to
use these data despite these qualifications, because they do have value for our
understanding of developing party membership; it is necessary only to remember
that this is another of the indicators for ethnic political behavior, and that since it
is one of many, we are less likely to be misled by it. Furthermore, its innate
prejudice toward indicating Republican membership will serve to give my
conclusions about the development of the Democratic consensus the added weight
of conservatism. I use the term identification rather than membership because
prior to 1928 I do not really have membership data.
TABLE V:l Ethnic Party Identification, 1918-1932 (Percentage Democratic of declared
members of the two major parties*)
Group 1918 1919 1920 1923 1924 1927 1928 ~930 1931 1932
-- -- -- -- -- -
Czechs 81 62 39 62 58 41 50.4 60 69 72
Poles 63 53 47 56 55 46 39 41 40 64
Lithuanians 81 81 68 78 69 46 46 45 36 65
Yugoslavs 37 35 15 27 34 22 13 15 26 38
Italians 71 62 38 34 39 22 15 35 29 46
Germans 50.1 54 30 28 31 19 16 30 29 59
Swedes 27 25 14 21 23 21 12 16 16 32
Jews 43 37 22 38 39 37 29 36 50.4 67
Negroes 25 22 11 13 12 5 8 11 12 23
Native-
Americans 38 26 27 26 25 21 16 21 16 36
*Party membership calculated on basis of: total number voting in relevant primary con-
test, 1918 to 1927, inclusive; total number of names on poll book (i.e., number of declared
party members), 1928 to 1932. Source: Official election returns, City of Chicago.
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cratic vote of the period, did not produce increased newer immigrant
Democratic registration (three groups decreased and two increased in the
1931 primary). But the 1931 mayoralty, and the accession of the Demo-
crats to power locally, was very effective: percentage strength of newer
immigrant Democratic identification rose among all five groups, a total
of eighty-five points, in the 1932 primary. The Czechs, Poles, and Lith-
uanians now showed strong Democratic majorities, while the Italians and
Yugoslavs, despite large Democratic increases, were still Republican.
Two conclusions emerge from this data. First, growing newer immi-
grant Democratic party identification was created not by anyone election,
but rather by the cumulative effect of the several general elections
starting with 1928. The 1928 national and 1931 local elections were
particularly successful in producing increased Democratic registrations.
Second, the large Democratic voting majorities given by the ethnics in the
1928, 1930, and 193 I elections did not immediately translate themselves
into majorities in party identification. The cumulative effect just noted
and the passage of time were necessary before the newer immigrants
were persuaded that they were not simply Democratic voters, but were
Democrats as well. The idea of a critical period of political change, rather
than a single election, is thus reinforced.
Party identification among the older immigrants and the Jews was
roughly similar to that among newer immigrants, although a little closer
to voting behavior. The Germans were barely Democratic in 1918 and
1919, and then clearly Republican until 1932-the same pattern as
their voting except that the Democratic voting shift preceded the registra-
tion shift by four years. The Swedes were strongly Republican through-
out, but they, too, increased their Democratic registration in 1932, just as
their Democratic voting increased in the same year. And the Jews were
firmly Republican until 1931, when they showed a slight Democratic
registration majority, which jumped further in 1932.
The older immigrants also reached a low point in Democratic
identification in the spring of 1928 and then began to rise. The 1928
election led to a percentage strength Democratic increase of eighteen
points. As with the newer immigrants, this decreased after the 1930
election (one point), but then jumped after the 1931 mayoralty by
forty-six points, so that in the spring of 1932 two of the three groups had
Democratic registration majorities. The Jews varied slightly: their Demo-
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cratic registration did not decrease in 1931, but continued its steady
increase, thus showing the best example of the cumulative effect on party
identification. And in party identification, as in voting, the Jews and
Germans made very clear and dramatic shifts.
This party identification measure denies any profound effect by the La
Follette candidacy on party loyalties of the most pro-La Follette groups.
Germans, for example, were 31 percent Democratic in the 1924 primary
and this decreased to 19 percent in 1927 and to 16 percent in 1928. And
Jewish Democratic identification also decreased during the same period,
although to a lesser extent. Thus while the La Follette candidacy did
serve to make 1928 Democratic voting easier for Germans and Jews, it
did not have any immediate effect on their party identification. They
seemed content to remain renegade Republicans until the cumulative
effect of several Democratic voting experiences resulted at last in their
identifying with the Democratic party.
The same general conclusions about party identification apply to the
older immigrants and Jews as to the newer immigrants. This is true also
of the Negroes, whose party identification closely reflected their voting.
Never did Negro Democratic identification exceed 25 percent, and it fell
as low as 5 percent in the middle of the decade. The increase to 23
percent by 1932 still left Negro party identification overwhelmingly
Republican.
Like the ethnic voter, the ethnic press could well U vote" for candi-
dates of one party while identifying with the other. The extent to which
the ethnic press identified with, or felt it belonged to, one major party or
the other will serve as a further indication of ethnic party allegiance.
Ethnic newspapers often considered themselves basically nonpartisan,
and to second-guess them is not easy. Issues and personalities do not
concern us here. We are interested in press identification with the party,
as party, apart from issues or candidates. Ethnic press party identification
will also contribute to understanding the pictures of the two parties
which ethnics, or their influentials, had over time.
The Polish press reflected Polish voting behavior, if not Polish party
registration, in consistently seeing the Democratic party as the party of
the Poles. At the start of the period the Dziennik Chicagoski was
issue-oriented rather than party-oriented, but by the mid-1920s its identi-
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fication with the Democrats was strong. At the time of the 1923 mayor-
alty, it saw the Democratic party as the only upopular" one and in 1924
identified it generally with tta better living for the future."2 Similarly, in
the same year a Republican Polish politician ruefully acknowledged that
most Poles identified with the Democratic party.s This continued into
1928, 1930, and 1932, with the paper supporting the entire Democratic
ticket in each election and endorsing the Democratic side of every issue.4
The most politically interested representative of the Polish press,
then, did identify strongly with the Democrats. This did not, however,
denote change, since the same was true in 1920 as in 1932. The same
consistently Democratic identification was probably true for the Czech
press as well-it seemed generally to see the Democratic party as uours."
Other Slavic groups were similar; in fact, by the end of the period, the
large Slavic Alliance of America was virtually a Democratic appendage.5
The case of the Italians was somewhat different, in that the basic
identification of the press remained Republican. As Italian party identifi-
cation stayed Republican while Italian voting became more Democratic
from 1928 on, the Italian press agreed with the former rather than the
latter. La Tribuna Italiana Trans-Atlantica demonstrated a strong emo-
tional Republicanism at the beginning of the period, in 1918. Many
issues were debated, some of them real and some imagined (Senator
James H. Lewis's Hpartisan opposition to McKinley and the Spanish-
American War"), but basically it was a case of devotion to the uglorious
past" of the Republican party.6 This identification continued into 1919
and 1920, for L'Italia as well as La Tribuna. For both papers only the
Republican party had virtues and qualified as the Italians' political home;
as L'Italia put it, a Republican vote in 1920 was a Hduty to party.,,1
This allegiance continued into the mid-192os. For example, La Tri-
buna, which really ignored the 1924 campaign, at the last moment
simply reassured Italian voters that even though Calvin Coolidge looked
2 Dziennik Chicagoski, Mar. 30, 1923, p. I; Nov. 4, 1924, p. I.
S Chicago Tl'ibune, Sept. 24, 1924, p. I; Nov. I, 1924, p. 2.
4 Dziennik Chicagoski, Nov. 5, 1928, p. Iff.; Oct. 21, 30, and 31, 1930, p. I;
~ov. 2, I932,pp.2,5.
5 ]ugoslavenski Glasnik, 31:14 (April 2, 1936), WPA. Also: Denni Hlasa-
tel, April I, 1923, WPA; Osadne Hlasy, Oct. 17, 1930, WPA.
6 La Tl'ibuna Italiana Tl'ans-Atlantica, Nov. 2, 1918, p. I.
1 Ibid., Oct. 9, 1920, p. 7; L'Italia, Mar. 30, 1919, p. I; Oct. 31, 1920, p. I;
Sept. 21, 1920, WPA.
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like a tltpuritan," they should continue to support the Republican party,
and that was all.s L'Italia told Italian voters that the Progressive party
existed only U to place a stick in the wheels of the national party.,,9 The
fact that the editor did not feel it necessary to put uRepublican" after
CCnational" demonstrates that he thought in Republican terms. And in the
1927 mayoralty, L'Italia endorsed Thompson in the process of being
ttfaithful to our Republican program.,,10 Similarly, the attractiveness of Al
Smith in 1928 did not really mean that Italians had changed their party
identification. When L'Italia shattered precedent by not endorsing the
Republican presidential candidate, it nonetheless supported all other
Republican candidates, and its owner personally supported Hoover as
well.11 The same sentiment was expressed by La Tribuna two years later;
in supporting an Italian Democrat for Congress it made it clear that this
did not mean any shift in basic party loyalty.12
The German press, like its readers, was more politically sophisticated
and issue-oriented, and therefore its party identification is less clear. Its
consistent support of Democrats at the end of the period, contrasted to its
generally Republican leaning earlier, does indicate that the German press
agreed with its readership in its conception of the two major parties.13
The Swedish press and Scandinavian opinion leaders demonstrated a
more determined emotional attachment to party, and this, of course, was
Republican. The Dovre Club, the leading Norwegian-American organiza-
tion, and the John Ericsson League, its near-equivalent among the
Swedes, were both virtual appendages of the Republican party. This
phenomenon went back to the late nineteenth century.14 Both organiza-
8 La T1'ibuna ltaliana T1'ans-Atlantica, Oct. I I, 1924, p. 2.
9 L'ltalia, Nov. 2, 1924, p. I.
10 Ibid., April 3, 1927, p. I.
11 Ibid., Nov. 4, 1928, p. I; La T'1'ibuna ltaliana T1'ans-Atlantica, Nov. 3,
1928, p. 7; Mrs. Oscar Durante, personal interview.
12 La T1'ibuna Italiana T'1'ans-Atlantica, Nov. II, 1930, p. I. Unfortunately,
neither paper could be located for 1932. L'ltalia did remain Republican in that
election, however; Mrs. Oscar Durante, personal interview.
13 See Abendpost, Nov. 3, 1929, WPA; Nov. 7, 1932, p. I; Nov. 3, 1934,
WPA.
14 Gustave E. Johnson, uThe Swedes of Chicago" (Ph.D. diss., University of
Chicago, 1940), pp. 39-43 and 53-54. The 1910 constitution of the Dovre
Club stated that its object would be U to inculcate the political principles on which
the Republican Party is founded" (Birger Osland, A Long Pull f1'om Stavange'1'
[Northfield, Minn., I945), p. 48).
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tions were issue-oriented, supporting the progressive wing of the Republi-
can party, but when this wing did not prevail they still remained Republi-
can.15 Similarly, the Svenska-Tribunen-Nyheter preferred La Follette to
Coolidge in 1924, but endorsed the latter out of a desire to maintain
Republican party strength; the John Ericsson League agreed.16
The limited Swedish leaning to Smith in 1928 was personal and not
partisan in nature. When the owner of Svenska-Tribunen-Nyheter (but
not his paper) endorsed and worked for Al Smith, it seemed to the other
leading Swedish paper, Svenska-Kuriren, that something really dismaying
had taken place.17 This view of the Republican party as the Swede's party
continued through 1932. As one student of the group put it in 1940,
ttThe story of the Swedes in politics [in Chicago] is the story of loyalty to
the Republican Party.,,18
The dramatic change in Jewish voting and party membership from
1928 to 1932 was not reflected in the Yiddish press, since the Democratic
Courier and Socialist Forward maintained consistent party identifications
from the start of the period to its end. As the Courier believed in 1924
(ttThe Democratic Party has always been and we hope always will be the
torchbearer of true liberalism"), so too did it believe in 1932.19 And the
Forward was likewise consistent in its disdain for all capitalist parties.
Jewish opinion leaders, however, did follow the trend of Jewish
voting and party identification. And the more conservative and issue-
oriented German Jews began, after 1928, to join the newer immigrant
Jews in identifying with the Democratic party.20
15 Thus the Dovre Club worked mightily to defeat Thompson in the 1919
Republican primary, but endorsed him when he got the nomination (Skandi.
naven, Sept. 12, 1920, WPA; Scandia, Mar. 8, 1919, WPA). This tendency
changed somewhat in later elections, in that the animosity of the urespectables" to
the Thompson-Small organization became so great that they would sometimes
endorse Democrats, as in 1924, which was the first time in thirty years that the
Dovre Club supported any Democrat (Chicago Tribune, Oct. 8, 192 4, p. 4; Oct.
21, 1924, p. 6; Oct. 28, 1924, p. 4).
16 Renel G. Hemdahl, UThe Swedes in Illinois Politics: An Immigrant Group
in an American Political Setting" (Ph. D. diss., Northwestern University, 1932),
p. 435; Chicago Tribune, Oct. 21, 1924, p. 6.
17 Johnson, cCThe Swedes of Chicago," pp. 53-54.
18 Ibid., pp. 54, 103.
19 Chicago Jewish Courier, Oct. 29, 1924, p. 8; Nov. 4, 1932, p. 8.
20 Dr. Louis L. Mann, personal interview; see also M. R. Werner, J_lius
Rosenwald: The Life of a p,.actical Humanitarian (New York, 1939), passim.
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Party identification in the Negro press and among Negro opinion
leaders complemented the voting and identification of the mass of Ne-
groes, in firm adherence to the Republican party. Despite occasional
attraction to Democratic candidates and issues, this did not really waver.
In 1920 the Defender said that uthe Democrats have frankly told us that
we are not wanted.,,21 And its 1928 support of Smith was strictly personal
and not partisan.22 It was not really surprising in 1930, when Mayor
Thompson supported the Democratic candidate for the Senate, that
Negro political leader Oscar De Priest called him a usick man" for
expecting Negroes to do likewise.23 And in 1932 the Defender felt just
about the same as it had in 1920: HEvery right we enjoy in this country
was bestowed upon us by the Republican Party.,,24
Further indications of ethnic political allegiance exist at the party
leadership level. The proportions of ethnic candidates and officeholders in
the two major parties at chosen points in time indicate whether ethnic
political leaders remained within the same party or made a shift similar to
that of their constituents. This points not only to which party ethnic
political leaders felt would prevail but also which they felt commanded
the allegiance of their own strongest supporters, the members of their
respective groups.
The party allegiance of ethnic political leaders is as well a cause as an
indicator of political change (see Chapter 8). Here, however, we are
interested only in the latter, effective aspect of the phenomenon.
Through listing the names of candidates in the ten elections studied
and tagging the applicable names with one of five ethnicities (German,
Scandinavian, Italian, Jewish, Slavic), we arrive at a quantitative measure
of ethnic party leadership. The same procedure was followed for everyone
to hold the post of ward committeeman (party leader at the ward level,
an elective position) during the same period. Tables V:2 and V:3
summarize these data.25
21 Chicago De/ende,., Oct. 30, 1920, p. 12.
22 Ibid., Nov. 3, 1928, Pt. 2, p. 2.
28 Chicago T"ibune, Oct. 27, 1930, p. 8.
24 Chicago Defende", Nov. 5, 1932, p. Iff.
25 This includes most candidates for most offices, but not all of them.
Particularly to be missed are precinct captains, whose names were not available,
and aldermen (members of the city council, one elected from each ward), who
TABLE V:2 Ethnic Composition of Party Slates, 1918-1932 (Number of candidates;
D = Democratic; R = Republican)
Election
year and German Scandinavian Italian Jewish Slavic Total
no. of
contests D R D R D R D R D R D R
---
1918: 58 5 4 0 3 1 1 2 1 6 5 14 11
1919: 41 7 5 1 1 1 0 1 2 5 7 15 15
1920: 50 6 10 0 5 1 1 4 3 2 1 13 20
1923: 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
1924: 46 6 8 2 4 0 1 2 0 4 1 14 14
1927: 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1
1928: 33 3 7 0 8 2 0 1 1 4 1 10 17
1930: 57 9 13 0 3 2 2 3 1 6 2 20 21
1931: 4 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 1
1932: 61 5 5 0 2 2 4 4 4 10 3 21 18
--- --- --- ---
TOTAL 42 53 3 27 9 9 17 12 41 20 112 119
TABLE V:3 Ethnicity of Chicago Ward Committeemen, 1918-1932 (Number of ward
commi ttmen; D = Democratic; R = Republican)
Year and German Scandinavian Italian Jewish Slavic Total
no. of
committeemen D R D R D R D R D R D R
--- --- --- -
1918: 35 4 10 0 3 0 0 2 2 5 1 11 16
1919: 35 3 11 0 3 0 a 2 2 4 1 9 17
1920: 35 3 11 a 3 a a 2 2 4 1 9 17
1923: 50/35* 5 11 0 3 a 0 3 2 5 1 13 17
1924: 50/35* 6 6 0 1 a 1 3 1 5 3 14 12
1927: 50/35* 6 6 0 1 0 1 2 1 5 3 14 12
1928: 50 5 12 0 3 0 1 2 2 6 2 13 20
1930: 50 6 12 0 0 0 2 2 2 7 4 15 20
1931: 50 6 12 0 0 0 2 2 2 7 4 15 20
1932: 50 5 13 0 1 1 4 3 1 7 2 16 21
TOTAL 49 114 0 18 1 11 23 17 55 22 129 172
*Chicago was redistricted in 1921 and changed from thirty-five wards to fifty.
The Democrats immediately followed suit in terms of organization. But the Republicans
were so divided by faction at this time that they could not agree on reorganization
until 1928; thus there continued to be only thirty-five Republican Committeemen, as
opposed to fifty Democrats, from 1921 to 1928.
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The data in the two tables are not definitive. But they do not conflict
with our other measures. That is, the data on ethnic party leaders
generally complement the data on ethnic voting and party identification
and reflect the same forces in operation at the same times.
Thus among the Scandinavians, who were quite Republican through-
out on our other measures, the overwhelming majority of officeseekers
and officeholders remained within the Republican party. And the moder-
ate decrease in Scandinavian Republican voting that began in 1930 was
reflected in the diminishing number of Republican Scandinavian candi-
dates and ward committeemen at the same time. Like the Scandinavian
voters, their political leaders seemed more to be leaving the Republican
party than joining the Democratic-leaving what appeared to be a losing
cause.
The same lingering Republicanism can be seen, without late fading,
among Negro political leaders. The lack of characteristic names prevents
a quantitative study of the party affiliations of Negro candidates and
committeemen, but the overwhelming majority remained in the Republi-
can party in 1932 as in 1920. Their party change came between 1934
and 1940.
In the case of the Germans, the pattern is considerably less clear, since
German political leaders played important roles in both parties, without
major changes over time. There were greater numbers of German politi-
cal leaders in the Republican party than the Democratic, and thus they
did not reflect the same forces as 'German voters. They probably did not
feel a need to do so. As members of a well-assimilated and secure ethnic
group, such considerations were less important to German politicians
than, for example, to Polish ones; the German political leader could well
expect in 1932 to appeal to the electorate at large and thus was less
strongly reliant upon his own group than was his equivalent among the
newer immigrants.
The relatively unpredictable nature of Italian voting was well re-
flected by the fact that there were relatively few Italian politicians in the
offices studied here. At the same time, the relative Republicanism of the
could not be used since aldermanic elections after 192 I were officially nonpar-
tisan, and party membership of each alderman could not be obtained. Also, names
of candidates for the state legislature were not always available. Source: Chicago
Daily News Almanac, for the relevant years.
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Italians, among newer immigrants, was in accord with the party mem-
bership of most Italian political leaders. But the majority of Italian voters
were voting Democratic at the end of the period, and this was not
reflected in the allegiance of Italian politicians at that time.26 The voters,
then, had made their party shift ahead of their own political leadership.
The Slavic data, which include all Slavic names and thus a large
proportion of newer immigrants, are more clearly similar to the voting
of the group involved. Almost equally divided between the parties in
1918-1920, the proportion of Democratic Slavic candidates grew pro-
gressively larger. For ward committeemen, the proportion of Democratic
Slavs was greater throughout, with little change. There was a clear
similarity, then, between the party preference of Slavic voters and of
Slavic political leaders, with each reinforcing the other.
Jewish political leaders, on the other hand, were more like the
Germans. They were found in roughly equal numbers in both parties
throughout the period. There was relatively little change over time, but
what change there was, was toward the Democratic party. And larger
numbers of both candiates and ward committeemen were found, overall,
in the Democratic party than in the Republican party. Thus the political
behavior of Jewish voters and Jewish politicians was complementary.
It is significant, in considering these five ethnic categories together,
that in 1920 thirteen ethnic candidates ran on the Democratic ticket and
twenty on the Republican; and in 1932, twenty-one ran as Democrats
and eighteen as Republicans (this difference was not seen among ward
committeemen, who were much more secure in their positions). There
was, then, an overall ethnic swing to the Democratic party, similar to that
among ethnic voters; further, the swing of political leaders was again like
that of voters in tending to develop from 1928 on.
Another indicator of the same phenomenon emerges from consider-
ing the ethnicity of the ward committeemen of selected ethnic wards.
Thus if the Democratic committeeman of a Slavic ward was a Slav, while
his Republican counterpart was not, this, too, indicated ethnic party
26 This generalization would have to be somewhat qualified had it been
practicable to include all candidates in these tables. In lesser offices, for example
the Illinois state legislature, the Italians were becoming more and more repre-
sented in the Democratic party by about 1930. Another factor of importance
here is the role of organized crime as a political control, especially on the
Italians. Some illumination on this point will be provided in Chapter 9.
TABLE V: 4 Ethnici ty of Ward Commi tteemen of Selected Ethnic Wards at Selected Points in Time
(Ethnicity of committeezren; D = Democratic; R = Republican)
Group &ward 1918 1924 1928 1932
-
Germans D German German German German
Ward 24/45* R Scandinavian Scandinavian German German
Swedes D Anglo-Saxon Anglo-Saxon Anglo-Saxon Anglo-Saxon
Ward 23/46* R Swedish Swedish German Swedish
Jews D Jewish Jewish Jewish Jewish
Ward 34/24* R Polish Polish Jewish Jewish
Italians D Irish Irish Irish Irish
Ward 18/25* R Anglo-Saxon Anglo-Saxon Anglo-Saxon Anglo-Saxon
Poles D Polish Polish Polish Polish
Ward 17/31* R Anglo-Saxon Anglo-Saxon Swedish Anglo-Saxon
Czechs D Czech Czech Czech Czech
Ward 12/22* R German German German German
Negroes D Anglo-Saxon Anglo-Saxon Anglo-Saxon Anglo-Saxont
Ward 2 R Irish Negro Negro Negro
*The two ward numbers represent pre-l92l and post-192l numbers of single wards whose boundaries
remained essentially unchanged during the period. The Republicans continued to operate organization-
ally along the old lines to 1928.
tpossibly Negro; odds very great that he was white.
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affiliation. It is also an important cause of political change (see Chapter
8) . We can isolate wards where each of the selected ethnic categories
dominated, and look at the ethnicity of their ward committeemen (Table
V:4)·
The data in the table do not provide any new information and again
are not definitive. There is little change over time. But they at least do not
conflict with what we have previously concluded. Ethnic political leaders
did move in the same direction as ethnic voters. They recognized where
their constituents were going, politically, and identified with the same
party. Which movement came first-that of the politicians or that of the
voters-is not too important, although it seems that at least in some cases
it was the voters who led the way. It is the fact of the congruence of these
several factors (ethnic voting and the tCvoting" of the ethnic press, ethnic
party identification and that of the ethnic press, and the political alle-
giance of ethnic political leaders) that is most significant in delineating
the political behavior of Chicago's ethnic groups from 1918 to 1932. The
fact that the data in this chapter generally reinforce the voting data of the
previous chapters makes the generalizations offered there more meaning-
ful.
VI. Political Party
Seli-Conceptions
Each major political party necessarily has a conception of itself, its
constituent parts, and the groups in American life which are important to
it. Thus party self-conception provides an interesting, if elusive, measure
of political change; it can also be a cause of political change, as groups
respond to developments in party self-conception. What, for example, did
the parties of the 1920S construe themselves to be? Whom did they feel
they represented? How did this change over time, especially in terms of
the role they allotted to the ethnics? We want especially to see if there
were changes in Democratic party self-conception which mirrored the
growing ethnic identification with that party from 1928 on.
There are two simple measures for investigating this problem of party
self-conception or self-identification: First, once every four years the
national party organizations are forced to come to terms with themselves,
in the drafting of platforms and nominating of presidential tickets. Here
a statement is hammered out, either through compromise among factions
or by the dominance of one or more factions over others. In either case
the platform and the candidates are, by definition, reasonably accurate
pictures of the parties' self-conceptions at the time, since the common
denominator of belief, or the belief of the most powerful group (s) in the
party, is thus expressed. This is found by looking at the national plat-
forms and presidential tickets of the 1920S for this kind of information.1
A second indicator of party self-conception consists in what candi-
dates say, directly or implicitly, about their parties. In many respects
candidates make the party, and their conception of it-whether in accord
or in conflict with the platform-ean be determining. The voter is often
more conscious of party through its candidates than through its organiza-
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tiona Moreover, candidates at the state and local level often differ with
the national organization in conception of the party and thus intrude
important variations at these levels which are closer to the voter.
In both of these approaches it is necessary to deal with issues, but in a
special way: How do the values represented in the issue-stands of each
party contribute to an understanding of which party was more receptive
to the ethnics? Should the same issue be of importance for the same
reason to a party as to the ethnics, it would indicate a positive sign of
identification of interest.
The platforms of both national nominating conventions were con-
servative in 1920. They reflected the concerns of uresponsible" leadership
generally. Their major differences were on the question of international
organization, the Democrats supporting President Woodrow Wilson and
his League of Nations, and the Republicans opposing both.2 The Republi-
cans insisted on seeing themselves as the party of traditional American
values and the Democrats as the instigators of Hun-American" adventures
at home and abroad. But the Democrats were radical only in Republican
eyes, not their own. They emulated the Republican vagueness on organ-
ized labor and opposition to such cCradicalism" as strikes. Like the Repub-
licans they said nothing about Prohibition, even though it was the leading
issue to the ethnics in 1920.
The two parties agreed in opposing Asiatic immigration, but appar-
ently disagreed on immigration generally. The Democrats simply said
nothing, while the Republicans believed that no more immigrants should
1 Much work remains to be done in the systematic study of party platforms
and platform battles over the past hundred years. Especially needed are quantita-
tive models for analysis of the kind that are being developed in studies of the
Constitutional Convention. The Democratic convention of 1924 and the Republi-
can of 1964 are two leading examples of the kinds of basic conflict that can exist
in convention and which are not necessarily seen if one looks only at the
postconvention campaign.
2 Party platforms can be found, in Kirk H. Porter and Donald B. Johnson,
National Party Platforms, I840-I956 (Urbana, Ill., 1956). What follows is a
kind of qualitative content analysis of platforms and of party decisions on
candidates. The ensuing notes for this section are simply guides to major sources
of information on the given convention or campaign; no effort has been made to
cite all sources or be comprehensive, since the conclusions are original and taken
from the surface facts of the conventions and nominations.
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be admitted than could be uassimilated with reasonable rapidity" and that
immigration legislation should Hfavor immigrants whose standards are
similar to ours." The Republican party's self-conception was not one
receptive to the newer immigrants. Similarly, the Republican platform
had UNaturalization" and HFree Speech" planks which were essentially
anti-alien and defensive of uAmerican institutions"; the Democrats ig-
nored these subjects.
By what they avoided saying, then, the Democrats saw themselves in
1920 in a way more representative of the ethnics, or at least less unrepre-
sentative of them. Thus they, and not the Republicans-partially out of
deference to President Wilson, but also perhaps to ethnic voters-ex-
pressed Uactive sympathy" with the Armenians, Chinese, Czechoslova-
kians, Finns, Poles, Yugoslavs, and, particularly, the Irish. For the Negro,
party roles were reversed, as the Republicans continued to see themselves
as his political protector, again supporting antilynching legislation. The
Democrats ignored the Negro.
The tickets nominated in 1920 complemented the rather neutral,
conservative policy statements of the platforms. Warren G. Harding was
a compromise, chosen when the several leading candidates stalemated
one another. He symbolized the regular Republican party, and partic-
ularly its congressional leadership-eomplacency, stability, and passivity
in government.3 The nomination of Calvin Coolidge to run with him can
be interpreted as a popular delegates' rebellion against domination by the
party ccbosses.,,4 But if so, it was a Urevolt" in favor of essentially the same
values personified by Harding, and indicated harmony in belief.
James M. Cox, for the Democrats, represented generally the same
forces in his party-the professional politicians, who, in this case, were
trying to take leadership away from President Wilson. As a mild progres-
sive and a mild Wet, Cox was nominated after forty-three futile ballots,
to compromise diverse choices. A symbol, politically, of nonadminis-
tration and non-Dry forces, he remained otherwise little different from
Harding, particularly in terms of ethnic orientation.5 Franklin D. Roose-
velt, as his running mate, was selected for availability. With Cox he
SWesley M. Bagby, The Road to N01'malcy (Baltimore, Md., 1962), pp.
36-42, 85-96.
4e Ibid., pp. 100-101.
5 Ibid., pp. 73-76, 110-20.
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represented a continuation of mild loyalty to Democratic progressivism
and not a great deal more.
In 1924 the differences between the parties were even less clear. The
Democrats said they were the party of human rights and change and that
the Republicans were the party of material rights and stagnation. The
slogan itself had some significance in terms of party self-conception, but
failure to implement it specifically indicated that if some Democrats
really believed it, others did not. The Democratic platform was better
suited to 1912 than 1924 in the problems it saw before the nation-
problems that were less relevant in 1924 and were certainly not vital to
the ethnics. Again nothing was said about immigration, or the Johnson
bill, and the Democratic stand on Prohibition was in effect anti-ethnic:
they accused the Republicans of failing to enforce the law, and vowed to
do so if they received power.
This was one sign of the lack of accord among the Democrats on
what values the party should represent. An even better indication was a
plank that did not appear in the platform-that on the Ku Klux Klan.
The narrowness of the vote by which specific condemnation of the Klan
was voted down is well known. It is also a good example of the
Democrats' inability to decide in 1924 whether they were the party of
Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, rural America, or of ethnic, heterogeneous,
urban America. The 1924 platform and candidates clearly demonstrated
that the latter elements were by no means dominant.
The Republicans were fat and happy in 1924, the Harding scandals
to the contrary notwithstanding. In abbreviated form they repeated their
platform of 1920 and continued to see themselves as the perpetuators of
traditional American values. The new immigration restriction law was
defended as a necessary protection for Americans, and laws were pro-
posed for the Ueducation of the alien in our language, customs, ideals and
standards of life." It was as if the Democrats could not decide whether to
be rural or urban, old or new, while at the same time the Republicans
were trying to escape the cities and re-create their party on a nineteenth-
century base.
The 1924 presidential tickets expressed the same forces as the plat-
forms. Calvin Coolidge was simply a shoo-in, both because he was the
incumbent and because he so well personified the traditional, conserva-
tive, complacent, and native-American conception that the Republicans
Party Self-Conceptions 95
had of themselves. This was complemented by the nomination, without
much dispute, of midwestern banker and soldier Charles G. Dawes as his
running mate; it was a consistent ticket.6
The new-old or rural-urban Democratic conflia was perfectly re-
flected in the excruciating battle between Al Smith and William Gibbs
McAdoo for the presidential nomination. Furthermore, the equal strength
of the two sides was seen in the failure of either to beat the other. Thus
John W. Davis was an escape from a basic problem as well as a
compromise: an honest man and loyal Democrat, but a Wall Street
lawyer and a different quantity from either McAdoo or Smith. He
represented honest conservatism and little more, neither Wet nor Dry,
neither Klan nor anti-Klan, neither rural nor urban. And the nomination
of William Jennings Bryan's brother Charles to run with him was so
patently contrived as to be insignificant, except as further proof that the
rural forces of the party continued strong.1
Finally, in 1924, there was Robert M. La Follette and his Progressive
party. Both the Conference for Progressive Political Action and La Fol-
lette personally drew up platforms, and the two were essentially the
same: short statements of the major ills of the time and of their proposed
cures. Like the Democratic platform of 1924, those of the Progressives
were probably better suited to 1912. La Follette's platform opened with:
((The great issue before the American people today is the control of
government and industry by private monopoly." Even if true, which is
hardly likely, this statement did not express a self-conception of party
cognizant of new forces in American life, particularly that of the ethnics.
The issues of interest to LaFollette represented values essentially foreign
to most of the ethnics of Chicago.
In 1924, as in 1912, progressivism meant to La Follette a movement
for political and economic reform, with a broad appeal to all well-inten-
tioned people. The common denominator of progressivism was not social
desire, nor was it ethnicity; rather, it was a middle-class concern with
honesty and efficiency. In its own way, then, the Progressive party of
1924 was strictly traditionalist-in the longstanding tradition of nonpar-
tisan middle-class American reform.8 It had precious little in common
6 John D. Hicks, Repuhlican Ascendancy (New York, 1960), pp. 90-91.
7 Ibid., p. 97.
8 Ibid., pp. 97-99.
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with most ethnics. That Germans, for example, were attracted to La
Follette because of his opposition to World War I, does not negate the
essentially nonethnic nature of the man and his party in 1924.
In 1928, platform differences between the two parties diminished
again. The Democrats moved toward the Republican value structure, and
the Republicans stood pat. The division within the Democratic party was
by no means gone, but it did sink beneath the surface. The two parties
agreed on limited government, economic stringency, and traditional
Americanism. The Democrats even specifically supported immigration
restriction, almost as strongly as the Republicans. And both supported
Prohibition, although haltingly, and vowed to enforce it. Both parties,
then, were oriented toward values which excluded the ethnics from
consideration. The Republicans, however, continued their tradition of
verbal support of the Negro.9
Thus the real difference between the parties seen by the voters in
1928 did not come from their platforms. And the presidential nominees,
though very different types of men, were to their parties pretty much the
same thing: leading political figures to be nominated simply because they
were the strongest candidates, for political rather than ideological reasons.
Herbert Hoover did have some opposition, for personal reasons and
because his party regularity was suspect. But he was nominated easily on
the first ballot. And his running mate, Charles Curtis, differed from him
only in being a party regular and a little closer to the farm belt.10
There was no Democratic nomination battle because William G.
McAdoo-traditional leader of the rural, WASP forces in the 192os-had
removed himself from contention late in 1927. This did not mean that
the party was united for Smith, but it meant that he was the only strong
contender, and he, too, won easily on the first ballot. Most of all, the
Democrats wanted to avoid a repetition of the 1924 experience. Continu-
ing reluctance to accept an urban, Wet, Catholic candidate was reflected
in the choice of running mate: Senator Joseph T. Robinson, a southerner,
a Protestant, and a Dry.11
Certainly many rural Democrats feared Smith's nomination-not
9 Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly, The I928 Campaign (New York,
I93 I ),Pp·24-2 7,32-33.
10 Ibid., pp. 8, 14, 29.
11 Ibid., pp. 10, 33-34.
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necessarily for what he was, but for what they imagined him to be. In
Houston, scene of the Democratic convention, the Protestant churches
were full, and Ha fervent petition has been raised to the Most High
against the elevation of Gov. Smith to the Presidency."12 But inside the
Democratic organization the emphasis was less on religious than on
political harmony and regularity. Thus in nomination, as in platform, the
basic problems that continued from 1924 were simply ignored. Perhaps
the likelihood of Republican victory made self-questioning less meaning-
ful to the Democrats in 1928.
At any rate, the changes in voting that began in 1928 were not
reflected in the Democratic party's conception of itself as expressed in
questioning over platform and candidates. But an urban, ethnically or-
iented, and ethnically attractive presidential candidate had nonetheless
been nominated.
The 1932 platforms saw some changes from those of 1928, partic-
ularly in reflecting the Depression situation. The Democrats, smelling
success, refused to argue with one another and issued their shortest
platform of the period. The Republicans, on the defensive, issued their
longest. What little the Democrats did have to say showed small change
from 1928: the party still insisted on looking upon itself as a conserva-
tive force, preserving traditional values. The platform's strongest stand
was on Prohibition, which it now opposed forcefully; and it returned to
the 1920-1924 pattern of ignoring immigration, which was at least
negatively closer to what an ethnic party should do. Finally, there were
hints in the platform of new directions, as in the advocating of active
governmental help to the unemployed. But that was about all there was to
it. It was not a strong document.
The Republicans in 1932 firmly maintained their successful values of
the previous twelve years, but they were on the defensive. They felt the
need to attack, but were able only to defend. The platform again sup-
ported immigration restriction and congratulated the party on having
Hformulated into law the quota system." The Negro continued to be
assured of a place of refuge. Previous strong support for Prohibition was
replaced by a plank arguing that it was not a upartisan" issue at all, and so
not worthy of discussion. They were willing that the issue be remanded to
12 Christian Century (July 5, 192 8), p. 847.
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the states. There was no indication that this plank had anything to do
with a changing party self-conception; rather, it was a hot political issue
to be straddled. On the whole, the Republicans in 1932 wanted to be seen
as the party of the 1920S, which would overcome the indisposition of the
Depression and maintain the civilization of 1921-1929.
As in 1928 the presidential tickets of the two parties offered on~y
small light on their self-conceptions. Hoover, as president, continued to
be disliked by the professional party leadership and by the small progres-
sive wing. But he was the incumbent, wanted renomination, and there was
little to be done. Moreover, he continued to represent the mainstream of
party thought and was certainly an honest representative of its platform.13
The Democratic contest was really between Smith and Franklin D.
Roosevelt. The several other candidates had little chance unless these two
stalemated one another.14 That the Democrats ultimately chose Roosevelt
over Smith was a sign basically of their desire to win: either candidate
had a good chance in 1932, but surely Roosevelt had less strikes against
him, and so was the more available. It would be incorrect to see much
conflict in party self-conception in the selection of Roosevelt over Smith.
If Smith was more ethnically oriented, for example, in his desire to stress
Prohibition over all other issues, he was less so in his emotional denuncia-
tion of Usetting class against class and rich against poor," and so on.15 In
fact, Smith's ethnic orientation was essentially emotional and superficial
and did not really amount to commitment, while that of Roosevelt was
more intellectual, and in the long run more sincere. Images often conflict
with realities, however, and it is likely that to the party Roosevelt was less
firmly on the ethnic-urban-Wet side of the scale than Smith in 1932, and
that the selection of Roosevelt in part reflects a reluctance to move too far
in new directions.
It is hard to find any dramatic differences between the self-concep-
tions of the two major parties, 1920-1932, as demonstrated in national
platforms and presidential tickets. But this is to be expected in the
American political system, where parties have traditionally stressed heter-
ogeneity and catholicity and have not looked upon themselves as repre-
18 Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly, The I932 Campaign (New York,
1935), pp. 19-2 5.
14 Ibid., pp. 25-43.
15 Ibid., pp. 63-64.
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sentative of one particular group or interest. Differences in such a system
tend to be subtle. Both parties in the 1920S saw themselves in the
mainstream of American belief and values, and thus they hoped to be in
the mainstream of American voting. Neither seemed to realize that this
mainstream was changing course, with the coming enfranchisement of
the newer immigrants.
The Democratic party did construe itself on somewhat more ethnic
lines, but this prevailed no more at the end of the period than at its
beginning. It seems that the ethnic voters came into the Democratic party
before the party came to consider itself consciously as the party of the
ethnics.16 Truly, the voters (and the candidates) led; the party consensus
followed well behind. In this phenomenon, which probably pervades
American politics from its earliest history, can be found basic strengths
and weaknesses of the American party system.
But if the Democratic party changed little in terms of self-conception
during the period, the Republican party changed not at all-and was
from the start considerably less ethnic-oriented (the Negro always ex-
cepted). Consequently the Democrats became the ethnics' party as much
by default as anything else. Indeed, the major division within the Re-
publican party in this period was between the old guard and the progres-
sives-a division based essentially on political and economic questions,
rather than social ones, and a division wherein neither side reflected
ethnic interests. But the major division within the Democratic party was
basically social: urban-ethnic-Wet vs. rural-wAsp-Dry, and this was a
division innately reflecting ethnic interest. Thus, regardless of which side
was winning in this intra-Democratic battle at any given point in time,
the fact remained that the ethnics at least made up one of the sides,
whereas they were on the outside with the Republicans. And by
1928-1932 the urban-ethnic-Wet side of the Democratic division had
more or less won out, even if this was not clear to the party at the time.
Therefore party history and party self-conception during this period are
congruent with changing patterns of ethnic political behavior.
16 The 1936 platforms showed this interparty difference much more clearly.
The Republicans remained the defenders of traditional American values, warning
that "America is in peril," and promising to retrench. The Democrats, faced with
what their administration had done over three and a half years, did seem to see
themselves as a party of new values, which were at least in effect pro-ethnic. Belief
was catching up with practice.
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Quadrennial platforms and presidential nominations are one expres-
sion of party self-conception. Another resides in what candidates have to
say about their parties. Here consensus gives way to diversity and permits
local variations to appear. The party conceptions of leading national and
local Chicago candidates might or might not agree with the parties'
official conceptions of themselves. In either case they contribute to an
understanding of party self-conception and its congruence, or lack
thereof, with ethnic political behavior.
The presidential candidates of the period tended to conceive of their
parties--especially in matters ethnic-much the same as the conventions
which had nominated them. In 1920, for example, James M. Cox fol-
lowed the platform in supporting President Wilson's League of Nations,
although reluctantly, and in being otherwise not at all controversial. Like
the platform, he had some general ethnic-consciousness, as in Chicago
where he stressed the Irish question.17 But he basically saw his party in
traditionalistic terms. His opponent, Senator Harding, gave off an aura of
even stronger traditionalism. When Illinois Senator Medill McCormick
brought 1,500 representatives of thirty different nationalities to Marion,
Harding told them U to love and support the old flag and all it stands
for.u18
In 1924 there were some clear-cut problems of ethnic interest, but
none of the candidates saw his party as involved on the ethnics' side. The
question of the Klan, for example, was important to the ethnics, but
Calvin Coolidge and Robert La Follette ignored it, and John W. Davis
mentioned it only to deny that it was an issue.19 Immigration restriction
was similarly ignored. In Chicago, Davis articulated the traditional Dem-
ocratic argument for Irish freedom and hinted that the Democrats con-
tinued to oppose Prohibition,20 but otherwise rivaled Coolidge in failing to
make any direct appeal for ethnic sympathy. The Democrats in 1924 used
former Senator James Hamilton Lewis to campaign among Chicago's
immigrants, which did show a continuing concern; Lewis denounced the
Illinois Republican organization for its threatened "criminal Negro domi-
17 Chicago Tribune, Oct. 31, 1920, p. Iff.
18 Ibid., Sept. 19, 1920, p. 6; Oct. 19, 1920, p. 3.
19 Ibid., Aug. 24, 1924, pp. 12-13. Finally, in October, the Democrats did
speak out against the Klan in Chicago, after being heckled for not doing so
before (ibid., Oct. 17, 1924,P. Iff.).
20 Ibid., Sept. 19, 1924, p. Iff.
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nation" of the state and the city.21 This was playing on interethnic
rivalries and prejudices, a game which could sometimes succeed but was
innately dangerous.
The Progressives hardly saw themselves as representing ethnic Amer-
ica. The only exception involved German-Americans, who were looked
upon as generally pro-La Follette, and whom he courted vigorously.22 The
Republicans accepted this as true; a leading Chicago German-American
congressman felt obliged to tell his constituents that they need not vote
for La Follette simply because he ustood by us" during the War.23
The 1928 presidential candidates presented a somewhat different
profile, in that one of them did see his party quite differently than had its
members in convention assembled. Secretary Herbert C. Hoover happily
ran as the candidate of the Republican party and its platform. As he put
it in his acceptance speech, cCNever has a political party been able to look
upon a similar period with more satisfaction."24 He believed this and thus
saw his party as it saw itself, for example, as the party of Prohibition, ua
great social and economic experiment, noble in motive and far-reaching
in purpose." Similarly, Hoover not only approved of immigration restric-
tion but also felt that the use of 1890 as a base for determining quotas
was Just.25 Between the candidate and the party there was harmony.
The case of Al Smith, however, was something else again. More than
any other presidential candidate of the decade he seemed to see his party
in a new and different way, and this helps explain the effect he had on
Chicago's ethnics. The specific matters on which Smith differed from his
party were questions of primary concern to the ethnics; and the sum of
his alterations amounted to a conception of the Democratic party far
more hospitable to ethnic voters. Smith was opposed to Prohibition and
would work for its modification, if not outright repea1.26 He acknow-
ledged that immigration restriction was necessary, but argued that the use
of the 1890 census for determining quotas was Udesigned to discriminate
21 Ibid., Nov. 1, 1924, p. 6.
22 Ibid., Sept. 24, 1924, p. 19.
23 Ibid., Oct. 11, 1924, p. 2.
24 Herbert C. Hoover, The New Day: Campaign Speeches of Herbert Hoover,
I928 (Stanford, Calif., 1928), p. 12.
25 Ibid., pp. 24, 71. (The different quota laws, and their effects, are consid-
ered in Chapter 7.)
26 Alfred E. Smith, Campaign Addresses of Gov. Alfred E. Smith (Washing-
ton, D.C., 1929), pp. 14-15, 200.
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against certain nationalities."21 Thus he seemed to see his party as the
protector of the interests of those who identified so heartily with him.
More generally, he tended more to view his party as one of change than
had the platform, and he offered a view of government which included
action and a searching for new answers to the problems of the urank and
file of the people."28
Here is one clear instance of a presidential candidate construing his
party as something quite different from the party's conception of itself;
moreover, the differences revolved around matters central to the problem
of the place of the ethnics in that party. To Smith the Democratic party
was a party for the ethnics, while to the leadership of his party this was
not the case at all; and the Republicans, by their own self-conception,
offered no contest to this in 1928.29
One can well overstate the case here. Indeed, as his later career would
indicate, Smith was never a social radical, much less a revolutionary.so But
he certainly was a successful ethnic politician up to 1928 and saw his
party (in those egocentric terms common to most successful politicians)
as being likewise. And he was the Democratic presidential candidate.
According to the voting returns, his party conception was shared by
ethnic voters.
The situation was less clear in 1932. Herbert Hoover remained
essentially the same man he had been in 1928 and continued to view his
party in the same light as before. Current problems would be solved not
by seeking new paths but by resolutely clinging to time-tested Republican
answers. Certainly the election of 1928 had not convinced him that his
party ought somehow to open its doors to the ethnics. Indeed, it seemed to
him that the Democrats were advocating some conspiratorial new concept
of society which, if implemented, could be disastrous to traditional Amer-
ican civilization.s1
27 Ibid., pp. 25-26.
28 Ibid., pp. 202, 260, 293.
29 This points to one of the most interesting and significant aspects of the
1928 campaign. It was clearly a contest between Hoover, as a representative of
the Republican party, and Smith, as an individual only secondarily representing a
party. The ethnics, too, saw it as a contest between a party and a man. This was
the source of much of Smith's strength among them.
30 As early as the campaign of 1932 Smith lost whatever uradical" elan he
might have had in 1928. (See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Crisis of the Old
Order [Boston, 1957], p. 416.)
81 Ibid., pp. 431,437.
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Franklin Roosevelt's conception of the Democratic party at this time
is by no means clear; above all, perhaps, it was a vehicle to power. In
Chicago, as elsewhere, he spoke mainly on the problems of Prohibition
and the Depression and in both seemed implicitly to see his party as one
of action-action which, in these cases, corresponded to ethnic belief.32
He liked the phrase ctNew Deal," with its implication of operating for the
mass of the people and assuaging their despair in difficult times. In this he
seemed to define his party in basically human terms, quite distinct from
Hoover's definition of the Republican party.33 He had a construction of
the Democracy roughly similar to that of Al Smith, but he saw it more
broadly and with a more general vision. For Smith's emotional and
largely unconscious ethnic sympathy, Roosevelt substituted a more con-
scious, calculating, and intellectual sympathy that would last far longer.
If his view of the Democratic party is not clear, it was nonetheless
something quite different from that of Cox or Davis, and something
which did have a place for the ethnics.
Thus, in a general way, the conceptions of party of presidential
candidates do correlate with ethnic voting behavior. The Republican
candidates demonstrated no real qualitative change in matters of ethnic
consciousness. And that of the Democrats can easily be overstated. But
Smith and Roosevelt, closing out the period, seemed to conceive of the
Democratic party as a house for all peoples among Americans; thus
party, like voter, was changing at this time, in complementary fashion.
And the rise of the ethnic Democratic consensus is further explained.
The party conceptions of presidential candidates are only part of this
measure; it is important also to consider leading local candidates and
officeholders, to see if their party conceptions corresponded with or varied
from those of national figures. This is particularly important for under-
standing the party conceptions which came across to the ethnics, since
their political horizons were not necessarily broad, and local party impres-
sions were important.
William Hale (UBig Bill") Thompson, Republican, and Anton Cer-
mak, Democrat, were the two most important politicians on the Chicago
scene in the 1920S, both generally and to the ethnics. Thompson was
mayor three times (1915-1923,1927-1931), and a candidate in three
32 Chicago Tribune, Oct. I, 1932, p. Iff.; Oct. 2, 1932, p. Iff.; Oct. 3, 1932,
p. 3; Schlesinger, Crisis of the Old Order, pp. 429-30.
38 Schlesinger, Crisis of the Old Order, pp. 429-30,433.
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of the elections under study (1919,1927,1931). Cermak emerged into
ever greater power as the decade unfolded, becoming Democratic boss by
1930 and defeating Thompson for mayor in 1931. The differences, if any,
between Thompson's conception of the Republican party and Cermak's
of the Democratic, in terms of the place of the ethnics in the parties, will
add materially to an understanding of local party self-conception and its
role in changing political behavior.
The traditional picture of Thompson as a clever ethnic politician is
only partially true and is hardly true for the later stages of his career. His
ethnic consciousness seemed to be working well in his much-publicized
reluctance to invite the Joffre mission to Chicago during the Great War.
It must be remembered, he said, that Chicago was uthe sixth largest
German city in the world, the second largest Bohemian, the second largest
Norwegian, and the second largest Polish," and some of these groups
might resent such an invitation.34 This was perhaps attractive to the
groups involved and did strengthen Thompson's appeal among the Ger-
man-Americans (his 1915 and 1919 opponent was a German-Ameri-
can). He gained national fame as an ethnically sophisticated politician, as
did one of his chief advisers, Fred Lundin, for saying that uthe party that
eliminated the hyphen would eliminate itself from politics."35 Thomp-
son's long battle with the king of England can also be construed as
ethnically oriented. He first began king-baiting in 1920, and it surely
pleased the Irish, and perhaps other groups as well, since monarchy was
not popular with any of them.36 It was in his reentry into politics in 1927
that Thompson really began to swing at King George, but this was
simply a part of his more general uAmerica First" campaign.
In the long run, the America First crusade signified a retreat from
ethnocentric politics. The crusade made little sense to the ethnics and
probably repulsed many of them. Thompson was moving away from a
pro-ethnic concept of party and politics.37
84 Lloyd Wendt and Herman Kogan, Big Bill of Chicago (Indianapolis, Ind.,
1953), pp. 152-53·
85 Chicago T1'ibune, Mar. 21,1919, p. Iff.
36 William H. Stuart, The Twenty Inc1'edible Yea1's (Chicago, 1935), p. 114.
87 "America First" was apparently Thompson's own idea. When asked what
the issues of 1927 would be, he decided to center it on America First. When
asked what this had to do with the campaign, he answered: "That's just it, it
hasn't anything to do with it, and that is why it will make a good issue. If anyone
opposes us, we will say he is not for America First; he is for America second or
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This became clearer as time passed and as Thompson's career became
less and less secure. It was as if he possessed a dormant nativism, which
he had managed to stifle until age and pressure caught up with him. By
1931 his conception of his party, as an extension of his person, was
clearly anti-ethnic. Throughout his campaign for a fourth term he insisted
that no man should be Chicago's mayor who was not born in America,
and he repeatedly sang of his opponent: HTony, Tony, where's your
pushcart at? Can you imagine a world's fair mayor with a name like
that?"S8 He continued to be effective with the Negroes and perhaps won
over the Irish with his comment on the Democracy: HFrom Szymczak to
Zintak to Cermak and the Irish are all out.,,39 But his nativism became
more and more pronounced, ultimately merged with antisemitism,40 and
before the campaign was over he had excluded most ethnic groups from
his Republican party.
Thus by 1931 Thompson's Republican party had no room for south-
ern or eastern European newer immigrants (the Italians excepted), and
since his was the only local Republican faction ever to have been really
ethnically oriented, it seemed that they were quite excluded, that the
Republicans really had tCeliminated the hyphen."
This change is important, because the Democrats under Tony Cermak
went in the opposite direction. Cermak was an archetypal ethnic politi-
cian-probably, with Fiorello LaGuardia, the best there ever was. His rise
to power had been through championing his own Czech group and
through interethnic cooperation (he was, for example, the leading figure
in the United Societies, an interethnic anti-Prohibition organization
third or he is perhaps not a good American at al1. Everybody is for America First,
and if anyone is against us we will say that he is disloya1." (Charles E. Merriam,
Chicago: A More Intimate View of Urban Politics [New York, 1929], p. 291;
Stuart, The Twenty Incredible Years, p. 297.)
38 Chicago Tribune, April 8, 1931, p. I; Wendt and Kogan, Big Bill of
Chicago, pp. 329-31; Harold F. Gosnell, Machine Politics.' Chicago Model
(Chicago, 1937), p. 13.
39 Collier's 9 1 ( Jan. 7, 1933): 2 I.
40 His wrath was directed especially against Judge Henry Horner, who would
be Democratic candidate for governor in 1932, and Julius Rosenwald, Chicago
businessman and philanthropist. (See Charles E. Merriam, "Recollections"
[manuscript autobiography], ch. 6, p. 14, Merriam Papers, University of Chicago;
M. R. Werner, Julius Rosenwald: The Life of a Practical Humanitarian [New
York, 1939], p. 318.) It is instructive to note, in this context, that in 1936
Thompson would run for governor on the Lemke ticket.
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founded in 1906). He had risen steadily through the regular Democratic
organization, becoming president and member of the Cook County Board
in 1922 and soon becoming known as tcThe Mayor of Cook County." But
at the same time he was never really close to the ruling clique of Roger
Sullivan and then George Brennan, largely due to traditional Czech-Irish
animosity.41 While remaining within the organization, Cermak was also
creating his own kind of Democratic party, characteristically via intereth-
nic ties.42
Cermak took the initiative in getting four opinion ballots on Prohibi-
tion added to the elections of the period and brought in Al Smith to speak
in favor of the one in 1922.43 He was the leader of Chicago Wets. As
head of Cook County government he created a separate and kosher
Jewish section in the county poorhouse, thus endearing himself to the
newer immigrant Jews and their political leaders." And with a Czech-
Jewish alliance he was ready to take over the party in 1928, when
Brennan died. He added his own Irish ties, with Pat Nash of the twenty-
eighth ward, who had been on the outs with Brennan for years.45 Between
1928 and 1930 Cermak solidified his hold over the local Democracy. He
was not Brennan's chosen successor (that honor went to a fellow Irish-
man, Michael Igoe) , but Cermak had planned too well, and his ethnic
Democratic organization was considerably more powerful than his rival's
less ethnic one.46 His ultimate victory over the Irish came in 1930 and
was signified in the party's endorsement of a truly ethnic ticket of
Cermak, Kaindl, Brady, Allegretti, and Smietanka.47 In this way he came
to power, reflecting the ethnics' goals. Prohibition was his issue, ethnic
representation his goal (and thus he gave up the Democratic tradition of
Negro-baiting, as practiced by his Irish predecessors) .
In the 1931 mayoralty, Cermak reacted to Thompson's nativist taunts
in a manner with which the ethnics could empathize: UHe don't [sic] like
41 Alex Gottfried, Boss Cermak of Chicago: A Study of Political Leadership
(Seatde, Wash., 1962), p. 138.
42 Ibid., pp. 134-37; Stuart, The Twenty Incredible Years, pp. 219-20.
43 Gottfried, Boss Cermak, pp. 118-19.
44 Philip P. Bregstone, Chicago and Its Jews (Chicago, 1933), p. 323.
45 Gottfried, Boss Ce1'mak, pp. 178-79.
46 Harold L. Ickes, The Autobiography of a Curmudgeon (New York,
1943), pp. 2S4-SS·
47 Gottfried, Boss Ce1'mak, pp. 199-203.
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my name.... It's true I didn't come over on the Mayflower, but I came
over as soon as I could.,,48 In Cermak's hands and eyes the Chicago
Democracy was very different from what it had been under Brennan and
equally different from Thompson's Republicans. It was to him an ethnic
political party; that was why he had joined it and what he had made it.
The party conceptions of any number of local political figures could
be considered; none of them, however, played so central a role as the two
considered above. There are other significant indications of increasingly
greater Democratic identification with the ethnics, without a reciprocal
concern on the part of the Republicans. Both parties had ethnic organi-
zational systems operating during campaigns, but the Democratic system
was much more active, especially toward the end of the period. The
Democrats were also more attentive to building up a network of social,
athletic, and other kinds of clubs among the ethnics, all of which were
designed to win them over to the party and hold them there, while at the
same time serving ethnic nonpolitical interests.49
The pro-ethnic effort permeated most levels of the local Democracy.
For example, Carter Harrison II, five times mayor and leader of a small
ccreform" group within the party in the 1920S, argued to William Gibbs
McAdoo in 1928 that the ethnics made up an important part of the
Democratic party's strength and that it would be wrong to deny them
their proper influence within the party.50 The changing proportions of
ethnics represented on party tickets expressed the same belief.
Democratic leaders in Chicago more and more saw their party as the
ethnics' real representative in local and national politics. The Chicago
delegation to Washington to testify against the Johnson bill in 1924 was
led by Jacob M. Arvey, Jewish Democratic leader and Cermak ally.51 And
no one was more expressive of this feeling than A. J. Sabath, congress-
man from Cermak's Czechoslovakian section. Sabath was both Czech and
Jew and represented both groups, as well as the ethnics generally. As
48 Report of a student (H. Bobino), of Democratic campaign meeting,
Trianon Ballroom. Gosnell materials, Merriam Papers, University of Chicago.
49 See series of interviews in Wards 11, 12, 14, and 15 in 1934. Mary
McDowell Papers, Chicago Historical Society.
50 This was in a letter requesting that McAdoo support Smith in 1928
because Smith was the ethnics' choice. Harrison to McAdoo, Oct. 16, 1928.
Harrison Papers, Newberry Library.
61 Chicago Jewish Courier, Mar. 5, 1924, WPA.
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ranking Democrat on the House Immigration Committee, Sabath led the
battle against the Johnson bill, fighting Democrats and Republicans
alike, in Congress and out.52 Between 1918 and 1932 he introduced
innumerable bills to Congress, about 80 percent of them concerning
immigration, immigrants, and Prohibition. His stance on Prohibition was
ferocious and unremitting, as were his efforts to obtain a national Pulaski
Day, recognition of Soviet Russia, and various kinds of aid for countless
individual immigrants.53 He was striving to create a Democratic party
that was a home for the ethnics-particularly the Jews, but generally as
wel1.54
Sabath is a leading example of those ethnic politicians within the
Democracy who served to bring the ethnics into the party, by conceiving
of the party as the ethnics' true place of refuge. He was rather alone at
the start of the period, but toward its end had quite a few colleagues,
because the Democratic party was reluctantly coming around.
52 See, for example, Sabath to Gompers, May 10, 1924, and speeches to
House, April 4 to May 15, 1924. Sabath Papers, American Jewish Archives.
53 See copies of bills introduced and speeches delivered in Sabath Papers,
American Jewish Archives.
54 See letter to Sabath from Harry [?], Aug. 24, 1945, Sabath Papers,
American Jewish Archives.
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VII. Political Issues
Among the several forces of political change, issues are probably fore-
most. These are the substantive and qualitative matters important to the
individual voter and to groups of voters: what should or should not be
done; what would or would not serve one's interest.! The voter opts for
that party or candidate which best represents his desires on the issues, or,
negatively, which least conflicts with those desires. The voter can asso-
ciate the alternatives of an issue with political parties as wholes, or simply
with one of two contesting candidates, or anywhere in between.
Thus when issue considerations prompted an ethnic voter to opt for a
Democratic candidate, or group of them, that voter was not necessarily
persuaded that the whole Democratic party participated in that issue in
the same way. Most significant, then, were those issues which were of
greatest importance to the ethnics, particularly when the alternatives
seemed to divide the major parties. But issue arguments in favor of
leading individual candidates must also be considered, since it was of this
in good part that party allegiances were eventually created.
The number of issues in which the ethnics were really involved
during this period was relatively small. They were interested in matters
which directly related to them, particularly in their roles as ethnic group
members: immigration restriction legislation, the xenophobia of the Ku
Klux Klan and other kinds of bigotry, and curtailments of their tradi-
tional practices and liberties. Prohibition was the issue in which they were
involved above all others. These issues which were most important to the
ethnics gave rise to strikingly similar attitudes among them. Additionally,
there were some more general issues in which the ethnics also demon-
strated interest: the Great War, President Wilson and the Versailles
Treaty, the League of Nations, and the Depression. The effect of these
latter issues was more selective, involving some of the groups and elicit-
ing less than unanimous decisions among those involved. Thus the former
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can be considered uethnic issues," while the latter were, more simply,
issues in which there was ethnic interest. Both kinds of issues affected
ethnic political behavior.
The ethnics were very much concerned with the outcome of the First
World War, since the homelands of so many of them were involved. The
war itself, and then the peace which followed, became important political
issues, particularly in the elections of 1918 and 1920. And President
Woodrow Wilson, as the leading American figure in the War and the
peace, became himself a complex issue as a symbol of many things.
No Chicago ethnic group was as involved in these issues as were the
German-Americans. Their position, especially after the United States
joined the Allies, was very difficult, and their interest was very great. As
early as 1916 most German-Americans considered Wilson pro-British,
and preferred the election of Charles Evans Hughes to the presidency.2
Up until the time that the United States entered the war, the Abendpost,
like the rest of the German-language press, continued to justify the
German cause; indeed, the Abendpost charged the United States with
responsibility for the rupture of diplomatic relations in early 1917.3
1 Distinctions have been made between actual substantive issues (Wilson's
peace plans, the Depression), on the one hand, and more attitudinal, contentless
issues (AI Smith as an urban politician) on the other. One group of scholars has
concluded that the latter become important mainly in elections where the former
are absent. (See Bernard Berelson and others, Voting: A Study 0/ Opinion
Formation in a Presidential Campaign [Chicago, 1954J.) The distinction may
not be really meaningful, however, because there were issues which straddled
both categories. Prohibition is the best example; there was an actual substantive
dispute involved, but there were also many qualitative ramifications.
A better distinction, I think, can be made between those issues which include
cultural-social disputes and those which do not. The former tend to involve more
people more deeply than the latter. In this study, Prohibition is the leading
example, and religious and ethnic bigotry (the Klan, much of the criticism of Al
Smith) would also be included. And these were the issues most important to the
ethnics. A study of Iowa voting in an earlier period has concluded similarly
(Samuel P. Hays, "History as Human Behavior," Iowa Journal of History 58
[July 1960]: 193-206,196).
2 Carl Wittke, The German-Language Press in America (Lexington, Ky.,
1957), pp. 255-56; Andrew]. Townsend, "The Germans of Chicago" (Ph.D.
diss., University of Chicago, 1927), pp. 144-48; Harold L. Ickes, The Autobiog-
raphy 0/ a Curmudgeon (New York, 1943), p. 186.
3 Wittke, The German-Language Press, pp. 238-43, 259-61.
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Overall, the problems of the war seemed to make Chicago's Germans
more ethnocentric and united.4
Once America entered the war, however, the Abendpost became very
patriotic and pro-Wilson, for reasons of self-preservation as well as
sincere patriotism.5 This was facilitated by the issuance of the Fourteen
Points in early 1918, which the Abendpost accepted with great enthusi-
asm and which was the keystone of its support of the Democrats in the
fall elections. President Wilson was a Uman of peace," the paper said,
who had gone to war uonly against the German government, not against
the German people," and who wanted a League of Nations uof all
people," including the Germans. For this reason, all of UWilson's per-
sonal candidates" should be elected.6
James Hamilton Lewis, campaigning for reelection to the Senate,
played upon this kind of sentiment and upon German-American fears:
uTo Illinois-this Illinois, the largest German state of America-to this
Chicago, the largest German city of America, Berlin's eyes are turned. The
Kaiser and Hindenburg are watching the election."7 These tactics were
fairly successful. The Abendpost supported Lewis, uSo he can pursue the
president's policy of peace in the Senate"; a vote for his opponent
(Medill McCormick, who won) was a vote for the URoosevelts and
Lodges" and other supporters of an unjust peace.8 German voters agreed,
although not overwhelmingly: these traditionally Republican voters gave
Lewis 54 percent of their senatorial vote.
Other Chicago ethnic groups were also very much involved in the
Great War, but they did not always relate their interest to American
politics. The Swedes, like the Germans, were sympathetic to the Central
Powers, out of distrust of Great Britain and Russia.9 But they were not
4 Townsend, tcThe Germans of Chicago," p. 68.
5 The Illinois Staats-Zeitung, which remained more critical of the United
States, was forced to suspend publication during the war and never really
recovered. The implications of this were not lost on the Abendpost. (See Wittke,
The German-Language Press, p. 265; Townsend, "The Germans of Chicago," pp.
178-79.)
6 Abendpost, Nov. 4, 1918, p. 4.
7 Chicago Daily News, Nov. I, 1918, p. 2.
8 Sonntagpost, Nov. 3, 1918, pp. 4, 8; Abendpost, Nov. 4, 1918, p. I.
9 Reuel Hemdahl, UThe Swedes in Illinois Politics: An Immigrant Group in
an American Political Setting" (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1932), p.
431; Ickes, Autobiography, p. 185·
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intimately involved. The Irish, too, favored the Central Powers over their
foremost enemy, Great Britain. The rest of Chicago's ethnic groups
seemed pro-Ally from the start and stayed that way.10 Some even outdid
the Native-Americans in jingoism. The Czech press, for example, was
virulently anti-German and participated in all the agitation in favor of
restricting civil liberties to remove any pro-German sentiment in the
United States.11 By and large, however, and especially among the central
and eastern European ethnics, it was a case of overwhelming interest in
the course of the war itself which tended to minimize rather than
accentuate questions of American politics.
Wilson's plea for a Democratic Congress in 1918 received consider-
able attention in the metropolitan press, as did the answers of prominent
Republicans.12 But the foreign language press refused to become involved
in the campaign in any great way and devoted itself instead to straight
war news, plus news of the Liberty Loan campaign and the current flu
epidemic. This political apathy existed despite an alleged administration
effort to pressure the foreign language press, through the machinery of
the foreign language division of the Liberty Loan organization, into
prominently featuring the president'S appeal for a Democratic Congress.13
The war and looming peace did have some effect on ethnic political
behavior in 1918, although less than in 1920 when the trammels on free
expression were no longer felt. As with the Germans, most of this activity
favored President Wilson and the Democrats, expressing the real or
forced patriotism of wartime. One leading Polish newspaper, Dziennik
Chicagoski, cautioned its readers to remember President Wilson and what
he was doing for Poland on election day.14 Even a Republican Italian
paper, La Tribuna Italiana Trans-Atlantica, while supporting a straight
Republican ticket, felt obliged to justify itself, arguing that the Republi-
10 Ickes, Autobiography, p. 185.
11 Denni Hlasatel, April 2, 1918, WPA. According to Cermak's biographer,
he was a leading Hun-baiter during the war, although advised that this was
politically dangerous. (Alex Gottfried, Boss Ce1'mak of Chicago: A Study of
Political Leadership ([Seattle, Wash., 1962], pp. 92-95.) This is exaggerated,
however, since Cermak was close to the Germans, particularly through the United
Societies, and was always treated well by the German press and German voters.
12 E.g., Chicago Daily News, Oct. 25, 1918, p. I; Chicago Tribune, Oct. 26,
1918, p. I; Chicago Daily News, Oct. 31, 1918, p. I.
13 Chicago Tribune, Nov. I, 1918, p. 6.
141 Dziennik Chicagoski, Nov. 2, 1918, p. I.
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cans had supported Wilson more faithfully than the Democrats.15 A
Greek paper argued identically.16 And the Chicago Jewish Courier, like
Dziennik Chicagoski, reasoned that Wilson's plea for a Democratic Con-
gress deserved to be satisfied by Jewish voters.17 The relatively high
Democratic vote among all the ethnic groups in 1918 well reflected this
loyalty to the party in power during wartime.
More significantly, because it was free of wartime restraints, was the
effect of this general issue on the election of 1920, and to a lesser extent
on that of 1919. The whole problem telescoped into the question of a
League of Nations. The Democrats were identified as the party of the
League and of Woodrow Wilson, while the Republicans were identified
as opposed to both. It was clear that the people as a whole were opposed
to the League in 1920, and James M. Cox realized this; he complained
that the Republican National Committee sent scouts out on his campaign
trail to urge Republican newspapers to deluge him with questions on the
League (obliging him continually to commit himself).18
The German-American reaction to this issue was intense; the peace
treaty was far different from what they had expected, and the proposed
League excluded Germany. Throughout the nation the German press
rebuked uWilsonism" in language antithetical to that of 1918; it hoped
for the nomination of isolationist Hiram Johnson by the Republicans and
ultimately strongly supported Warren G. Harding as the anti-Wilson
candidate.19 Chicago's Germans were very strongly anti-League in 1920.20
To the Abendpost, the whole election centered on the League, and it
insisted that German voters choose uHarding and staying out of the
League.,,21 With the Sedition Act no longer hanging over its head like a
guillotine, the Abendpost rapidly lost its Wilsonian fervor.
15 La T,.ibuna ltaliana T1'ans-Atlantica, Nov. 2, 1918.
16 Saloniki, Aug. 10, 1918, WPA.
11 Jewish Cou1'ie,., Oct. 29, 1918, p. 4.
18 Chicago Tribune, Sept. 12, 1920, p. 3. On the predominance of the League
issue and the general animosity to the League, see Chicago He,.ald & Examine,.,
Oct. IS-Nov. 2, 1920, passim, and W. R. Hearst editorial, Oct. 27, 1920, p. I;
Chicago T,.ibune, same period, passim, especially p. I McCutcheon cartoons;
Chicago Daily News, same period, passim.
19 Wittke, The Ge,.man-Language p,.ess, pp. 277-78.
20 Townsend, "The Germans of Chicago," p. 180. The same seems true for
New York (Chicago Tribune, Sept. 7, 1920, p. 9).
21 Abendpost, Nov. I, 1920, p. 4.
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The Scandinavians agreed. The Norwegian Dovre Club issued an
announcement saying that the only issue in the election was the defeat of
Woodrow Wilson; it therefore endorsed the entire Republican ticket.22
The Swedish-language Svenska-Tribunen-Nyheter endorsed Harding be-
cause of his uAmerica First" program.23
The leading Italian-language newspaper, L'[talia, reacted profoundly
against Wilson and related this to both local and national elections. Its
Republican endorsements in the 1919 local election were made on
international issues: vote straight Republican to rectify the Ugreat blun-
ders . . . made by the party now in power" and to prepare for the
campaign of 1920.24 This reasoning continued into 1920 in a bitter attack
on Wilson, reflecting the feelings of Italians everywhere that the Amer-
ican president had betrayed them at Versailles. uWilson has always vio-
lated international ethics." The ccabuses of Wilsonism" were endless,
whereas Harding had fought the ucaprice of Pres. Wilson" in the Senate
and had opposed the president's policy on the UItalian question," doing so
etas an act of justice to Italy and all humanity." The peace conference,
under Wilson's direction, had done a etgrave injustice to Italy," but
Harding, as an ctItalophile," would rectify this, and the Republicans
ought therefore to be supported and Wilsonism defeated.25
Chicago's other major Italian-language paper agreed. It bitterly criti-
cized Wilson for the activities of George Creel (chairman of the Com-
mittee on Public Information), who, the paper insisted, was encouraging
ubolshevism" in Italy. It supported the whole Republican ticket, telling
Italian voters to etmock and snub the Democratic administration and elect
. . . Sen. Harding who is the champion of Americanism against hysteria
and of liberty against oppression."26
Italian voters, like the German and Scandinavian, articulated this
reaction to the issue of Woodrow Wilson and his international policy on
election day.27 Their general attitude was well summarized in the com-
22 Skanainaven, Oct. 29, 1920, WPA.
23 Svenska-T1'ibunen-Nyhete,., Oct. 13 and 17, 1920, WPA.
24 L'Ztalia, Mar. 30, 1919, p. I.
25 Ibid., Oct. 10, 1920, p. I; Oct. 24, 1920, p. I; Oct. 31, 1920, p. I.
26 La Tribuna ltali-ana T1'ans-Atlantica, Oct. 9, 1920, p. 7; Oct. 30, 1920, p. 2.
27 One national study of the 1920 election points out the "correlation
between Republican gains and the percentage of German-Americans, Austrian-
Americans, Irish-Americans and Italian-Americans in that state:' (Wesley M.
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ment of Titto Ruffo, star baritone of the Chicago Grand Opera: ttA Bas
the league of Nations. It is no good. Harding and Coolidge-they will
win this fall, sans doute."
The Negro attitude on this issue was stated in a Chicago Defender
editorial which argued that the league was not considered a paramount
issue ttby us." ttThe More Important Issue" was seen in an accompanying
cartoon, showing Harding and Cox arguing over the league while a
lynched Negro hung from a telephone pole in the background.28
There were groups, however, to whom Wilson's policies were not
offensive. This was particularly true of the submerged nationalities of
eastern Europe which achieved national independence as a result of the
Congress of Versailles. In Chicago, the group most affected was the
Poles. The very large and prestigious Polish Roman Catholic Union, for
example, had telegraphed its thanks to President Wilson in I9I9 for rec-
ognizing the Polish government; Polish freedom and independence, it
said, were ccmainly due to yoU.,,29 Dziennik Chicagoski, which had been so
strongly pro-Wilson in I9I8, remained so. In endorsing the Democratic
candidate for mayor in I9I9, it had argued that a vote for his opponent
(Thompson) would be CCa vote against Pres. Wilson and a free Poland.,,30
In 1920, this paper recognized that Harding would probably win, but
endorsed the Democratic candidates. Cox, too, was a ccgood friend of
Poland the Polish people.u3l Dziennik Zwiazkowy, official newspaper of
the Polish National Alliance, had been so interested in the war in I9I8
that it had totally ignored American politics and was rather unclear on
this issue in I920, probably because its tradition was nonpartisan. It
endorsed the League of Nations and noted that Poles were very grateful
to Wilson for the League and other help; but it did not endorse Cox. In
fact it grew critical of Wilson's wartime administration and, while re-
maining uncommitted, said that many voters would opt for the Republi-
cans.32 Thus devotion and gratitude to Wilson did not automatically
Bagby, The Road to Normalcy: The Presidential Campaign and Election of I920
[Baltimore, Md., 1962], pp. 159-60, 185 n.)
28 Chicago Defender, Oct. 23, 1920, p. 12.
29 Narod Polski, Nov. 5, 1919, WPA.
30 Dziennik Chicagoski, Mar. 30, 1919, p. 16.
31 Ibid., Oct. 27, 1920, p. I; Oct. 28, 1920, p. I; Oct. 30, 1920, pp. 1,4.
32 Dziennik Zwiazkowy, Oct. 28, 1920, p. I; Oct. 30, 1920, pp. 5, 6; Oct. 31,
1920,PP. 1,4; Nov. 2, 1920,p.4.
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result in support of the Democrats in 1920; and Polish voters reflected
this, giving 61 percent of their presidential vote to Harding.
Roughly the same thing obtained in the Jewish press, where there
was much adulation of Woodrow Wilson as a Umessianic figure" of
peace, particularly because of strong Jewish acceptance of the idea of a
League of Nations.33 But Jewish voters, like Polish voters, reasoned other-
wise and delivered strong Republican majorities.
The issue of Wilson and his peace plans and activities was a real
issue, and one with considerable effect. But it was more powerful in
reinforcing the Republican-predisposed than the Democratic-predisposed
voter. That is, Wilson's detractors were more strongly moved to vote
Republican by the issue than were his friends to vote Democratic. The
difference probably reflected the fact that other concerns of the time
reinforced Republican voting and impeded Democratic. The Polish press,
for example, while very grateful to Wilson, seemed by 1920 to suffer a
war-weariness that led to passive acceptance of the likelihood of a
Republican victory.
The effect of the issue was considerable, and to the disadvantage of
the Democrats. The group that remembered it longest, the German-
Americans, would continue to identify the Democrats with Wilson and
the hated League for several elections to come.
Prohibition was the greatest ethnic issue, both for its precise aims and
for the more general ethnic-Native-American conflict which it epito-
mized. This was an old conflict in Chicago, long predating the passage of
the Nineteenth Amendment. In 1873, for example, Mayor Joseph Medill
let himself be pressured into closing the saloons on Sunday, something
which Illinois law required but which Chicago had generally ignored.
This resulted in the formation of a People's party, with strong ethnic
(and particularly German) support, which elected Harvey D. Colvin to
the mayoralty in 1874 and reopened the saloons on Sunday.34
In 1906, with the Prohibition movement becoming more and more
powerful, the editor of the Abendpost suggested a meeting which led to
the formation of the United Societies for Local Self-Government. The
33 Jewish Courier, Oct. 27, 1918, pp. 4-5; Nov. 2 and 5, 1920; Dr. Louis L.
Mann, personal interview.
34 Lloyd Lewis and Henry J. Smith, Chicago: The History of Its Reputation
(New York, 192 9), pp. 147-48.
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United Societies was an interethnic pressure group which concerned itself
with a number of immigrant problems, but especially Prohibition. It
became Chicago's leading opponent of the Prohibition movement, as that
movement came closer and closer to victory. By 1919, at its fourteenth
convention, the United Societies allegedly comprised 1,087 separate eth-
nic organizations, representing a membership of 258,224 people.s5 Here
there was power. The organization was officially nonpartisan, but admit-
tedly political. As time went by it became rather pro-Democratic, par-
tially because most Chicago anti-Prohibitionists were Democrats, and
primarily because Anton Cermak was its secretary and leading figure and
used the organization for his own and his party's success. The United
Societies was the outstanding interethnic, or omni-ethnic, organization in
the city; it continued to exist and derived its power from the fact that the
overwhelming majority of Chicago's ethnics found the idea and then the
actuality of Prohibition absolutely repugnant.
The effects of Prohibition in Chicago, as elsewhere, are well known:
patent breaking of the law and the rise of disregard for the law; a rapid
rise in the crime rate; increased drinking and alcoholism; growing resent-
ment and dissent. A 1926 study of the problem in the Back-of-the-Yards
area of Chicago (Polish, Lithuanian, and other newer immigrant stock-
yards workers) by the University of Chicago Settlement described the
situation and the ethnics' attitudes toward it. The Settlement, which
favored Prohibition, concluded that it was a Hhuge joke" in Chicago:
countless saloons could be found in the area, often operating under police
protection; much home-brewing was also discovered; there seemed to be
more drinking in 1926 than ever before; women in the area felt that
Uneighborhood conditions were worse" under Prohibition; there was
animosity between the Roman Catholic clergy, which opposed Prohibi-
tion, and the Protestant clergy, which favored it; most businessmen
opposed it; and to the residents it was an insult forced upon them by the
Native-Americans, which was uencroaching upon their personal lib-
erty."SG The frequency with which terms such as liberty and freedom were
used in the anti-Prohibition struggle suggests the complexity of the issue
and its social and political ramifications.
It is important that the ethnics not only opposed Prohibition but also
35 Ahendpost, June 9, 1919, WPA.
36 "Prohibition Survey of the Stock Yards Community, 1926:' MS in Mary
McDowell Papers, Chicago Historical Society.
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tended to feel that it was something willfully and maliciously foisted
upon them by the Native-Americans. The battle for repeal was also a
battle for the general recognition of ethnic rights.
There were opinion referenda on Prohibition at four points in time
between 1919 and 1930. In each of these referenda, Chicagoans voting
on the issue voted between 72 and 83 percent anti-Prohibition; thus it
was not only the ethnics who were Wet.31 The first of these ballots was
included in the 1919 mayoralty and was typical. The question was: uShal1
this city become Anti-Saloon territory?" Chicago as a whole voted 73
percent UNo," the newer immigrants 88 percent, the older immigrants
78 percent, the Natives 58 percent. The Czechs, Germans, Lithuanians,
and Italians all voted 90 percent or more against; the Yugoslavs and
Poles over 80 percent, the Jews 77 percent. The Negroes were only
slightly more anti-Prohibition than the city at large, 75 percent; and the
Swedes were close to the Native-Americans, at 64 percent. (See Table
VII:2.)
Thus the two most Protestant ethnic groups-Swedes and Negroes
-were the two least opposed to Prohibition. The Germans and Czechs,
on the other hand, although each group had numbers of Protestants, had
long traditions of anti-Prohibition activity and were the highest UNo"
voters of all. Most important, of course, was the fact that great majorities
among all groups were opposed to Prohibition, in this and subsequent
referenda, and that all of them were considerably more opposed to
Prohibition than the Native-Americans.38
The strength of this anti-Prohibition sentiment was important to
political behavior, since the Wet cause came to be associated with the
81 See Harold F. Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago, 1937),
p. 145. On the whole, "the Catholics, the foreign born, the unemployed, the
persons who pay the lowest rents, and the non-home owners tend to be wet.
Inversely, the Protestants, the native whites of native parentage, the employed, the
persons paying the highest rents, the home owner, the persons with superior
educational attainments tend to be the dries" (ibid., p. 149). All these general-
izations are true, but within the ethnic groups I have discovered little difference in
anti-Prohibition voting on the basis of socioeconomic status; the ethnic animosity
to Prohibition was most determining.
88 Jewish Forward, Mar. 26, 1919, p. 1; Dziennik Chieagoski, Mar. 30, 1919,
p. 16, Mar. 31, 1919, pp. 1,7; Amerikanski Slovenee, Feb. 17, 1926, WPA;
Denni Rlasatel, May 21, 1917, April 23, 1917, Mar. 27, 19 17, Mar. 17, 1917,
WPA; Abendpost, Mar. 20, 1919, letters to the editor.
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Democratic party, both locally and nationally. This association can be
seen throughout the period, but tended to become clearer and greater as
time went by, steadily contributing to ethnic Democratic allegiance.
In the election of 1920, Cox 'and Harding both tried to avoid the
issue, but it was not easily done. Cox, whose campaign was more active,
had a particularly grueling time. He was endlessly questioned in Chicago
about his stand on the issue, but simply insisted that it was dead and not
to be discussed.39 The Democratic gubernatorial candidate, James Hamil-
ton Lewis, was less fearful and campaigned strongly against Prohibition;
he was rewarded with the endorsement of the United Societies.40 This was
significant and a lesson to future candidates, since Lewis led the Demo-
cratic ticket in Chicago. At the same time, he received a majority from
only one ethnic group, making it clear that other issues were involved,
here as in all subsequent elections. Nonetheless, Lewis's opposition to
Prohibition clearly helped him, and other Democrats would profit from
the example.
Agitin on the national level, the 1924 election did not offer any real
alternatives on this crucial issue. Ethnic press involvement was primarily
with the questions of immigration restriction -and the Ku Klux Klan,
especially since none of the candidates was speaking forcefully on Prohi-
bition. Democrat John W. Davis, however, did argue for "personal
liberty" in Chicago, and, as one reporter put it, CCthey all thought personal
liberty meant free liquor."41
In 1928 the issue was joined much more vigorously, and the two sides
were clearly delineated. As the generally Republican La Tribuna Italiana
Trans-Atlantica put it in a headline: uPROHIBITION OR NO PROHIBI-
TION!! THAT'S THE QUESTION." Not only was it the question, but it was
also the main reason Italians were advised to vote for Al Smith for
president and for all other anti-Prohibition candidates as well. (ccGreat
are the merits, most numerous, of Antonio [sic] Cermak, the champion of
personal liberty." ) 42
The larger L'Italia reasoned similarly. In the long run, it said, the
39 Chicago Tribune, Sept. 12, 1920, p. 10; Sept. 13, 1920, p. 7.
40 Chicago Herald & Examine,., Oct. 27, 1920, p. 4.
41 Chicago Tl'ibune, Sept. 19, 1924, p. Iff.
42 La Tl'ibuna ltaliana Tl'ans-Atlantica, Sept. 22, 1928, p. I; Oct. 6~ 1928, p.
I; Oa. 20, 1928,pp. 1,3.
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issues of the campaign were simply the udinner pail" for Herbert Hoover
and anti-Prohibition for Smith. Many voters would be willing to forsake
the security of Republican rule in their ardor to be rid of Prohibition.
This paper endorsed the entire Republican ticket, as usual, with the
exception of the presidency, where it was neutra1.43 Prohibition was
clearly the main reason for its refusal to endorse Hoover.
These feelings were quite general. The Democratic Dziennik Chica-
goski advised its Polish readers that teA big moment in your lives"
approached, especially since Smith was so strongly against Prohibition.44
The Abendpost placed Prohibition above all other issues; one headline
proclaimed: U cI CAN AND WILL CHANGE THE PROHIBITION LAW-AL
SMITH.'" Hoover, on the other hand, was a Utool of the Anti-Saloon
League." Cermak, like Smith, was a Ufighter against Prohibition" and was
thus endorsed, as were larger numbers of Democrats than ever before.45
The Widespread effect of this issue in 1928 was seen in the editorial of
a nonpartisan Danish paper, which reasoned exactly as had L'Italia.·
voters would be deciding between Republican prosperity and Democratic
Wetness.46
The Democratic Jewish Courier also devoted a great deal of space to
the Prohibition issue, to the advantage of Smith and the Democrats.47 The
Negro Chicago Defender, on the other hand, while making its first
Democratic presidential endorsement, concentrated on other issues. It
thus reflected the milder repeal feelings of Negro voters.48 And a leading
Swedish paper, reflecting the voting of Chicago's Swedes, was not very
Wet at all and stayed Republican in 1928.49
After a general and vacillating identification of the Democrats with
'3 L'Italia, July 15, 1928, p. 2; Oct. 14, 1928, p. I; Oct. 21, 1928, p. I.
44 Dziennik Chicagoski, Nov. 2, 1928, p. 7; Nov. 4, 1928, p. 24; Nov. 5,
1928, p. Iff.
45 Abendpost/Sonntagpost, Nov. 4, 1928, p. Iff.; Nov. 5, 1928, p. Iff.; Nov.
3, 192 8, p. 9. Given the rather overwhelming qualitative and quantitative
evidence for the role of the Prohibition issue in 1928 which is in this chapter,
one is rather unimpressed by suggestions that it was an Uinsignificant" correlate of
Smith voting, even when buttressed by partial analysis (e.g., Ruth C. Silva, Rum,
Romanism and Votes [University Park, Pa., 1962], p. 43). Cf. Table VII:I.
46 Danske Tidende, Oct. 19, 1928, and Oct. 26, 1928, passim.
47 Jewish Courier, Oct. 17, 1928, p. 8; Nov. 4, 1928, p. 8.
48 E.g., editorial of Nov. 3, 1928, Pt. 2, p. 2.
49 Svenska-Tribunen-Nyheter, Oct. 26, 1921, Feb. 15,1922, WPA; Oct. 31,
1928, p. I.
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the anti-Prohibition cause, this became very well articulated in 1928.
Alfred E. Smith's stand on this issue played an important role in the
voting changes of that year. The only two groups which failed to give
Smith majorities in 1928-the Swedes and the Negroes-were also the
two ethnic groups which voted least anti-Prohibition in the referenda on
that question. Similarly significant was the fact that Cermak, the local
Wet leader, did even better than Smith among ethnic voters in 1928.
This emphasis on Prohibition continued into the 1930 elections,
attracting much more attention than did the Depression; and the ethnics
continued to associate the Democrats with repeal. To some groups it was
the only real issue. For example, La Tribuna Italiana Trans-Atlantica,
which returned to the Republican party in 1930, cautioned its readers
that: uWe renew our prayer to the Italian voters that, whatever their
party, they ... respond with a YES to all the [anti-Prohibition] questions
on the REFERENDUM ballot.,,50 In supporting Ruth Hanna McCormick
for the Senate, rather than ttJ. Ham." Lewis, La Tribuna assured Italian
voters that she would vote against Prohibition and that Lewis really could
do nothing to get it abolished.51 Thus, albeit negatively, here was an
admission that most Italians did look upon the Democrats as the real
Wets.
The 'Germans continued to be the leading battlers against Prohibi-
tion. Mrs. McCormick, in seeking their votes, allegedly said that UNo
German should sell his soul for a glass of beer.,,52 But the Abendpost was
unrufiled by this admonition and concluded that Prohibition was the great
issue of the election, noting that most of the real anti-Prohibitionists were
Democrats.53 The paper worked mightily to secure Lewis's election, basi-
cally on this one issue, as did a newly organized German-American
Liberty League, which campaigned for Lewis because of his Ufight for
individual freedom."54
When the election was over, a leading Slovak paper decided that the
returns demonstrated that ttthe public has proved what it thinks of the
50 La Tribuna ltaliana Trans-Atlantica, Nov. I, 1930, p. I. There were three
Prohibition questions on a special ballot; a uYes" vote was a vote against
Prohibition. See also Dziennik Zwiazkowy, Nov. 3, 1930, p. 7.
51 La Tribuna ltaliana Trans-Atlantica, Nov. I, 1930, p. I.
52 Abendpost, Nov. 6, 1930. WPA.
53 Ibid., Nov. 2, 1930, pp. 1-3,4.
54 Ibid., Nov. 2, 1930, p. 20; Nov. 6, 1930, WPA.
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present administration and prohibition."55 Even the Republican Svenska-
Tribunen-Nyheter, which was relatively friendly to Prohibition, admitted
that the issue was a major factor in diminishing Republican power.56
Finally, 1932 was but a continuation of 1928 and 1930: continuing
great attention focused on Prohibition and continuing identification of
opposition to it with the Democratic party. By this time all congressional
candidates from Chicago--of both parties-were acknowledged Wets, a
strong indication of voters' wishes; in the state, all Democratic congres-
sional candidates were Wet, while twelve of the twenty-eight Republi-
cans refused to commit themselves.57
The German press had moved, by 1932, into a position of real
Democratic party support because of the issue: HONLY THE DEMOCRATIC
PLATFORM GIVES THE GUARANTY OF ABOLISHING THE COERCION LAWS,
The Main Issue of the Whole Campaign is the Prohibition Question."
Thus German voters should UVote the Whole Democratic Ticket"-the
first time this paper had ever made such a recommendation.58 The effect
of this one issue on German political behavior could hardly be overesti-
mated. A leading Polish paper reasoned similarly in 1932: Prohibition
had given H a bad name to our country," and a straight Democratic vote
was the only answer.59
The major Italian papers are missing for this election, but certainly
they continued to be concerned with Prohibition. Which party this led
them to in 1932, however, is not known. The Yiddish-language press did
continue to cite Prohibition as a major reason for its Democratic endorse-
ments.60
In local politics Prohibition also served the Democrats, but it took
some time before this became clear. When Mayor Thompson campaigned
for reelection in 1919, he was criticized for having inaugurated Sunday-
closing in 1915, after promising to oppose it. But he managed nonetheless
to appear Wet. The very anti-Prohibition Abendpost, for example, de-
cided that he and his Democratic opponent, Robert M. Sweitzer, were
equally Hrespeetable" on the issue, and simply urged its readers u many
55 Osadne Riasy, Nov. 7, 1930, WPA.
56 Svenska-Tribunen-Nyheter, Nov. 12, 1930, WPA.
57 Chicago Tribune, Sept. 10, 1932, p. 7.
158 Abendpost, Nov. 7, 1932, pp. 1,4.
59 Dziennik Chicagoski, Nov. 2, 1932, p. 2.
60 Jewish Courier, Oct. 19, 20,25, 26, 1932, p. 1; Nov. I, 193 2, p. 4.
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-hundred thousand times" to vote against Prohibition on the opinion
ballot.61 Other ethnic newspapers also saw the candidates as equally Wet
and the issue was therefore minimized in 1919. (Overwhelming ethnic
interest in European events tended to overshadow the mayoralty, any-
way.) It is worth noting, however, that all the candidates endorsed by the
Anti-Saloon League for the Illinois General Assembly in 1920 were
Republicans.62
In 1923, when Thompson was not a candidate, roughly the same
situation prevailed. Neither candidate made Prohibition an issue. But in
1927, when Thompson returned to confront Mayor William Dever,
Prohibition was very important. Dever was not a Dry, but he had tried to
maintain an honest administration and to enforce the law. The results of
his effort had been ttdisastrous"-the reformed police department had
closed thousands of liquor places, and, to some, Chicago had become Hthe
driest large city in the country.,,63
For this reason Thompson combined a uwide-open town" appeal with
that of America First in the 1927 campaign. He promised his Negro
audiences, for example, that he would end the upolice terror" in Chicago:
ttWherever Bill Dever closes up one [liquor] joint, I will open up two.
Wherever he closes up one wet place, I will open two. . . . I will break
any cop I catch on the trail of a lonesome pint into a man's house or car. I
will put them on the street and they must catch hold-up men.,,64
Dever assured the ethnics that he was as Wet as Thompson, or wetter.
He told a Czech audience that Thompson only talked while he, as mayor,
had gone to Washington to testify against Prohibition; to German and
Polish audiences he pointed out the number of Drys in the Illinois
Republican party, hoping to taint his opponent with their dryness.65
61 Abendpost, Mar. 3 I, 1919, p. 4.
62 Chicago T1'ibune, Sept. 13, 1920, p. 7. This says as much about the
Anti-Saloon League as it does about the Illinois Republican party.
63 Lite1'a1'Y Digest 79 (Dec. 15, 1923): 16. The statement was more wishful
thinking than anything else, but Dever did try to live up to his ureform" image.
See also Kate Sargent, cCChicago, Hands Down-tBig Bill' and Politics," F01'um
78 (Nov. 1927): 708-24, 7 11 ; Dever Papers, folders 32-34, Chicago Historical
Society.
64 Chicago De/ende1', Mar. 19, 1927, p. Iff.; Merriam, "Recollections" (MS
Autobiography), ch. 7, p. 7, Merriam Papers, University of Chicago; William H.
Stuart, The Twenty Incredible Yea1'S (Chicago, 1935), p. 297; Lite1'(lry Digest
93 (April 16, 1927) : 6.
65 Chicago T1'ibune, April I, 1927, p. 12.
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Clearly both candidates sensed the importance of the issue. The United
Societies, which was by then pretty well controlled by Cermak, advertised
in the German press that a Thompson who had gone back on his
anti-Prohibition pledge in 1915 could not be trusted in 1927, whereas
Dever was a real fighter against Prohibition.66 Perhaps this had some
effect: the Abendpost refused to endorse either candidate, arguing that
there were no important differences between them.67
The issue received much attention in 1927, but the Democratic press
tended to stay with Dever and the Republican with Thompson. To each
side, its champion was the real Wet of the two. Most indicative was the
neutrality of the Abendpost, which could always be counted upon to
support the wetter candidate. Thompson's victory, and his support from
lower-class ethnics, who had the hardest time in circumventing Prohibi-
tion, was certainly facilitated by Dever's effort to enforce the law and
Thompson's promise to flout it.
By 1930 Thompson lost this issue, because one of the nation's leading
Wets now controlled the local Democracy. Cermak had played a leading
role in placing the anti-Prohibition referenda on ballots earlier in the
decade and continued to epitomize organized political Wetness.68 In
March of 1931, one month before Cermak defeated Thompson for the
mayoralty, the Illinois Senate passed the O'Grady-McDermott bill, and
Illinois became the sixth state to repeal its enforcement laws. All thirteen
Cook County Democrats voted for the bill, as did five of the six Cook
County Republicans.69
In 1931, the issue of Prohibition was rather overshadowed by that of
ethnic intolerance, but Cermak did profit from his long years of leader-
ship. As the German-American Liberty League put it, Cermak was Hour
trustworthy old leader,"70 and his years of fighting the ethnics' greatest
battle paid off.
Because ethnic voters were able to express their feelings about Prohi-
bition in the voting booth, it is the one issue of the period for which we
can construct quantitative models. In Table VII: I are listed Pearson's l'
66 Sonntagpost, April 3, 1927, p. 12.
67 Abendpost, April 4, 1927, pp. 1,4; Sonntagpost, April 3, 1927, p. I.
68 See Gottfried, Boss Cermak, pp. 118-19.
69 Chicago Tribune, Mar. 26, 193 I, p. I.
70 Abendpost, Apri14, 1931, p. 7.
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Correlations between Voting against
Prohibition, 1919, and Voting for
Leading Candidates, 1919-1932*
Candidate, Office, Year
Cox, President, 1920
Davis, President, 1924
La Follette, President, 1924
Smith, President, 1928
Roosevelt, President, 1932
Thompson, Mayor, 1919
Dever, Mayor, 1923
Thompson, Mayor, 1927
Cermak, Mayor, 1931
Thompson, Hayor, 1931
~ with voting against
Prohibition, 1919
.62
.20
.25
.75
.58
-.80
.60
-.52
.45
-.45
"J~Calculation of Pearson's r between percentage vot-
ing "No" on proposition, "Shall-This City Become Anti-
Saloon Territory" in 1919, and percentage voting for
named candidate, for nine ethnic groups.
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correlations for ethnic voting against Prohibition in the 1919 elections
with ethnic voting for leading candidates of the period. And in Table
VII:2 there are percentage figures for voting on this proposition, as well
as standard deviations for each group and between groups.
The correlations for national voting clearly agree with our qualitative
data of the role of the Prohibition issue in the Smith campaign. Of the
contests shown, only the Smith candidacy has a really statistically signifi-
cant relationship with voting against Prohibition in 1919; the anti-Prohi-
bition vote ttexplains" 56 percent of the Smith vote of 1928. Even
Roosevelt in 1932 appears to have benefited far less from anti-Prohibi-
tion sentiment, as did all the other presidential candidates of the time.
In mayoral voting there is a striking lack of positive relationship
between anti-Prohibition voting and pro-Thompson voting, which is
quite opposite from what one would expect in looking at the rhetoric of
the decade. The 1919 contest saw a significant negative relationship; the
1927 Hwide-open town" campaign resulted in relatively little change; and
Cermak voting clearly related more highly-albeit not very strongly-to
anti-Prohibition voting than did Thompson voting in 1931. Here there is
a strong hint of the weak foundations of Thompson's relationship with
most of Chicago's ethnic groups: while individual groups (e.g., the
Germans) may have seen him as a Wet leader, the ethnics as a whole did
not make him their champion in the one issue which meant the most to
them.
The importance of this issue to them is indicated in Table VII: 2. We
have already noted the size of the anti-Prohibition voting majorities. The
relatively small standard deviations reinforce this. The s of 10.1 for all
nine groups was the lowest s among them for any election between 1914
and 1936. And the s of 5.5 for the five recent immigrant groups was
lower than that for any election except the 1936 presidency. Within
groups also, s was unusually low. The ethnics were both strong and
strongly united in their opposition to Prohibition. And the Democrats
were profiting from this by the end of the 1920S.
There were a number of complementary ethnic issues that can be
called Hethnic interest and defense." These include such problems as
immigration restriction and various forms of real and imagined ethnic
and religious prejudice. These issues tended to wax and wane in impor-
TABLE VII:2
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Percentages and Standard Deviations of Ethnic Group
Vote against Prohibition, 1919*
Percentage Anti- Standard
Group (s) Prohibition deviation
Nine ethnic groups 83 10.1
Five recent immigrant
groups 88 5.5
Czechoslovaks 95 2.3
Italians 90 4.0
Poles 83 13.2
Lithuanians 91 4.5
Yugoslavs 82 10.7
Germans 93 3.8
Swedes 64 8.7
Jews 77 5.8
Negroes 75 8.6
*Based on percentage voting "No" on proposition, "Shall This
City Become Anti-Saloon Territory,lI in 1919. Standard deviation
computed between ethnic groups and between areas comprising sample
of each ethnic group, as indicated.
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TABLE VII:3 ImU<dgration into the united States Based on Varying Scales,
1922-1929
Country of Actual immigrants Annual quota Annual quota
origin fiscal 1923 1921-1924 1924-1929
Great Britain 48,277 77,206 34,007
Sweden 17,918 19,956 9,561
Norway 11,745 12,116 6,453
Denmark 4,523 5,644 2,789
Germany 48,277 68,039 51,227
Czechoslovakia 13,840 14,269 3,073
Poland 26,538 20,019 5,982
Yugoslavia 6,181 6,405 671
Lithuania 1,828 344
Russia 17,507 34,247 2,248
Italy 46,674 42,021 3,845
Jews 49,719 11,483*
Source: World Almanac and Chicago Daily News Almanac for relevant
years.
*There was no quota for Jews; this number represents the actual number
of Jewish immigrants, fiscal 1928, within the quotas of the various nations
from which they came.
tance, but all had political effects at one time or another (a prime
example is seen in Cermak's defeat of Thompson in 1931). None of
these issues, however, was as omnipresent, nor as omnipotent, as Prohibi-
tion.
Immigration restriction was a very real problem, especially after the
passage of the Johnson Act in 192 4. The 3 percent quota established in
1921 was based on the census of 1910 and greatly diminished the
number of immigrants allowed into the United States. The Johnson Act
created an even more restrictive 2 percent quota based on the census of
1890 (see Table VII:3).
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The table makes clear the difference between the two quota laws. All
immigrant groups except the Germans were to be allowed fewer immi-
grants under the Johnson Act than had actually entered in fiscal 1923
(and the number in fiscal 1923 was by no means high for any group).
Moreover, the newer immigrants would suffer most of all, as the law had
intended.
It was not surprising, then, that the Chicago Italian Chamber of
Commerce formally protested the proposed immigration law in 1920 and
emotionally denounced the 1924 Johnson bill as meaning that «tthe
American nation will brand millions of its citizens as belonging to an
inferior race.u71 This reaction was typical. More to the point was the fact
that the Chicago delegation to testify against the Johnson bill was
dominated by Democrats and led by Alderman Jacob M. Arvey, and that
the battle in the House was often led by Chicago Democratic Congress-
man Adolf J. Sabath, who was probably the most vociferous opponent of
restriction in the entire Congress.72 The major restriction legislation was
passed by a Republican Congress, under Republican presidents, and this
was equally important.
The strong ethnic opposition to immigration restriction included
older as well as newer immigrants: both the John Ericsson Republican
League of Illinois and the Danish-American Citizens League of Chicago
denounced the restriction laws, as did countless newer immigrant organi-
zations.73 It does seem that ethnic opposition to restriction was led by the
Democrats, who in turn profited therefrom. When a joint committee of
Poles, Czechs, and Slovaks was formed in 1927 to create a united
Slavic-American opposition to restriction, the temporary president was
none other than Tony Cermak.74 As with Prohibition, Cermak put him-
self on top of a major ethnic issue to the advantage of his own career and
that of his party.
71 Chicago Italian Chamber of Commerce Bulletin, March 1920 and March
192I, WPA; Chicago Italian Chamber of Commerce to Senate Immigration
Committee, April 1924, WPA.
72 See, e.g., speech before the House, May 18, 1928, Sabath Papers, American
Jewish Archives. Sabath also strived to associate opposition to immigration and to
immigrants with the Republican party (see Jewish Courier, Oct. 25, 1932 , p. 4).
73 Hemdahl, "The Swedes in Illinois Politics;' p. 230; Danske Tidende, Sept.
17, 1926, WPA.
74 Dziennik Ziednoczenia, Oct. 18, 1927, WPA.
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The problem was complicated by the reluctance of either of the
national parties to take a stand against restriction. But the Republicans
more clearly supported it during the early 1920S, and the Democrats
profited from simply saying nothing. For this reason a Polish paper
supported John W. Davis in 1924.75 And an Italian paper that supported
Calvin Coolidge argued in his defense that the Johnson Act had been
passed over his veto;76 this, too, showed the importance of the issue.
When both parties supported restriction in their 1928 platforms, the
studiedly nonpartisan Interpreter, official journal of the Foreign Lan-
guage Information Service, printed one of the very few political editorials
of its history, saying that neither party could any longer be looked to for
help in alleviating the quota laws.77
Al Smith did commit himself against discriminatory restriction legis-
lation, and this had some effect in 1928. A Polish paper argued that the
Republicans were against immigration from Poland, while Smith was
ufair" on the issue.78 An Italian paper also endorsed Smith for this reason,
but noted with some fear late in the campaign that he seemed to be
weakening.79 Unlike the John Ericsson League, the Svenska-Tribunen-
N yheter did not see anything wrong with restriction; indeed, it looked
upon it as a safeguard of the Umixture of races which makes up the
American people" and cited it as one of the reasons for staying Republi-
can.80 This agreed, however, with the ethnic conception of the Democrats
as the antirestriction party.
In 1932 the Democrats returned to their earlier policy of saying
nothing about restriction, while the Republicans continued to support it.
Thus the Democrats continued to appear as the immigrants' only hope.
The ethnic press did not devote much attention to the issue after 1928. It
75 Dziennik Chicagoski, Nov. 4, 1924, p. I.
76 La T,ibuna Italiana T,ans-Atlantica, Oct. I I, 1924, p. 2. This was not true;
Coolidge had signed the bill. The other Italian paper argued similarly, saying that
more Democrats than Republicans had voted for the bill (L'Italia, Nov. 2, 1924,
p. I).
77 The Inte,p,ete, 8 (June 1928): 3-6.
78 Dziennik Chicagoski, Nov. 4, 1928, p. 24.
79 La Tribuna Italiana Trans-Atlantica, Oct. 20, 1928, p. 3. For this reason,
probably, the Smith forces ran an ad in L'ItaUa on election eve (a day that La
Tribuna was not published) strongly reasserting his stand against the Johnson
Act.
80 Svenska-Tl'ibunen-Nyhete1', Oct. 3 I, 1928, p. 4.
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was always there, implicitly, but was seldom specifically mentioned.
When the leading Chicago Yiddish paper devoted two major editorials to
an assurance that ((Gov. Roosevelt Speaks for Humanitarian Immigration
Law-Is Against Registration [sic] Law," it was concentrating on an
issue that most other ethnic papers had apparently given up as lost.81
But immigration restriction had been an issue of some importance and
as such worked to the Democrats' advantage. It was they who articulated
what little opposition there was to restriction, and ethnic voters recog-
nized this.
The Ku Klux Klan also aroused ethnic interest, particularly in 1924
and, to a lesser extent, 1928. The issue helped neither party in 1924, since
neither was willing to take a strong stand against it. Candidate John W.
Davis, for example, asked Coolidge to agree that the Klan was not an
issue; the president wisely declined to answer, leaving Democrats to stew
in essentially Democratic juices.82 The Abendpost complained about the
weakness of both parties here; Robert M. La Follette seemed to it the
only candidate really against the Klan.83 A Democratic Yiddish paper, on
the other hand, argued that it was Davis who was really anti-Klan, while
Coolidge refused to do anything about it and La Follette had Klan-like
views himself.84 A Republican Italian paper said that Coolidge was the
Klan's real enemy.85 Thus there was no consensus, simply because neither
party was truly committed on the issue.
The Klan was, however, basically a Democratic problem in 1924, and
the party was hurt by it. As the Negro Chicago Defender put it, ((The
Klan was born in the stronghold of the Democratic Party, and flourishes
there today."86 The issue might well have hurt the party more, in the long
run, were it not for the fact that the Klan became effectively Republican
in 1928, due to its animosity to Smith's Catholicism. Thus the Defender
would argue in support of Smith because he had udenounced in no
uncertain terms the Ku Klux Klan.,,81 The Smith candidacy had the effect
81 Jewish COUNe,., Oct. 26, 1932, p. I; Nov. 7, 1932, p. 4.
82 Chicago T,.ibune, Aug. 24, 1924, pp. 12-13.
83 Abendpost, Aug. 25, 1924, WPA.
84 Jewish Courier, Oct. 16, 1924, p. 8; Oct. 17, 1924, p. 4; Oct. 26, 1924,
p. I.
85 La Tribuna ltaliana Trans-Atlantica, Oct. II, 1924, p. 2.
86 Chicago Defender, Oct. 4, 1924, p. 16.
81 Ibid., Nov. 3, 1928, Pt. 2, p. 2.
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of removing the Klan from around his party's neck, and this did work to
the party's advantage with ethnic voters.
On the whole it was not a major issue, because it was short-lived. But
it does help explain ethnic Republican voting in 1924 and Democratic
voting in 1928. After that time, the issue was dead in Chicago.
Religious bigotry was a related issue. It, too, came and went in
Chicago politics for both local and national elections. Most of this bigotry
was anti-Catholicism, and in the long run it, too, aided the Democrats
with the largely Catholic newer immigrants. The first of William Hale
Thompson's successful contests for the mayoralty (1915) was marked
by religious acrimony. Local Republicans allegedly mailed thousands of
letters to voters, pointing out Democratic candidate Robert Sweitzer's
Catholic loyalties. Reciprocally, Democrats publicized Thompson's Ma-
sonic support.88 Similar developments took place when the two met again
in 1919; both were accused of injecting the Ureligious issue" into the
campaign.89 But the ethnic press was not very involved in this and drew
no conclusions from it; and Thompson won both times.
In 1923, when Catholic Democrat William E. Dever ran against
Lutheran Republican Arthur Lueder, religious bigotry again entered a
mayoral campaign. There was considerable anti-Catholic publicity against
Dever, as in a broadside distributed around the city by the HCommittee of
Public School Teachers":
NON-CATHOLICS: If you want Rome to run our Public Schools
and City Government vote for WILLIAM E. DEVER, Democratic
candidate for Mayor. He is a Roman Catholic and a member of
the Knights of Columbus.90
The campaign itself was rather dull, and the effects of this publicity were
probably not too great. It was noticed, however. One Italian paper felt
that the Ureligious question . . . did much to influence the foreign
element, especially the Jews, to vote for Mr. Dever."91 And it is true that
88 Lloyd Wendt and Herman Kogan, Big Bill of Chicago (Indianapolis, Ind.,
1953), pp. 107-108; Lewis and Smith, Chicago, p. 375; Stuart, The Twenty
Incredible Years, p. IS.
89 Chicago Tribune, Mar. 22, 1919, p. 7; Jewish Courier, Mar. 28, 1919, p. I.
90 A copy can be found in the Agnes Nestor Papers, Chicago Historical
Society.
91 La Parola del Popolo, Apri17, 1923, WPA.
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Dever became, in 1923, the first Democratic mayor in eight years.
Anti-Catholic politics was a two-edged sword in highly Catholic
Chicago.92
In the 1928 presidential campaign religious prejudice reached its
political zenith. The criticism of Al Smith because he was a Catholic
contributed to the size of his vote and on the whole served the Demo-
cratic party in ·Chicago. The religious issue received a great deal of
publicity. Some of this sentiment came from nonpolitical sources, but
much of it did come from Republican partisans.93
The largely Catholic immigrant groups were understandably pleased
that a coreligionist might become president and were sensitive to the
anti-Catholicism of the campaign. The generally Republican La Tribuna
Italiana Trans-Atlantica decried opposition to Smith on social and reli-
gious grounds and felt that teindependent Americans" would have to vote
for him to demonstrate that religious bigotry was a thing of the past.94
The Polish-language Dziennik Chicagoski said that Republicans were
warring against teall Catholics, foreigners and Negroes," and it was
essential that Smith be eleeted.95 Even the very Republican L'Italia, which
was neutral in the presidential contest, was affected by the religious issue
and vigorously applauded Smith's denunciation of religious bigotry in one
of his major addresses.96 Smith's religion, like his stand on Prohibition,
pushed this paper out of the Republican column for the presidency for
the first time.
Non-Catholic ethnic groups were also affected by the religious issue
in 1928. A Yiddish newspaper was very concerned with tethe issue of all
issues-religion" and denounced Hoover for his reticence in condemning
92 There were some allegations of anti-Catholicism being used against Dever
in 1927, when he lost to Thompson. These were not great, however, and
Thompson's America First campaign cannot really be called anti-Catholic in any
but the most general and implicit sense. (See Jewish Courier, Mar. 18, 1927, p.
14.)
93 See John M. Allswang, UPortrait of a Campaign: Alfred E. Smith and the
People of Chicago" (M.A. thesis, State University of Iowa, 1960), pp. 26-35.
There was little anti-Catholicism in the press of Protestant ethnic groups, but see
Nov. 10, 1928, editorial of Svenska Kuriren, reprinted in Gustave E. Johnson,
ccThe Swedes of Chicago" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1940), p. 54.
94 La Tribuna Italiana Trans-Atlantica, Nov. 3, 1928, p. I.
95 Dziennik Chicagoski, Nov. 2, 1928, p. 7; Nov. 4, 1928, p. 24.
96 L'ltalia, Oct. 14, 1928, p. I; Oct. 2 I, 1928, p. I.
I36 A House for all Peoples
the religious attack on Smith.91 Rabbi Stephen S. Wise campaigned in
Chicago for Smith and used the same arguments.98 This was a matter of
practical as well as ideological importance to Chicago's Jews: UToday a
Roman Catholic will be disqualified from holding public office. Tomor-
row a Greek Catholic will be disqualified, and the day after, a Jew will
suffer the same fate.,,99 The Abendpost also considered the issue and
argued that Smith, whom it favored, was religiously Uliberal', and that
there was no need to fear him on this account.100 The Scandinavian press,
on the other hand, did not devote much attention to the issue. The Negro
press did stress it, however: in making its first presidential endorsement
of a Democrat, the Defender was impressed by Smith's opposition to
CCracial and religious bigotry"; hopefully, his suffering of the latter would
make him active against the former.10l
The religious question did not reappear in significant form subsequent
to 1928. It was not as long-lived an issue as Prohibition, nor as influen-
tial, but it did play a role in both local and national elections. Most
important, it was another of the ethnic issues that worked to the advan-
tage of the Democratic party.
The Depression was not an uethnic issue," but it was an issue of
considerable interest to the ethnics. It was frequently mentioned in the
campaigns of 1930 and 1932, but in both instances Prohibition was of
much greater concern, despite the severity of the Depression among the
ethnics of Chicago.
Inevitably the Depression was associated with the party in power, and
the Republicans had the misfortune to be in power nationally, locally,
and at the state level. Thus in the 1930 campaign, Dziennik Chicagoski
charged that the full dinner pail had become the empty dinner pail and
that the Republicans were responsible.102 In 1932 it said the Depression
was worsening and that the answer was political change: UWith Demo-
91 Jewish Courier, Oct. 3, 1928; Nov. 4, 1928, p. I.
98 Chicago Tribune, Oct. 26, 1928, p. 8; Jewish Courier, Oct. 28, 1928.
99 Jewish Courier, Nov. I, 1928, p. 8.
100 Abendpost, Oct. 3 I, 192 8, p. 3.
101 Chicago Defender, Nov. 3, 1928, Pt. 2, p. 2.
102 Dziennik Chicagoski, Oct. 21, 1930, p. I; Oct. 30, 1930, p. I; Oct. 31,
1930, p. I.
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crats-Better Times.,,103 A Slovak paper, also generally Democratic, simi-
larly blamed the Republicans for the Depression in both campaigns.104
And a Greek paper said the same thing in 1932, arguing that the
ttRepublican administration has done nothing to alleviate depression ills,"
but rather had Uaccentuated them.,,105
The Italian press, on the other hand, was so fully involved in the
problem of Prohibition in 1930 that it simply ignored the Depression.
The same was true of the Abendpost, which was becoming more and
more Democratic in 1930 and 1932. Only when the Prohibition question
was fully settled did it consider the Depression, and then it argued the
issue in favor of the Democrats.10G A Swedish paper did see the 1930
results as an economic protest against the Depress~on.l01 The Yiddish
press and Jewish opinion leaders felt the same in 1932.108
Local elections, too, were affected by the Depression, again to the
Democrats' advantage. The ethnic press was primarily concerned with
purely ethnic problems in 1931, but the ethnics participated in the
general worker alienation from the Republican party. Many labor organi-
zations supported the Cermak candidacy in reaction to the ctRepublican
Depression," and there was more worker involvement in this campaign
than in any other local election of the period. An teA. J. Cermak for
Mayor Union Labor Club" was organized, financed by a group of a
hundred unions and representing over 300,000 workers.l09 Many of
Chicago's ethnics were involved in this and other labor organizations
active in the election, virtually all of which supported Cermak.
These are the issues that most affected Chicago's ethnic voters be-
tween 1918 and 1932 and the political response that emanated from
them. Certainly there is nothing here which conflicts with our quantita-
tive data on ethnic political behavior. Indeed, most of these issues, and the
103 Ibid., Nov. 2, 1932, pp. 2, 5.
104 Osadne Hlasy, Nov. 7, 1930, Oct. 17, 1930, Feb. 24, 1933, WPA.
105 Hellenic Center News, Oct. I, 1932, WPA.
106 Abendpost, Nov. 3, 1934, WPA. Cf. Nov. 3, 1930, p. Iff., and Nov. 7,
1932, pp. 1,4·
101 Svenski-Tribunen-Nyheter, Nov. 26, 1930, p. I.
108 Jewish Courier, Oct. 19, 20, 25, 1932, p. I; Oct. 26, Nov. I, 1932, p. 4.
Dr. Louis L. Mann, personal interview.
109 Chicago Tribune, Mar. 14, 1931, p. 8.
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most important and latest of them, clearly help to explain the rise of the
Democratic party among the ethnics of Chicago. The only major issue
which ran contrary to this trend was the series of questions revolving
around Woodrow Wilson and his international policies. But this issue
died over time, and by the end of the period was virtually gone. Other
issues that persisted, and new ones that arrived, tended to reinforce ethnic
Democratic voting and to increase it from year to year, particularly from
1928 on.
VIII. Political
Organization
Ethnic membership in and identification with political parties are not
only indexes of political change but are also forces promoting such
change. Thus the ethnic press's conception of the two major parties
demonstrated its party loyalty over time, and it also served as an influence
on ethnic voting behavior. The same forces, then, were indicators and
agencies of change-both cause and effect.
This is evident in the phenomenon of the ethnic composition of party
tickets, which is an important indicator of ethnic political allegiance (see
Tables V:2 and V:3) and also a major determinant of ethnic political
motivation. As a force for change, ethnic representation on party tickets
and in political office has a twofold importance: ethnics tend to vote for
members of their group, regardless of party affiliation; and ethnics tend
to support whichever party affords the greatest representation to their
group.
The situation of the Negro was typical. In 1920 a Republican Italian
judge upbraided a Negro audience for not forcing one of their own onto
the Municipal Court; every Italian, he said, had ensured his election by
voting for him. Negroes should do the same. Reporting this, the Broad
Ax complained: uThe Irish-Americans, the German-Americans, the
Swedish-Americans, the Italian-Americans, the Jewish-Americans, the
Polish-Americans, And All the Other Nationalities Amounting to Any-
thing in This City, Aside from the Japanese, Chinese and the Colored
Race, Have Representatives on the Municipal Court Bench."1 Twelve
years later, Negroes would make the same plea, as the Defender said
during the 1932 campaign: uWe are entitled to a Judge."2 A similar
source of Negro resentment was the prevalence of whites as precinct
captains in Negro areas.s Both parties were guilty here, but continuing
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Negro Republicanism was logical enough: in 1930 the Republicans
slated a Negro for the Municipal Court (who-lost), along with eight
other Negro candidates, including the only Negro congressman in the
country and the only Negro state senator in Illinois. The Democrats in
1930 did not have one Negro candidate.4
The same forces operated among the rest of Chicago's ethnic groups.
The Czechs, for example, entered the Democratic party when they arrived
in the 1880s, in good part because Czechs were nominated for office by
the Democrats.5 This continued through the years, and the Czechs re-
mained Democratic. One Czech newspaper, strongly recommending Cer-
mak for the presidency of the County Board in 1922, also noted: UAll
Czechoslovak voters, both men and women, should forever bear in mind
that there are four of our countrymen on the Democratic ticket and not
one on the Republican-and act accordingly next Tuesday."a Czechs, like
other ethnics, expected their representation to increase steadily. The
Slovaks, who fared less well in this regard, were threatening to Ujoin the
other side" as late as 1930, uif the Democrats fail to recognize US.,,7 A few
years earlier, the leaders of the Chicago Hungarian Republican Club had
1 B1'oad-Ax, Oct. 23, 1920, p. 3. This is a good example of the operation,
among ethnic groups, of the concept of urelative deprivation." The concept has
been characterized as an Uinterpretative variable," ua provisional after-the-faet
interpretative concept which is intended to explain the variation in attitudes." In
this case, with all ethnic minorities considered as one reference group, Negroes
are affected by the fact that all other members of the group are faring better than
they, and they feel deprived relative to the others. The feeling would tend to
reinforce Negro Republican voting, since their better representation in that party
would result in the feeling operating less in the Republican than in the
Democratic context. (See Robert K. Merton, in collaboration with A. Rossi,
"Contributions to the Theory of Reference Group Behavior," in Social The01''Y
and Social Structure, rev. ed. [Glencoe, 111., 1957J, esp. pp. 227-30; James A.
Davis, uA Formal Interpretation of the Theory of Relative Deprivation," Sociom-
etr'Y 22 [Dec. 1959J: 280-96.) The concept has potentialities for the study of
ethnic group history that deserve intensive exploration and refinement.
2 Chicago Defender, Sept. 17, 1932, Pt. 2, p. 2.
S Harold F. Gosnell, Negro Politicians (Chicago, 1935), p. 137.
4 Chicago Tribune, Oct. 16, 1930, p. 6; Frances W. McLemore, c'The Role of
the Negroes in Chicago in the Senatorial Election, 1930" (M.A. thesis, Univer-
sity of Chicago, 1931), p. 12.
5 Alex Gottfried, Boss Cermak of Chicago,· A Stud'Y of Political Leadership
(Seattle, Wash., 1962), p. 42•
.. Denni Rlasatel, Nov. 5, 1922, WPA.
'I Osadne Hlas1, Oct. 17, 19~0,WPA.
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threatened to join the Democrats if they did not get three political jobs;
and they probably so joined.8
The Republican Italian press generally endorsed the entire Republi-
can ticket, but always with the exception of any Italian Democrats.
Italian candidates always came first. And when an election was generally
uninteresting, they tended simply to publicize the Italian candidates of
both parties, and to ignore the rest.9 The relative Republicanism of the
Italians in 1932 is partially explained by the fact that they were still
better represented by the Republicans than by the Democrats. But they
were becoming better represented in the Democratic party under Cermak,
and for this reason many Italians were switching.10 The more Democratic
Poles responded in a similar fashion. When a Polish-American Demo-
cratic congressman supported a Jewish Democrat for the state senate,
rather than his Polish Republican opponent, the newspaper of the Polish
Roman Catholic Union protested vigorously.11 And as a progressively
higher proportion of Polish candidates appeared on the Democratic
ticket, the Polish press became progressively more attached to the party.
The generally nonpartisan paper of the Polish National Alliance became
partisan indeed when Democrat M. S. Szymczak ran for city treasurer in
1927; the importance of this ethnic attraction was clear in the fact that
Thompson advertisements in this paper endorsed Szymczak rather than
Thompson's own running mate.12 The most partisan Polish newspaper
always lost its partisanship when a Polish candidate ran for the other
party.13
This ethnocentricity in politics was not confined to less assimilated
ethnic groups. The Abendpost, for example, took an unprecedentedly
strong stand in local politics when Arthur Lueder ran for mayor in 1923,
and as late as 1934-when it was a Democratic paper-it recommended
the election of all German-American candidates, regardless of party.14 In
1928 the Abendpost warned Thompson that, in return for their support
in 1927, German-Americans wanted more political representation than
8 Magyal' Tl'ibune, Mar. 12, 1926, WPA.
9 L'ltalia, Mar. 30, 1919, p. I; Oct. 26, 1930, p. II.
10 George L. Spatuzza, personal interview.
11 Dziennik Ziednoczenia, April 7, 1922, WPA.
12 Dziennik Zwiazkowy, April 4, 1927, pp. 7, 9.
13 E.g., Dziennik Chicagoski, Nov. 3, 1930, pp. 6-7.
14 Sonntagpost, April I, 1923, p. I; Abendpost, Nov. 3, 1934, WPA.
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they were receiving.15 And the Abendpost supported Cermak in 1931.
This problem was not as great among the Germans as among some other
groups because they were pretty well represented in both parties by 1932;
but it was always an issue.
For the Jewish press, increasing Jewish representation in the Demo-
cratic party was important. The Jewish Courier felt this to be true always,
and it reached its highest point in 1932, when a Jew received the
Democratic nomination for governor (Uforget everything in order to give
your vote to the Democratic candidate for governor, Henry Horner") .16
Even at this point, the Democratic Courier supported all Jewish candi-
dates, regardless of party, but the fact that most of them were Democrats
was important.17
In this context, the data in Tables V:2 and V:3 assume a new
importance, as reasons for ethnic voting changes. The differences between
the two parties were not overwhelming. But there was a steady rise in
ethnic representation in the Democratic party, particularly for the newer
immigrants. Given the intense importance attached to this factor by the
ethnic press and other ethnic spokesmen, this development is a significant
force for change in ethnic political behavior. Other aspects of political
organization will further clarify the forces of change.
The development of local party organizations is an indicator of
changing ethnic-consciousness in party self-conceptions. Ethnic reactions
to these developments were instruments of political change. That is, in Big
Bill Thompson's career we can see not only his organization's reaction to
the ethnics but also the ethnics' reaction to his organization. The same,
obviously, also applies to Cermak's Democratic organization. And a
climax was reached when the two men confronted one another in the
mayoralty of 1931.
Thompson's antiwar stand in his first term in office (1915-1919)
probably lost him more ethnic support than it gained. His enforcement of
Sunday closing laws in 1915 was also resented by the ethnics. When he
15 Abendpost, Apri16, 1928, WPA.
16 Jewish Coul';e" Nov. 3,1918, p. I; April 6,1923, WPA; Oct. 28,1932,
p. I.
17 In 1932, for example, Republican Samuel Heller was strongly supported
for the Municipal Court in the same preelection editorial which endorsed
Roosevelt and Horner. <Jewish Coul'iel', Nov. 7, 1932, p. 4.)
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tried to get the Republican nomination for the United States Senate in
1918, he suffered the first loss of his political career: in the primary he
carried the city with 57 percent, but lost the state with only 40 percent.
His alleged pro-Germanism was resented by newer immigrant leaders.18
The same held true in his successful campaign for reelection in 1919. Fred
Lundin, one of his leading advisers, felt his strength for the campaign
would be among selected ethnics: the Negroes and the anti-British Irish
and Germans.19 Lundin was only partly right. There was considerable
German support for Thompson, then and later. The Deutsch-Amerikan-
ischer Burgerbund, for example, reminded German voters that it was
Thompson who had kept the city safe for them during the war. And the
Abendpost agreed.20 But only half of the German voters felt the same.
Thompson's 1919 victory was essentially a party victory, in that he did
best among the traditionally most Republican groups-Jews, Swedes, and
Negroes. There was no strong ethnic break in his favor.
Thompson's 1919 victory was actually built on a weak alliance-
weak because it pretty well excluded the newer immigrants and also
because its reliance on the Negro vote alienated other ethnic voters.21
Moreover, further weakness came from the disruptive effect that Thomp-
son was beginning to have on the Illinois Republican party. By 1920 this
animosity was open and sufficiently bitter that the Republicans were
unable even to agree on where and when to hold their preelection
convention.22 Things got worse as time passed. Throughout the 1920S
there were generally three strong factions in the party and sometimes
more; occasionally two or more would work together for one campaign,
but the fragmentation always returned. This made the party less effective
than it might have been, and in some campaigns ethnic spokesmen
specifically cited Republican factionalism as a reason for supporting the
Democrats.23
18 Chicago Daily News, Oct. 6, I9I8, p. I; Lloyd Wendt and Herman Kogan,
Big Bill of Chicago (Indianapolis, Ind., I953), pp. I6I-62.
19 Wendt and Kogan, Big Bill of Chicago, pp. I67-68.
20 Abendpost, Mar. 2, 1919, WPA; April 2, I9I9, WPA.
21 The Abendpost, for example, noted that efforts had been made to dissuade
Germans from voting for Thompson because he was pro-Negro. (Mar. 31, I9I9,
WPA.)
22 Chicago T'1ibune, Sept. 20, 1920, p. I.
23 E.g., Jewish Courie'1, Mar. 25, 1923, p. 8, Nov. 4, I932, p. 8; Dziennik
Chicagoski, Mar. 30, I923, p. I; Chicago Defender, Mar. 31, 1923, p. 10. A
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Internecine Republican conflict partially dictated Thompson's deci-
sion not to try for a third term in 1923; it was reinforced by the aura of
corruption around his chief allies and himself. Fred Lundin had just been
indicted for fraud of three million dollars in School Board expenditures,
and Thompson was fearful. More scandal had appeared in the guberna-
torial administration of his ally, Len Small. And, for the time, the Robert
E. Crowe and Edward Brundage factions of the party were fighting him.
So Thompson removed himself from active politics for four years,
another factor which probably weakened his position in the long run.
Nonetheless he was triumphant when he reentered politics in 1927 to
run for a third term as mayor. One contemporary analyst of his uAmerica
First" campaign felt that it exerted a strong ethnic appeal because it was
not really anti-English, but rather anti-American English-the white
Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture dominating American life.24 But this kind
of analysis was at most only partly right. Thompson did not carry the
votes of the Czechs, Poles, or Lithuanians in I927, and his vote among all
the newer immigrants was only 50.4 percent; this certainly demon-
strated no strong hold on ethnic sympathies. He profited greatly from the
Negro vote, and from continuing German loyalty, which was greater in
I927 than in 1919-and here, perhaps, Prohibition was the crucial
issue.25
While winning a third term, Thompson was also creating the forces
that would undercut him. In 1926 he had broken with Fred Lundin, who
supported his own candidate in I927: Dr. John Dill Robertson, formerly
Thompson's health commissioner. Thompson bitterly attacked Lundin
during the campaign, in one of his famous exhibitions (debating two rats
in cages, one called uFred" and the other UDoc"). Chicago's Swedish-
Americans were offended at this treatment of one of their more famous
countrymen.26 Thompson had also broken relations with Governor Small
convenient summary of the factions in the Republican party can be found in
Carroll H. Wooddy, The Chicago Primary of I926 (Chicago, 1926).
24 Editorial in the New York Evening Post, quoted in The Interpreter 6
(Nov. 1927): 3-5. One ethnic newspaper came to the same conclusion: Magyar
Tribune, Feb. 25, 1927, WPA.
25 Chicago Tribune, Mar. 21, 1927, p. 5; Abendpost, Dec. 7, 1926, WPA,
April 6, 1928, WPA.
26 The Swedish Club of Chicago voted to "censure William Hale Thompson
for calling a Swede a rat." Chicago Tribune, Dec. 18, 1926, quoted in Reuel G.
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in 1925-1926, creating another faction; they came back together for the
1927 campaign, with Thompson promising to support Small's reelection
in 1928. But it would be an uneasy reconciliation, and, moreover, it was a
reconciliation that required Thompson to break an earlier promise of
1928 gubernatorial support to Illinois Attorney General Oscar Carlstrom.
He was in a bind, with no easy way out.27
Newer immigrant resentment of Thompson's Negro alliance also
emerged in 1927. Italian and Polish newspapers used this as a reason for
endorsing Dever. To La Tribuna Italiana Trans-Atlantica, Thompson was
making Chicago ((the Mecca and Paradise Land of the Negro." Negroes
were infiltrating Italian neighborhoods, depreciating property values, and
competing with Italian workers for jobs. And ((promiscuity of races"
threatened-all due to Big Bill's friendship for the Negroes.28 Dziennik
Chicagoski agreed: a front-page cartoon showed Big Bill kissing a HCol-
ored Thompsonite" while a ((White Thompsonite" said uAmerica First.,,29
Ethnic animosities were real and put Thompson in a difficult position, but
he needed his Negro votes too badly to do anything about it.
The relationship between Thompson and Chicago's Negroes was
clearly of the first importance, especially in its dual role of creating
Thompson's strength and of maintaining Negro Republicanism. It was
also important because of the effect this alliance had on the other ethnics
of Chicago. From the start of his career, Thompson had been oriented in
this direction: in his first term as alderman (1900-1902) he introduced a
bill for the building of the city'S first public playground-in the heart of
the Black Belt.so When he first ran for mayor, he enlisted the aid of
Bishop Archibald Carey, a leading Negro clergyman, and this alliance
was maintained throughout his career. He made alliances with rising
Negro politicians, such as Oscar De Priest, and gave City Hall jobs to
many Negroes to help Negro politicians build a going organization.
Hemdahl, uThe Swedes in Illinois Politics: An Immigrant Group in an American
Political Setting" (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1932), p. 417. See also
Gustave E. Johnson, "The Swedes of Chicago" (Ph.D. diss., University of
Chicago, 1940), pp. 45-46, 48-49·
27 See William H. Stuart, The Twenty Incredible Years (Chicago, 1935), pp.
226-27,327-28,335-36.
28 La Tribuna ItaUana Trans-Atlantica, April 2, 1927, p. 2.
29 Dziennik Chicagoski, Mar. 19, 1927, p. I.
so Wendt and Kogan, Big Bill of Chicago, p. 42.
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The mayor made frequent trips to the Black Belt to maintain his rap-
port with the mass of the Negro electorate.31
Thompson's opponent of 1915 and 1919, Robert M. Sweitzer,
doubted his sincerity: ttHe talks church, home and civil service in Hyde
Park; in the First and Second Wards it is, (I am for prize fights, dice
games and jobs for you colored boys.' ,,32 But Thompson was effective, as
when he told a Second Ward audience in 1919: uEnemies have tried to
divide us-they are trying to divide us now, but we have always stood
together and we always will. I've given you a square deal, and you've
given a square deal to me.u33 To this, a man in the audience cried out,
UYou're our brother," expressing the feeling that many Negroes had for
Thompson throughout his career. He received 78 percent of the Negro
vote in 1919, and the city's leading Negro newspaper exulted that, Ult
was a victory, not only for Mayor Thompson, but for the Chicago
Defender as well.,,34
Thompson's hold over Negro voters was convincingly demonstrated
in 1923, when he did not run for reelection. His role in the campaign is
not clearly known, but he did oppose Republican nominee Arthur
Lueder, who represented the rival Brundage faction of the party. By
implication at least (and perhaps quite openly in private councils)
Thompson supported Democrat Dever.35 This primarily affected Ne-
groes: Oscar De Priest openly bolted and endorsed Dever as did Alder-
man Louis B. Anderson, who shared control of Second Ward politics with
him.36 And the Chicago Defender refused to endorse anyone, bemoaning
the factionalism that was hurting the local Republican party.37
81 McLemore, HThe Role of the Negroes," p. 3; Lloyd Lewis and Henry J.
Smith, Chicago: The History of Its Reputation (New York, 1929), pp. 392-94.
32 Lewis and Smith, Chicago, p. 374.
83 Chicago T1'ibune, Mar. 25, 1919, p. 7.
84 Chicago Defende1', April 5, 1919, p. I. The elaborateness of Thompson's
Negro organization was already great by 1919, as the following perhaps apocry-
phal report of that year demonstrates. HOscar De Priest. . . was reading election
returns. One precinct showed 272 votes cast, of which 271 were for Thompson.
Oscar turned to a henchman. 'I know who double-crossed there: he said. 'Go out
and find Mose Jackson and give him a raking over the coals:" (Literary Digest
76 [Mar. 3, 1923]: 54.)
8fS Stuart, The Twenty Inc1'edible Yea1's, pp. 186-87. Stuart was a Hearst
reporter and Thompson apologist; he was apparently as close to Thompson as any
Chicago reporter.
86 B1'oad-Ax, Mar. 22, 1923; Gosnell, Negro Politicians, p. 44.
37 Chicago Defender, Mar. 3 I, 1923, p. 10.
Political Organization I47
Dever received 53 percent of the Negro vote (and 69 percent in the
Second Ward). Clearly, the Thompson-Negro alliance was strong
enough to persuade a majority of Negro voters to switch their party
loyalty in a local election.38 It was the combination of Thompson and
Negro politicians, working together, that accomplished this, but Thomp-
son made the mistake of thinking that he had done it alone.
Negro support was crucial in Thompson's bid to return to the mayor-
alty in 1927, and both parties knew it. The Democrats, still under the
leadership of George Brennan, unwisely chose the path of prejudice.
Calliopes went through the streets playing HBye, Bye Blackbird," and
distributing cartoons showing a trainload of Negroes coming up from
Georgia, piloted by Thompson: HThis train will start for Chicago, April
6, if Thompson is elected.,,39 When, early in the campaign, Thompson
apparently embraced a Negro child, Brennan distributed cartoons pictur-
ing this, and reading, UDo you want Negroes or White Men to Run
Chicago? Bye, Bye, Blackbirds."40 In a speech Brennan cautioned his lis-
teners not to turn the city over to Hthe black belt." Numbers of Negroes
were jailed during the campaign, in an apparent effort to exert political
pressure.41
The Democratic campaign backfired, since it solidified Thompson's
Negro support and did not arouse other ethnics to the degree necessary to
defeat him. It was a stupid policy in the politics of a pluralistic society,
where the louder prejudice becomes the less effective it tends to be.
Brennan's successor would know better.
Thompson built on the situation presented by the Democrats in his
campaign. Allover the city he called his critics Ulily white gentlemen"
and Utraducers and liars." He anticipated ethnic sympathy for his stand.42
When Brennan talked about ttBlack Belt Rule," Thompson replied that
CtThe black finger that is good enough to pull a trigger in defense of the
American flag is good enough to mark a ballot."43 And at a Negro mass
38 See St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, Black Metropolis (New York,
1945), p. 347·
39 Gosnell, Negro Politicians, p. 54.
40 Wendt and Kogan, Big Bill 0/ Chicago, p. 256.
41 George C. Hoffman, "Big Bill Thompson, His Mayoral Campaigns and
Voting Strength" (M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, 1956), pp. 36-38;
Chicago Tribune, Mar. I, 1927, p. Iff.
• 2 E.g., Chicago Tribune, Mar. 19, 1927, p. 6.
~ Chicago De/ender, Mar. 5, 1927, p. I.
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meeting, attended by both Thompson and Oscar De Priest, one speaker
said: ttyou must either vote for Thompson or else die.,,44
With this and his promise of a wide-open town, Thompson's Negro
support reached its apogee in 1927. The Defender called it Hone of the
dirtiest political campaigns ever held in the city of Chicago" and in its
own desire to ensure Thompson's election enjoined its readers to vote a
straight Republican ticket.45 Thompson received 90 percent of the Negro
vote (94 percent in the Second Ward, and as high as 98 percent in two
precincts of the Nineteenth Ward), and this was his margin of vietory.46
In the disastrous 1928 primary Thompson and his allies still had very
strong Negro support, and he continued sure of his invincibility with the
Negroes. But in 1930 it became clear how little he really knew of ethnic
politics.
Between Thompson and Ruth Hanna McCormick (widow of former
United States Senator MediII McCormick, and daughter of Mark
Hanna), there had never been friendship. This turned into real hostility
in 1930, when Mrs. McCormick was Republican nominee for the Senate
and Thompson sought to defeat her by delivering the Negro vote to
Democrat ttJ. Ham." Lewis. De Priest and other Negro leaders would not
join him, but he was implacable in his overconfidence. He arranged to
have a handbill, which attacked Mrs. McCormick as anti-Negro and
endorsed Lewis, distributed by an uUncle Tom" float and uniformed
policemen at the doors of Negro churches on a preelection Sunday.41 And
the plan backfired tremendously.
Oscar De Priest made a clear break with his old ally, saying repeat-
edly: UI was surprised to find the mayor a sick man. He certainly is not
the same man we elected mayor three times. No sane man, unless
44 Chicago Tribune, Mar. 26, 1927, p. 5.
45 Chicago De/ender, April 2, 1927, p. Iff., and Pt. 2, p. 2.
46 Another impressive indication of this strength: Edward H. Wright, a
leading older Negro politician, broke with Thompson in 1927 and supported
Robertson. He was able to get Robertson only 526 votes in the entire Second
Ward and only seven votes in his own precinct, despite the fact that his family
numbered eight! W right was replaced as Second Ward committeeman by Daniel
Jackson, who toured the Black Belt promising that Thompson would reopen
policy stations closed by Dever. (See McLemore, uThe Role of the Negroes," pp.
19-22; Wendt and Kogan, Big Bill of Chicago, p. 249; Gosnell, Negro
Politicians, ch. 8.)
.1 McLemore, "The Role of the Negroes," pp. 17-18, 24; Stuart, The Twenty
Incredible YeMs, pp. 412, 437-39.
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ill-advised or sick, would ask the colored people to vote for a Demo-
crat.,,48 De Priest stumped the state for Mrs. McCormick, telling Negroes
that to vote for Lewis would be to lose the franchise in the North.49 He
put out a special campaign newspaper, The Plain Truth, and set up mass
meetings in the Black Belt to reiterate these charges and to revive the
charges of racism which had been raised against Lewis, with justification,
in 1920.50
The Chicago Bee, a relatively new Negro paper, also denounced
Thompson for misleading Negroes and praised De Priest for his inde-
pendent Negro leadership.51 Even the very nonpolitical Chicago branch
of the NAACP bitterly attacked the mayor for opposing Mrs. McCormick,
and questioned his general comportment as wel1.52 The Defender,
Thompson's greatest journalistic support, said absolutely nothing.
The results showed how weak Thompson was without the support of
Negro politicians. Mrs. McCormick received 76 percent of the Negro
vote, while Lewis was carrying the city and every other ethnic group by
better than two-to-one. Thompson was the big loser. His Negro support
would never again be as great as it had been, and a number of his close
Negro allies left him. Even before election day he had acknowledged
defeat: he requested a meeting with De Priest and guaranteed he would
make no reprisals.53 At last it should have been clear to Big Bill that his
control over Negro voters was based on reciprocity, as are all political
48 Chicago T1'ibune, Oct. 27, 1930, p. 8; Wendt and Kogan, Big Bill of
Chicago, pp. 318-19. De Priest, of course, had openly supported Democrat Dever
in 1923, and perhaps covertly Smith, in 1928.
49 Chicago T,ibune, Oct. 22, 1930, p. 9.
50 McLemore, "The Role of the Negroes," pp. 42-47, 62-71 (she attended
these meetings, as a student of Harold F. Gosnell). A copy of The Plain T,uth
can be found in the Gosnell materials, Merriam Papers, University of Chicago.
In the 1920 campaign, Lewis had said: "This is a white man's government and as
long as I have voice or power to protest, I will never permit the criminal, lawless
Negro to overrun the righteous, law-abiding Negro or drive the white man from
the polls." (Chicago De/ender, Oct. 30, 1920, p. 12. A slightly different but
essentially similar version is in Chicago T,ibune, Oct. 26, 1930, p. 7. And see
also McLemore, p. 8n.)
51 Chicago Bee, quoted in McLemore, uThe Role of the Negroes," p. 55n.
52 Chicago T,ibune, Nov. 2, 1930, p. II.
53 McLemore, uThe Role of the Negroes," pp. 48-49; Stuart, The Twenty
Incredible Yea,s, pp. 437-39. One important white ally lost here was George F.
Harding, longtime boss of the Negro Fourth Ward, and one of Thompson's
earliest backers.
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relationships; but he was not a man to learn lessons this late in his career.
The 1930 campaign signified Thompson's reentry into political life,
despite the fact that he had been mayor since 1927. He had suffered the
greatest defeat of his career in the 1928 primary and remained very
inactive from that time until the fall of 1930. Chicago hardly had a
mayor during much of this time. The 1928 primary sheds considerable
light on the relationship between Thompson and the ethnics of Chicago.
Confident after his 1927 triumph, Big Bill immersed himself in na-
tional issues, looking once again to a place for himself in national
politics. He became a flood-control enthusiast and a leading supporter of
a Great Lakes to the Gulf waterway. He also participated in a ((Draft
Coolidge" movement, hoping to defeat Hoover's bid for the 1928 pres-
idential nomination.54 More controversially, in the fall of 1927 he tried to
implement his America First program in the Chicago public schools. He
harassed the Superintendent of Schools and finally had him put on trial,
primarily because school textbooks and the superintendent were allegedly
insufficiently patriotic and too anglophile. The school purge was followed
by a public library purge for similar reasons; book burning was threat-
ened. The whole affair was nationally publicized and kept the mayor on
the nation's front pages. It also disrupted Chicago's schools.55 Thompson
apparently expected ethnic support from this campaign-he was careful
to insist that America's foreign heroes were also inadequately honored.56
But the ethnic press, at least, was unimpressed.
At the same time, Republican factionalism grew worse. Thompson
had reneged on his earlier promise of 1928 gubernatorial support to
Oscar Carlstrom, switching to Len Small in order to have the latter's
support in the 1927 mayoralty. This renewed the anti-Thompson feelings
of a large segment of the party. State's Attorney Robert Crowe-pre-
viously a Thompson opponent-had joined Thompson and Small in a
rather unholy alliance, which prepared to do battle with the rest of the
party in the 1928 primary. All the other factions (the Charles Deneen
group, the Edward Brundage group, and various lesser ones) were united
54 Stuart, The Twenty Incredible Years, pp. 35I-55.
55 The best coverage of this whole affair is in George S. Counts, School and
Society in Chicago (New York, I928). See also Wendt and Kogan, Big Bill 0/
Chicago, pp. 284-302; John Bright, Hizzoner Big Bill Thompson (New York,
1930), chs. 15, 18, 19; Stuart, The Twenty Incredible Years, pp. 339-46.
56 Counts, School and Society in Chicago, pp. 280-83.
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under Deneen against them. The Thompson-Small-Crowe combine did
not help themselves by choosing Frank L. Smith as their senatorial
candidate. Smith had been elected to the Senate in 1926 in what was
generally called an uInsullized" primary. The Senate twice ruled his
election invalid because of Samuel Insull's huge investment in his candi-
dacy, and Smith was ultimately and decisively ejected from that body in
]an,uary 1928.51
Chicago's gangsters were also active in the 1928 primary, although
their exact role remains unclear. But Al Capone was involved, and the
primary campaign was characterized by bombings, murders, and general
violence. It was called the uPineapple Primary" because of the bombings
of the homes of Senator Deneen and his state's attorney candidate, John
A. Swanson, the leaders of the anti-Thompson group. When Crowe and
Thompson charged that the Deneen forces had engineered the bombings
to win voter sympathy, they chose a bad strategy, which backfired.58 The
leading candidates in the primary were Thompson-Small-Crowe: Small
for governor, Crowe for state's attorney, Smith for senator; Deneen
group: Louis L. Emmerson for governor, John A. Swanson for state's
attorney, and Otis F. Glenn for senator. The vote was a disaster for the
Thompson combine, both in the city and the state. In Chicago, Small
received 38 percent to Emmerson's 62, and Crowe received 39 percent to
Swanson's 61. Small and Crowe received strong majorities only among
the Negroes (68 percent) and the Italians (74 percent)-the former
was a pro-Thompson vote and the latter was probably influenced by the
gangsters. Otherwise, Thompson's candidates received bare majorities
among some relatively Democratic ethnic groups and did very poorly
among the most Republican. Table VIII: I compares the vote received by
Thompson in the 1927 mayoral primary with that received by Small and
Crowe in the 1928 primary for a graphic demonstration of how the
mayor and his allies slipped in the course of this one year.
Thompson lost ground with every ethnic group in the city, only one
year after his triumphal return to the mayor's office. The decline among
the most Republican groups (Jews, Germans, Swedes, Native-Americans,
51 Stuart, The Twenty Incredible Years, pp. 327, 335-36, 358; Wooddy, The
Chicago Primary of I926, and The Case of Prank L. Smith (Chicago, 1931).
58 Wendt and Kogan, Big Bill of Chicago, pp. 304-305; Stuart, The Twenty
Incredible Years, pp. 362-63; Lewis and Smith, Chicago, p. 467.
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and even the Negroes) showed that the local Republican party was far
from healthy. And Thompson's troubles were not over yet. Another blow
came shortly after the primary. For years the Uexperts' fees" case had been
dragging through the courts. This was a suit filed by the Chicago Tribune
against Thompson, George F. Harding, and others, accusing them of
cheating the city out of almost three million dollars through phony
usalaries" paid to hired real estate experts. In June 1928 a decision
emerged in the court of Judge Hugo Friend, a Deneen Republican. The
defendants were found guilty and held liable for $2,245,604. Thompson
was crushed, stayed away from City Hall, started drinking more, and
spent the greater part of the next two years in semiseclusion. Not until
the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the decision for lack of proof in the
fall of 1930 did Thompson really come back to life.59 Even then, his
return was less than striking, since it was to the unsuccessful attempt to
deliver the Negro senatorial vote to Democrat Lewis.
Tony Cermak's career was considerably different. It was, throughout,
more ethnically oriented. Cermak's political frame of reference was an
ethnic one, and he concerned himself with ethnic issues. His Democratic
party was clearly more ethnic at base than Thompson's Republican party.
It was also a more rational political movement.
The pre-Cermak Irish leadership of the local Democracy (by Roger
Sullivan and then George Brennan, until he died in 1928) was not
antiethnic. Both leaders had demonstrated considerable ethnic conscious-
ness in making up party tickets and in seeking votes generally. But they
were more interested in maintaining their own control over the party
than they were in victory and were considerably less ethnically oriented
than Cermak and the leaders who would rise with and after him. James
Hamilton Lewis was probably the most popular older Democrat with the
ethnics of Chicago, and he tended to stay away from the Brennan ma-
chine.60
The Irish leadership had effectively discouraged some ethnics from
59 Wendt and Kogan, Big Bill of Chicago, pp. 311-13; Stuart, The Twenty
Incredible Years, pp. 383-85; Charles E. Merriam, Chicago: A More Intimate
View of Urban Politics (New York, 192 9), p. 8S.
60 On Lewis's popularity with the ethnics generally, see Chicago Tribune,
Nov. I, 1920, p. 6.
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TABLE VIII:l Ethnic Vote for Thompson Organization in Republican
Primaries of 1927 and 1928 (Percentage of the vote
for the two major candidates received by candidate
named)
Group Thompson, 1927 Small, 1928 Crowe, 1928
Czechoslovaks 86 58 56
Poles 74 53 49
Lithuanians 64 48 52
Yugoslavs 70 45 39
Italians 74 72 76
Germans 63 36 34
Swedes 60 30 25
Jews 69 37 37
Negroes 90 68 68
Native-Americans 51 21 22
CHICAGO TOTAL 68 38 39
considering the Democratic party as a group vehicle. Clearly the Brennan
organization was anti-Negro, and this reinforced the Negroes' predilec-
tion for the Republican party. It also discounted a growing and ethnocen-
tric group, which was stupid politics and demonstrated Brennan's short-
sightedness. Other groups were similarly affected. The Swedes, for
example, moved into the Republican party in the late nineteenth century
partially out of their dislike for the Irish Catholic leadership of the
Democrats.61 And essentially the same leadership prevailed down to
1928. Even the Czechs entered the Democratic party Hin spite of" the
Irish leadership, and Slavic-Irish conflict and rivalry predated both Cer-
mak and Brennan.62
61 Johnson, "The Swedes of Chicago," pp. 39-43, 54, 103.
02 Gottfried, Boss Cermak, p. 31.
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The Sullivan-Brennan forces prevailed until Brennan's death in 1928
despite their failure to achieve consistent Democratic victories after the
war. In good part this was due to the real political talent of the Irish
leadership; inertia also helped. While the Republicans were torn by
faction during this period, the Democrats were not. There was a small
ureform" faction or group, led by former Mayor Carter H. Harrison and
former Governor Edward F. Dunne, which opposed Sullivan and Bren-
nan.63 But it was a small group of older men who were neither vocal nor
influential. What could have been a more severe rupture, involving
Cermak or other powerful members of the local Democracy, simply did
not rise above the surface. This may have kept Cermak down until
Brennan died, but it also established a tradition of party solidarity from
which he would profit when the time came.
Cermak's rise as an ethnic politician, his support, and the issues he
employed help explain his increasing importance in the local Democracy.
In 1912 he ran in his first citywide race, for bailiff of the Municipal
Court, and was victorious. He held this office through 1918, when he ran
for sheriff and suffered his first defeat (here, his practice of never
relinquishing one office until he had a higher one paid off). He did carry
the city in 1918, with 51 percent of the vote, but lost in the more
Republican suburban returns. The office traditionally went to the Ger-
mans, and he had a German opponent, Charles W. Peters. But despite the
wartime anti-German campaign, which his biographer says he engaged
in, Cermak was supported by the Abendpost and by 47 percent of the
German voters.64 He had, as usual, strong support from his fellow Czechs,
and from other ethnics as well. The seldom partisan organ of the Polish
National Alliance, for example, called him U one of our sympathizers" and
urged his election.65 He received majorities from all of the nine groups
except the Germans, Swedes, and Negroes. He led the ticket among the
Czechs with 86 percent; and among the other groups that went Demo-
cratic, he stayed within five points of popular HJ. Ham." Lewis. For a
young man running for his first major office, this was good.
63 See Harrison's penned comments on a Sullivan dossier of 191 5 and on an
undated [192os] letter to Dever, Harrison Papers, Newberry Library.
64 Gottfried, Boss Cermak, pp. 91-94; Abendpost, Nov. 2, 1918, WPA.
65 Dziennik Zwiazkowy, Sept. 12, 1918, WPA.
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In 1922 Cermak achieved real power. He was elected member and
president of the Cook County Board of Commissioners, a position of great
responsibility and a major steppingstone traditionally in Chicago politics.
He was reelected in 1926 and 1930 and came to be known as ((the Mayor
of Cook County." Each time he ran for this office he set up another
referendum on Prohibition-the issue and the man continued to be
identified with one another, to his advantage. From his power base on the
County Board, Cermak began to create an organization, and his alliances
were indicative. Starting with the Jews, he approached Moe Rosenberg
and Jacob Arvey of the Twenty-Fourth Ward ghetto.66 For his Irish ties
he sought out Pat Nash, who was alienated from the Brennan organiza-
tion and Brennan's chosen successor ( and Cermak's major rival) , Michael
Igoe. Significantly, Nash was also one of the few Democratic Irish
politicians with a reputation of friendship with Chicago's Negroes.67
Cermak thought ahead: in 1927, while Brennan sought to defeat Thomp-
son with an anti-Negro campaign, Cermak put the publisher of the
Broad-Ax on his Civic Commission. Negroes were duly informed.68
Thus he built an ethnic career, particularly oriented toward those
ethnics who were least well represented in the political life of the city.
The more advantaged ethnic groups were not ignored, however, and he
tried to establish a foothold with the Native-Americans as well. In 1928,
when he reluctantly agreed to run for the Senate, Cermak led the ticket in
Chicago. Al Smith had more publicity and elicited more ethnic interest in
the campaign, but Cermak was also noticed. And he did better than
Smith among all groups except the Italians and the Negroes. He carried
the city, with 53 percent (though losing the state), while Smith received
just under 50 percent. The two candidates complemented one another,
and each profited from the other's candidacy; neither would have fared as
well if the other had not run. Both contributed to the political change
that began with that election.
The same was tme in 1930, when Cermak was again reelected to the
presidency of the County Board. He ran slightly behind Lewis among all
groups, but this was because Lewis had a female opponent. Cermak
66 Gottfried, Boss Cermak, pp. 177-78.
67 Broad-Ax, Oct. 26, 1918, p. 2.
68 Ibid., April 9, 1927, p. I.
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received considerable ethnic support in this campaign and contributed to
the extent of the Democratic victory.69 Moreover, by this time he was
clearly the boss of the Democratic party of Chicago and Cook County.
Michael Igoe was not willing to recognize the fact, but it was true
nonetheless; within two years even Igoe would be a believer.7o
The 1931 campaign was not the first clash between Thompson and
Cermak. In 1915, when Thompson enforced Sunday closing, Cermak led
the United Societies' protest effort. A' large number of protest meetings
and demonstrations were held, culminating in a great Wet Parade, with
about 4°,000 marchers and over half-a-million viewers. From this point
forward, the two men remained antagonists.71
The 1931 mayoralty was a clash of belief as well as personality.
Whatever understanding of ethnic politics Thompson previously had, it
degenerated in his campaign of vilification of UTony Baloney" and his
pushcart. It was a mistake from the start and backfired seriously, while
Cermak's years of working with the ethnics were paying off.
The 1931 primaries were typical in the careers of the two contestants
and the two local party organizations. Division among the Republicans
continued, and two ureform" candidates opposed Thompson for the
nomination. He managed to eke out a victory, largely due to the Negro
vote, but the party did not heal its wounds after the primary. One
Republican alderman, for example, said that party loyalty meant nothing
after Thompson had bolted in 1930, and so he endorsed Cermak.72 Other
Republican politicians did the same.73 And there is evidence that the
69 Dziennik Zwiazkowy, Nov. 3, 1930, p. 4; L']talia, Oct. 26, 1930, p. I.
L']talia was still strongly for Thompson and noted that Cermak was "attractive to
the Thompson organization." This was not true, but Cermak would take support
on any terms.
70 Harold F. Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago, 1937),
P·14·
71 Gottfried, Boss Cermak, pp. 82-85; Wendt and Kogan, Big Bill of
Chicago, p. 130.
72 Chicago Tribune, Mar. 17,1931, p. 6.
73 E.g., George Harding, who had broken with Thompson in 1930 tried to
deliver the Fourth Ward for Thompson's primary opponent, Judge Lyle, but
failed. Harding returned to the Thornpson team for the general election, but
other Republican politicians did not. (Wendt and Kogan, Big Bill of Chicago,
pp. 328-3 I.)
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Deneen group made a deal with Cermak and covertly supported him.
Among the Democrats all was calm. Cermak had no real competi-
tion, and no dissenting voices emerged publicly from members of the
Chicago Democracy. Lesser threats were removed. Herman Bundesen, a
popular former health commissioner, did threaten to run as an Independ-
ent, but Cermak offered him the health commissionership and Bundesen
withdrew. A number of minor candidates filed for the election, but
County Board President Cermak controlled the Board of Election Com-
missioners, and their petitions were adjudged illegal.74 Thus the Demo-
crats were in good shape even before Mayor Thompson played into their
hands.
The clearly anti-immigrant stand taken by Thompson in 1931 has
already been noted. But the ethnics' reaction to that stand is important in
explaining the continuing alliance between the ethnics and the Demo-
cratic party.
Ethnic press reaction to Thompson's campaign was strong. Dziennik
Zwiazkowy told its Polish National Alliance readers that ((This campaign
is not only against Anton Cermak, but also all of those who are not
North Americans." A vote for Cermak was a vote to ((Help your own
kind."75 Nothing could be more meaningful to the ethnic voter.76 The
Democratic Dziennik Chicagoski agreed, saying of Thompson that cCthe
whole city bitterly hates him." A vote for Cermak and the other Demo-
crats was HIn Defense of the Honor of Poland."77 Both papers carried on
lengthy and emotional campaigns against the mayor, and both, after the
election, ran front-page ((pushcart" cartoons, satirizing Thompson's most
disastrous anti-immigrant remarks.78 Political recognition was also impor-
tant here: an independent Polish-American Voters League endorsed Cer-
74 Gottfried, Boss Cermak, p. 204.
75 Dziennik Zwiazkowy, April 4, 1931, p. 4.
76 In effect, Cermak was looked upon as a member of the general reference
group of ethnic minorities, which was a real group in Chicago politics. This
feeling certainly prevailed among influentials-editors of ethnic newspapers and
various ethnic spokesmen and leaders; and it probably filtered down to the mass
as well. It explains empathy with Cermak and his strong attraction to ethnic
voters.
77 Dziennik Chicagoski, Apri14, 1931, pp. 4, 16.
78 Dziennik Zwiazkowy, April 4, 1931, pp. 10, 14, April 8, 1931, p. I;
Dziennik Chicagoski, April 1,1931, p. I, April 4,1931, p. 10, April 8, 1931,
p. I.
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mak because Thompson remembered the Poles Hanly at election time,"
while filling offices with the Irish instead.79
Similarly, a White Russian newspaper called Cermak Han old friend
of the White Russians" and a fellow Slav, who was supported by all Hthe
most outstanding representatives of the White Russian colony."80 All four
Greek-language newspapers and the largest Hungarian newspaper also
supported Cermak.81 The Jewish Courier stressed the number of jobs
Cermak had given to Jews and argued that he would uraise Chicago in
the eyes of the civilized world," from the depths to which Thompson had
taken it. Cermak appealed directly to the Jews and emphasized the
number of jobs he had given them; this received front-page, headlined,
and gratis space.82 A large Jewish meeting at the Hotel Sherman accused
Thompson of injecting bigotry into the campaign and of being anti-
Semitic in his attacks on Julius Rosenwald.83 Even the Chicago Irish-
American Good Fellowship Club entered the fray, endorsed Cermak, and
accused Thompson of trying to ttexploit various racial groups, including
the Irish, for the purposes of political gain, by fomenting prejudice and
bigotry."84
The Germans were also active in Cermak's behalf, and the Abendpost
was unusually interested in local politics. Thompson's administration, it
said, was a disaster: ttScandals, an orgy of corruption, squandering and
incapability." Cermak, however, was a friend of the Germans and a good
candidate in all respects.85
The Italians were an exception, reflecting the closer ties which
79 See full-page ad in Dziennik Zwiazkowy, April 4, 1931, p. 10.
80 Belorusskaya Tribune, Mar. 30, 1931, WPA. See also Rassviet, April 29,
1931, WPA.
81 Greek Star, Mar. 13, 1931, WPA; Greek Press, Mar. 12, 1931, WPA;
Democrat, April 1931, WPA; Greek Daily, April 6, 1931, WPA; Gottfried, Boss
Cermak, p. 217; Magyar Tribune, April 3, 1931, WPA.
82 Jewish Courier, April 6, 1931, p. 4; April I, 1931, p. I.
83 Chicago Tribune, Mar. 27, 1931, p. 2. Thompson had referred to UTony,
the Jew hater, supported by Rosenwald, the fake philanthropist." (Gottfried, Boss
Cermak, pp. 205-206; M. R. Werner, Julius Rosenwald: The Life of a Practical
Humanitarian (New York, 1939), p. 318.
84 Chicago Tribune, Mar. 27, 1931, p. 2. Cermak was also endorsed by the
Chicago Irish-American Club, the oldest Irish club in the city. (Ibid., April 5,
1931, p. 2.)
85 Abendpost/Sonntagpost, Mar. 24-April 6, 193 I, passim; April 4, 193 I, p.
7; April 5, 1931, pp. 2,4,6-7; April 6,193 1, p. 4· Chicago Tribune, Mar. 30,
1931, p. 6.
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Thompson had maintained with the group. Cermak had begun to make
Italian ties and to appoint Italians to office, to bring them into the
Democraey.86 And this had some effect in 1931, in pro-Cermak activity
within the Italian community.87 But the Italian press, like the Italian
voters, remained with Mayor Thompson. L'Italia publisher Oscar Du-
rante had always been close to Thompson and had recently been ap-
pointed to the school board. L'Italia endorsed the mayor for reeleetion.88
La Tribuna Italiana Trans-Atlantica did not formally endorse anyone, but
it was nonetheless in Thompson's camp and totally forgot its opposition
to his candidacy four years earlier. In a characteristic editorial/
advertisement it listed some of the u1,000 Reasons for II Simpaticone
Tommasone." None of them were very much related to the election at
hand. But after opposing Thompson in 1927 because he was too pro-
Negro, the paper applauded him in 1931 for giving out jobs uirrespec-
tive of religion, nationality, race and color.,,89
Negroes, too, remained loyal to the mayor, notwithstanding the clash
of 1930. But the relationship was not as close as before. Thompson used
his traditional tactics, highlighting Democratic racism. He distributed a
reprint of a page of the 1929 Report of the Forest Preserve District of
Cook County (under Cermak's control) which stated that HOwing to the
complaints and trouble with colored caddies, they were replaced with
white boys."oo Publicity was also given to a racist broadside allegedly
distributed by the Democrats:
Wake up Democrats
to the Menace of
Thompson and his Negroes
vote for
Cermak and His Whole Democratic Ticket91
86 George L. Spatuzza, personal interview. Cermak had also led in the battle
for making Columbus Day a legal holiday, and this was endearing to Italian
voters. (La Tribuna ltaliana Trans-Atlantica, Sept. 22, 1928, p. I.)
81 Ibid.; Chicago Tribune, April 5, 1931, p. 2.
88 Mrs. Oscar Durante, personal interview; Gottfried, Boss Cermak, p. 2 1 7.
Exactly what this paper said in its endorsement is not known, since I was unable
to locate issues of 193 I.
89 La Tribuna ltaliana Trans-Atlantica, April 4, 193 I, p. 2.
go A copy may be seen in the Gosnell Materials, Merriam Papers, University
of Chicago.
91 A copy may be seen in ibid.
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The Defender printed news of the latter on page one, but did not
comment editorially. And it gave almost equal space to Cermak's argu-
ment that the broadside was phony, put out by the Thompson forces.92
Moreover, the paper virtually ignored the election and made no
endorsements.93 This was a clear sign that Thompson's grip on his Negro
support was not what it had been. Nor were Negro politicians visibly
very active.
The vote followed the campaign, with no real surprises. Cermak
carried every ethnic group except the Italians and Negroes. The Czechs,
Germans, Yugoslavs, Swedes, and Jews voted more Democratic than in
any other mayoralty of the period. From all newer immigrant groups,
except the Italians, Cermak received over 60 percent. Four groups which
had gone for Thompson in 1927 rejected him in 193 I: Germans,
Yugoslavs, Jews, and Swedes (see Table VIII:2).
All in all it was an impressive victory. Cermak certainly profited from
the Democratic resurgence of 1928 and 1930. But he also furthered that
resurgence, particularly in bringing it firmly down to the local level. This
was the most uethnic" election of the period, and in it the most uethnic"
politician of the period was clearly triumphant. The cementing of the
ethnic vote into the Democracy was well on its way to completion.
One additional factor in Cermak's 193 I success was his apparent deal
with the Deneen Republican organization. His running mates for city
clerk and a vacancy on the municipal court also won easily. But his other
running mate, Edward J. Kaindl, for city treasurer, lost to Republican
James A. Kearns. This was most unusual for Chicago politics, where city
clerk and city treasurer are part of a ticket with the mayor, and all three
almost always are elected together. But Kearns was the one Deneen
Republican on the ballot, and this has led some students to suggest that
the Deneen group and Cermak made a deal to trade votes at the expense
of Thompson and of Kaind1.94 The hypothesis is reasonable and may
well be true. If Cermak did make the deal, it was a good one for him;
92 Chicago Defender, April 4, 1931, p. 2.
93 See, e.g., issues of Mar. 14,21,28, April 4, 1931, passim.
94 The New Republic, 66 (April 22,1931): 260-61; Stuart, The Twenty
Incredible Yeaf's, pp. 470,488. If there was a deal, Kaindl was probably in on it;
he was very close to Cermak. Moreover, he was and remained a Democratic ward
committeeman and was soon appointed city collector by Mayor Cermak.
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TABLE VIII:2 Ethni c Vote for Mayor in Three Thompson Campai gns :
1919, 1927, 1931 (Percentage of the vote for the
two major candidates received by the candidate
named)
1919 1927 1931
Group. Thompson Thompson Thompson Cermak
Czechoslovaks 27 41 16 84
Poles 45 46 30 70
Lithuanians 24 43 38 62
Yugoslavs 48 64 36 64
Italians 49 58 53 47
Germans 49 63 42 58
Swedes 65 62 47 53
Jews 60 61 39 61
Negroes 78 93 84 16
Native-Americans 58 45 39 61
CHICAGO TOTAL 52 54 42 58
there is no evidence that it did Deneen much good-it may have defeated
Thompson, but Chicago has not had a Republican mayor since.
As the complete ethnic politician, Cermak immediately acted to bring
the remaining two ethnic groups into the Democratic consensus. He left
little to chance. An Italian ward committeeman soon appeared in the
Italian Twentieth Ward, and there was an increase in the number of
Italians on the Democratic ticket in 1932. The continuing battle against
the gangsters also served to free Italian voters from Republican obliga-
tions. This would prove effective by 1932.
Negroes also felt Cermak's persuasiveness. On taking office he fired
2,260 temporary employees, and, as the Defender put it, uThe Race was
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hard hit." He also cracked down on Republican Negro crime: tcThe entire
city is closed up like a drum. The lid went on five minutes after it was
certain Mayor Thompson had lost.,,95 He told the bosses of policy gam-
bling in the Black Belt that they had better change their politics if they
wanted to stay in business. And he began the more important job of
building a Democratic Negro political organization, with Negro leader-
ship. His successor, Ed Kelly, continued this after Cermaks's 1933 death,
and the success of the two men was marked by the number of leading
Negro politicians (William Dawson and Arthur Mitchell, for example)
who had switched parties by 1936.
Political organizations and leadership played their most important
role on the local level. To consider ethnic reaction to every m·ajor national
candidate would not add much new information here, but it is reasonable
to look again at the election of 1928, and Smith's candidacy, since the
ethnic reaction to Smith was tremendous and was carried over to his
Democratic successors in 1930 and 1932. Ethnic support for Smith
personally did not entirely transfer into ethnic support for the Demo-
cratic party, but it was a major force in breaking the ethnics loose from
the Republican party. Smith and Cermak, together, are the two most
important individuals in the Democratic party's success.
The 1928 campaign was unusual in many respects. Intensity of
interest, particularly among the ethnics, reached new heights. Voter
registration and voter turnout also set records (e.g., presidential vote in
Chicago: 1920-731,795; 1924-949,3°2; 1928-1,27°,3°0; 1932-
1,347,7°9). Third parties fared less well in 1928 than in any other
election of the period, again because interest was so intense in the battle
between the major candidates.
Smith's stand on the issues, particularly Prohibition, produced much
of his support, but ethnic identification with him was even more impor-
tant. The Foreign Language Information Service participated in this
empathy:
Following the Democratic nomination at Houston, hundreds
of foreign language newspapers and periodicals, irrespective of
party affiliation, expressed, it is true, sentimental interest in the
81 Chicago Defende1', April I I, I9~ I, p. I.
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New York Governor on the part of the erstwhile immigrant.
It is natural, perhaps, that the new American citizen should like to
think of the Governor as [one] ... who has made good in real
Horatio Alger fashion. That he is not the son of an immigrant
seems to make little difference. The wishful thoughts of many
an editor places [sic] him in that light and sees him emerging
from the lower east side of Manhattan, an environment which
many of them know so well.96
This was true, and the ethnics of Chicago had all heard of Al Smith, even
if they were not sure just what he did. The United States Naturalization
Bureau examiner for Chicago reported that the question asking the name
of Illinois' governor was frequently answered teAl Smith."97 The belief
that Smith was the son of immigrants was also found in Chicago and was
indicative.98
Dziennik Chicagoski enthusiastically informed Chicago's Poles that
the Smith candidacy was U a big moment in your lives." The Republicans
were against uall Catholics, foreigners and Negroes," but Smith was tea
friend of the Poles," a fighter against Prohibition, and, at one and the
same time, uthe successor to Woodrow Wilson" and a strong opponent of
the League of Nations.99 One could not ask for more.
Dziennik Zwiazkowy and Dziennik Zjednoczenia, the papers, respec-
tively, of the Polish National Alliance and the Polish Roman Catholic
Union, did not forsake their traditional refusal to endorse non-Polish
candidates. But both were unusually interested in the election and gave
Smith considerable coverage, and the latter was quite critical of the
Republican party.100
96 The Interpreter 8 (Sept. 192 8) : 3-7.
91 Chicago Tribune, Sept. 8, 1928, p. 4. This kind of thing was not :uncom-
mon. The politically unsophisticated immigrant would know the names of one or
several politicians and associate those names with politics. The owners of those
names were the effective ethnic politicians. (See record of "Conversation with
Chief Examiner of Chicago District of the Naturalization Bureau," 1925, Gosnell
Materials, Merriam Papers, University of Chicago.)
98 E.g., Jewish Courier, Oct. 29, 1928; La Tribuna Italiana Trans-Atlantica,
Nov. 3, 1928, p. I.
99 Dziennik Chicagoski, Nov. 2, 1928, p. 7; Nov. 4, 1928, p. 24; Nov. S,
1928, p. 1ft.; Nov. 6, 1928, p. 14; Oct. IS-Nov. S, 1928, passim.
100 Dziennik Zwiazkowy, Nov. 6,1928, p. 14; Oct. Is-Nov. S, 1928, passim.
Dziennik Zjednoczenia, Mar. IS, 1928; April 10,1928; May 12, 1928; Oct. I,
1928, WPA.
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There was equivalent Polish organizational support. In anticipation, a
ttpolish-American Al Smith for President and Anton Cermak for Gover-
nor Club" had been organized in 1927 (before it was decided that
Cermak would run for the Senate) .101 Similar organizations sprang up in
1928. When Smith visited Chicago during the campaign, 3,500 Polish
businessmen gave him a dinner. Other Slavic groups were also active in
his support. Among the Slovaks, White Russians, and Yugoslavs there
was strong journalistic and popular enthusiasm for his candidacy.102
L'Italia publisher Oscar Durante remained Republican in 1928, as did
his paper for all offices except the presidency, where it was silent. L'Italia
was very critical of the Coolidge administration as the campaign wore on,
and did specifically endorse Smith's stand on Prohibition. Moreover, the
campaign was characterized as one where a ttfarmer of Iowa" faced a
ttpaper boy of the New York slums"; where the ttspirit of the Quaker
pioneers" was confronted by the ttelastic and aggressive spirit of the
immigrant.,,103 Italian voters could logically be expected to choose the
latter of each alternative.
La Tribuna Italiana Trans-Atlantica was not neutral, but overwhelm-
ingly pro-Smith, whom it repeatedly characterized as a ttRoman Catholic
and anti-Prohibitionist." The message was clear. This paper ran a long
and enthusiastic Smith campaign, concentrating on the candidate's per-
sonality and on the issues of Prohibition and religion.104 Front-page space
was given to a guest editor who argued that Smith was being opposed for
"social and religious" reasons and also because he was the U son of
immigrants"; were it not for these factors, he would easily be elected, and
Italian voters should support him unanimously.105
The Abendpost, while more sophisticated, was no less enthusiastic. It
101 Dziennik Ziednoczenia, Oct. 5, 1927, WPA.
102 Chicago Tribune, Sept. 16, 1928, p. 2, Sept. 17, 1928, p. 15; Osadne
Riasy, Oct. 27, 1928, WPA; Belorusskaya Tribune, Oct. 20, 1928, WPA;
Radnik, Oct. 31, 1928, WPA.
103 La Tribuna ltaliana Trans-Atlantica, Nov. 3, 1928, p. 7; Mrs. Oscar
Durante, personal interview; L'ltaIia, July 15, 1928, p. 2, Oct. 14, 1928, p. I,
Oct. 21, 1928, p. I, Oct. 27, 1928, p. I, Nov. 4, 1928, p. I.
104 La Tribuna ltaliana Trans-Atlantica, July 7, 1928, p. I, and July 14,21,
28, 1928, p. 3; Sept. 22, 1928, p. I; Oct. 16, 1928, p. I; Oct. 20, 1928, p. 3;
Nov. 3, 1928, p. I.
105 Ibid., Nov. 3, 1928, p. I. The writer was Luigi Barzini, editor of the
Carriere d'America of New York.
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covered the campaign fully, ran a full-page Smith campaign biography,
and gave prominent notice to famous German-Americans and others who
endorsed his candidacy and to various Smith-for-President organizations
in which German-Americans participated. It insisted that Smith had
nothing to do with the despised Wilson; indeed, Hoover was anti-Ger-
man and had called Germany tta nation without honor" during the War.
Smith's stand on all the issues, especially Prohibition, was frank and good,
whereas Hoover was u a tool of the Anti-Saloon League," and H on every
issue of importance he has gone around like a cat in hot porridge."106 The
paper's involvement and commitment were unprecedentedly great, as was
the number of German-American organizations working in Smith's be-
half.l01
The Swedish press, like Swedish voters, remained Republican. None-
theless, as with all other newspapers, foreign language and American,
Smith received more publicity than Hoover.10B And there was more
support for Smith from Swedish organizations and leaders than for any
other national political figure of the period.109
The Yiddish press and Jewish infIuentials were involved to an amaz-
ing extent in Smith's candidacy. The Jewish Courier was simply saturated
with coverage of and enthusiasm for his campaign, and it reached unpar-
alleled levels of linguistic ecstasy. The paper understood pretty well what
Smith represented for the ethnic voter: HWe are, it is true, developing in
this country a new type (of individual), urban in background and different
from the old. Governor Smith is one of its finest representatives. . . . The
people love him for they know that their cause is his cause and that he
speaks their mind and expresses their feelings and sentiments.,,110 On
every issue, and in every consideration, Smith was the ideal candidate:
106 Abendpost/Sonntagpost, Oct. 24, 1928, p. I; Oct. 25, 1928, p. I; Oct. 29,
1928, pp. 4, 7; Oct. 31, 1928, p. 3; Nov. I, 1928, p. 4; Nov. 3, 1928, p. 9; Nov.
4, 1928, p. Iff.; Nov. 5, 1928, p. Iff.
101 Chicago Tribune, Aug. 17, 1928, p. 10, Sept. 10, 1928, p. 18; Sonntag-
post, Oct. 21,1928, p. I, Nov. 4,1928, p. I; Abendpost, Oct. 27,1928, p. I.
lOB Johnson, uThe Swedes of Chicago," pp. 53-54; Svenska-Tribunen-Ny-
hete" Oct. 3, 1928, p. I, Oct. 31, 1928, p. 4.
109 Johnson, uThe Swedes of Chicago," pp. 53-54; Chicago Tribune, Sept. 23,
1928, p. 6.
110 Jewish Courier, Oct. I, 18, 19, 24, 1928, p. 8. Smith, like Cermak, became
a member of the ethnic reference group and in this lay a good part of his
strength.
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UA Political Socrates," Hthe incarnation of genuine political wisdom."lll
The popular Yiddish Socialist newspaper, the Forward, remained
convinced of the unworthiness of capitalist political parties, but was
nonetheless attracted to Smith. He was an attractive candidate, it said,
who spoke on some issues Has if he were a Socialist."112
The number of Jewish Al Smith organizations in Chicago was
countless-for women, for businessmen, for virtually everyone. And an
equivalent number of Jewish leaders spoke on his behalf. Rabbi Stephen
S. Wise of New York, for example, came to Chicago on a speaking tour
for Smith and called him Hthe greatest political educator in half a century
of American life.,,113
Even the Negroes demonstrated empathy with Smith. The Defender
supported a Democratic presidential candidate for the first time in its
history. It saw the contest as between the Republican party, on the one
hand, and Smith, personally, on the other, and found the former ungrate-
ful for long years of Negro support, while the latter was a fair and wise
man who Hstands for ALL the citizens of his dominion."114 Other elements
in the Chicago Negro community felt similarly. The three presiding
elders of the influential African Methodist Episcopal Church, the leaders
of several secular Negro organizations, and even Marcus Garvey, en-
dorsed the Smith candidaey.115 Oscar De Priest, campaigning successfully
for the United States Congress, was curiously silent on the presidential
race. And Louis B. Anderson, Republican alderman and ward committee-
man of the Second Ward, went further and supported Smith openly:
ccThe Republican Party has shown us the gate. Now let all the colored
people walk out of this gate.,,116
This was the campaign among the ethnics that led to the great
Democratic upsurge of 1928. The campaign was important in itself, and
111 Ibid., see also issues of Oct. I, 1928-Nov. 5, 1928, passim.
112 Jewish Forward, Oct. 29, 1928; see also issues of Nov. 2, 3, 4, 6, 1928.
The paper nonetheless endorsed Norman Thomas.
113 Chicago Tribune, Oct. 26, 1928, p. 8; Jewish Courier, Oct. 28, 1928, p. 7.
114 Chicago Defender, Nov. 3, 1928, Pt. 2, p. 2. There were also charges of
racial bigotry leveled against Hoover and his organization. (See Chicago Tribune,
Oct. 8,1928, p. I; Chicago Defender, Aug. 4,1928, p. 4, Oct. 20, 1928, pp. 1,8;
Chicago Eagle, Oct. 13, 1928, p. I.)
115 Chicago Defender, Oct. 27, 1928, pp. 6, 9; Nov. 3, 1928, p. I; Chicago
Tribune, Aug. 2I, 1928, p. 8.
116 Chicago Tribune, Oct. 31, 1928, p. 3.
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for two other reasons. First, ethnic political allegiance to the Democratic
party continued to grow in succeeding elections-1930, 1932, and be-
yond. Thus the switch of 1928 was more than just personal or temporary:
it helped precipitate a major party shift. And second, most large Amer-
ican cities were similarly affected, some even more so than Chicago; and
they would share the same future development.111
111 See Samuel Lubell, The Future 0/ American Politics (Garden City, N.Y.,
1952), ch. 3; Gustave R. Serino, «(Italians in the Political Life of Boston: A
Study of the Role of an Immigrant and Ethnic Group in the Political Life of an
Urban Community" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1950), pp. 45-47; J.
Joseph Huthmacher, Massachusetts People and Politics, I9I9-I933 (Cambridge,
Mass., 1959), ch. 6; Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? Democ1'ac'Y and Powe1' in
an Ame1'ican City (New Haven, Conn., 1961), pp. 45,49-50. For a major
exception, see John L. Shover, HWas 1928 a Critical Election in California?"
Pacific Northwest Qua1'te1'ly 58 (Oct. 1967).
IX. Crime & Reform
Reform sentiment in Chicago in the 1920S concentrated on the relation-
ship between crime and politics. As such, reform played a role in the
political behavior of Chicagoans. This is important because reform senti-
ment, perhaps contrary to tradition, ultimately aligned itself with the
Democratic party.
Reform affected the ethnics of Chicago somewhat differently than did
other forces, since interest in reform varied considerably with socioeco-
nomic class. It was confined to middle- and upper-class Chicagoans,
generally, and tended more to motivate them than the majority of the
ethnics, who were lower in socioeconomic position. Nonetheless, reform
was important, because it brought the voting of solidly middle-class
ethnics into conjunction with that of the lower-middle and lower-class
ethnics who were moving into the Democratic party for other reasons.
The extent of the Democratic consensus by 1932 would have been less
fully developed had it not been for the reform impetus affecting middle-
and upper-class ethnics, and Native-Americans as well.
The term reform} as used here, is construed broadly, to include
whatever Chicagoans of the time considered as ureform." Particularly,
reform comprised an effort to seek honesty in government and to rid
government of criminal influence. By the late 1920S, reform generally
meant the ousting of Big Bill Thompson and his allies from political
office, and of Al Capone and other gangsters from their position of in-
fluence in city affairs. That Thompson and Capone seemed to be working
together made things that much clearer to the reformers.
The rise of organized crime in Chicago during the Prohibition Era is
well known, even legendary, and little of the legend exaggerates the
truth. Lawlessness was rife, and life was extremely cheap, especially
among the gangsters themselves in their war for control of the spoils of
Prohibition (in 1924,a typical year, the Tribune's «Hands of Death"
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clock showed 293 deaths by gun on election eve) . Al Capone was not the
only successful gangster in Chicago at this time-he had strong competi-
tion from «tBugs" Moran and others-but he was the most successful one,
and the most powerful. The Unione-Sicilione, for example, which was
just one organization under his control, was making about ten million
dollars per year from distilling in 1928, when it translated its name to
uThe Italo-American Union" during the campaign preceding the pri-
mary election.1
This rampant criminality becomes important, for our purposes,
through its connection with politics. Indications of this connection are
endless. A good example was the funeral, in the spring of 1920, of ttBig
Jim" Colosimo, who was succeeded by Johnny TorriD, who was, in turn,
succeeded by Al Capone. An editorial in a Norwegian newspaper noted
that: uFollowing the body of Ubig Jim" Colosimo to the grave today will
move a cortege which should interrupt the complacent thoughts of Chi-
cago. Three judges, eight aldermen, an assistant state's attorney, a con-
gressman, a state representative, and leading artists of the Chicago Opera
Co. are listed as honorary pallbearers, along with gamblers, ex-gamblers,
divekeepers and ex-divekeepers."2 This turnout honoring a notorious
criminal was indicative of the attitudes of the politicians involved. Judge
Bernard P. Barasa and soon-to-be judge Francis Borreli were, respec-
tively, leading Republican and Democratic Italian politicians in the city
during the 1920S; both were honorary pallbearers (thus demonstrating
the particularly close interconnection between Italian politics and crime).
Michael Igoe, Democratic leader in the Illinois legislature and George
Brennan's heir apparent, was also a pallbearer. The Democratic bailiff of
the Municipal Court, Dennis J. Egan, and at least one Democratic
Municipal Court judge, John K. Prindiville, were similarly honored.
Most of the attendants were Democrats, since Colosimo was a First Ward
figure (Aldermen UBathhouse John" Coughlin and UHinky Dink" Kenna
were pallbearers, and Coughlin delivered a moving eulogy), but there
were enough Republicans, especially among the Italians, to make it a
nonpartisan affair. The funeral was a major event, and the curious list of
1 See Fred D. Pasley, At Capone: The Biography 0/ a Self-Made Man (New
York, 1930), pp. 228-29, and passim. This is another of the many vague
indicators of the interrelationship between politics and crime.
2 Skandinaven, May 15, 1920, WPA.
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pallbearers gave it national publicity.3 It was also something to give the
citizenry pause.
The leading gangsters tended to create small fiefdoms for themselves
within the city. That of Dean O'Bannion (and his successor, UBugs"
Moran, after the Capone mob killed O'Bannion) was the Near North
Side, particularly the Italian areas. At the 1924 presidential election,
O'Bannion's men patroled the polling places to make sure the electorate
voted H right."4 The overall effect of this kind of activity is difficult to
determine, since the gangsters were not necessarily loyal to one party or
another; rather, like individuals, they would deliver the votes under their
control to the candidate or organization which offered the most in return
at a given point in time. O'Bannion, like Capone, worked mainly for the
Republicans. He would boast later that he personally turned the Forty-
second Ward from Democratic to Republican, ensuring the victory of
Robert E. Crowe, Thompson's sometime ally, over Michael Igoe, for
state's attorney.5
Al Capone was far and away the most powerful gang leader in
Chicago by the last half of the decade, in both criminal activities and
political influence. He was one of the most powerful men in the entire
county, for any purpose, and neither peace nor war could be easily had
without his consent. When the dry-cleaning industry suffered great labor
unrest, only those companies protected by the gangsters managed to stay
open.6 One operator, who hired the Capone organization for protection,
later explained why: HOur stores were bombed forty times. The police,
the State's Attorney, and the U.S. District Attorney refused to act. That is
why we appealed to a man who was able to protect us-AI Capone.,,7
This was forceful testimony to the breakdown of law and order, and it is
3 Chicago Herald & Examiner, May IS, 1920, p. I, May 16, 1920, p. 2;
Chicago Tribune, May 16, 1920, p. S; New York Times, May 16, 1920, p. 10.
4 Harvey W. Zorbaugh, The Gold Coast and the Slum (Chicago, 1929), pp.
193-94, 193n.
5 Illinois Association for Criminal Justice, Illinois Crime Survey (Chicago,
1929), pp. 1013-14; Herbert Asbury, Gem 0/ the Prairie (New York, 1940),
pp·341-42 •
6 Ahendpost, Nov. I, 1929, WPA.
7 The speaker was Morris Becker, testifying at the trial of certain others who
were accused of conspiracy to obtain control of the dry cleaning industry by
violence. Abendpost, Feb. 2, 1934, WPA.
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important to remember that this occurred during Thompson's third term
as mayor, 1927-1931.
Businessmen were not the only people who despaired of the tradi-
tional sources of law and order and turned to Capone. After the bloody
climax of the uPineapple Primary" of April 1928, Frank ]. Loesch was
called in as president of the Chicago Crime Commission, to see what
could be done about the situation. Ultimately, it appears, Loesch could
find no better means than to go to Capone himself and ask for his 'aid in
keeping the hoodlums out of the November election. Capone magnani-
mously acceded and promised to pressure the hoodlums, and the police, to
keep things on the up and up. As a result, November saw uthe first really
honest election in the city of Chicago in forty-five years." The cost,
however, was great.8
The relationship between Capone and Thompson is clouded by the
lack of reliable and firsthand information. By 1927, however, the two
men seem to have reached at least an informal understanding. On the
bullet-proof walls of his private office Capone allegedly had the portraits
of Washington, Lincoln, and Big Bill Thompson.9 More to the point,
Capone probably contributed to Thompson's reelection campaign in
1927, perhaps in excess of one hundred thousand dollars, and he prob-
ably induced other gangsters to do the same.to
This was not really surprising, since the Dever administration had
staged a number of raids against vice dens, endeavored to enforce Prohibi-
tion, and generally made things Uhot" for the gangsters. Respite could be
8 The story of Loesch going to Capone is frequently told, but I was not able to
find anywhere an admission by Loesch that this was true or untrue. The comment
quoted, however, is by Loesch, in an address called CtThe Criminal and His
Allies," which he gave to the Nebraska State Bar Association in 1929 (Nebraska
Law Bulletin 9 [July 1930]: 88-96). Verification of the visit is found in some
reliable sources, especially Judge John H. Lyle, a reform Republican politician
and prime enemy of Capone and Thompson (and also the man who allegedly
invented the "Public Enemy" list) (The Dry and Lawless Years [Englewood
Cliffs, N.J., 1960], pp. 185-87). See also V. O. Key, Jr., CtThe Unholy Alliance,"
Survey Graphic 23 (Oct. 1934) : 473·
D See Lloyd Wendt and Herman Kogan, Big Bill 0/ Chicago (Indianapolis,
Ind., 1953), p. 250.
10 Ibid., pp. 268-69. The Illinois Association of Criminal Justice also con-
cluded that Capone had contributed to the Thompson campaign. (Pasley, At
Capons, p. ISX.)
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expected under another Thompson administration, and Thompson's
uwide-open town" campaign made it clear that such respite would come.
The closeness of the Thompson-Capone relationship can be overem-
phasized. Indeed, 1928 saw the beginning of an organized hounding of
Capone by the police force under a new chief, William Russell. Capone's
biographer suggests that this resulted from the enormous publicity given
Capone's every action at that time: Thompson could do nothing except
fight him, because the public was aroused. Other factors were the disas-
trous primary election and court judgment against him, both in the spring
of 1928, which left Thompson weak and afraid to refuse the reformers'
demand for replacement of his old police chief, Michael (HGo-Get-'Em")
Hughes.11 But even during the 1928-1930 period when Thompson was
hardly functioning as mayor, Capone continued to have a voice in his
cabinet, through Daniel Serritella, the city sealer. During the 1931
campaign another outcry against Capone control in the city government
broke out, when Serritella was indicted for conspiring with merchants to
cheat the city out of fifty-four million dollars through short weights.12
The 1928 Republican HPineapple Primary" was characterized not
only by the bombing of the homes of candidates Charles Deneen and
John A. Swanson. It was violent in a number of other ways as well. Five
days before the bombings, HDiamond Joe" Esposito was gunned down.
He was a kind of gangster-politician allied to the Deneen organization,
and his murder opened the war between the two factions. The primary
itself was indeed cause for Loesch's activity; it was characterized by
Usluggings, vote thievery, intimidation and stuffing of ballot boxes." Even
this, however, did not save the Thompson organization.13
The great part of the political-criminal interrelationship in the 192 0S,
then, appears to have been through the Thompson organization, particu-
larly in its connection with Capone. A number of Thompson's on-again-
off-again allies were equally culpable. Governor Len Small (1921-
11 Pasley, At Capone, pp. 181-82; William H. Stuart, The Twenty Incredible
Years (Chicago, 1935), pp. 38 5-87.
12 Chicago Tribune, Mar. 27, 1931, p. Iff.; Harold F. Gosnell, Machine
Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago, 1937), pp. I 1-12; Alex Gottfried, Boss
Cermak 0/ Chicago: A Study of Political Leadership (Seattle, Wash., 1962 ), p.
235; V. O. Key, Jr., uThe Unholy Alliance," p. 475.
13 Wendt and Kogan, Big Bill 0/ Chicago, pp. 303-308; Stuart, The Twenty
Incredible Years, pp. 360-63; Loesch, "The Criminal and His Allies."
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1929), who provided the downstate support for the Small-Thompson-
Crowe combine, was accused of countless wrongdoings and much cor-
ruption, most of which was probably true.14 And it was the Thompson-
Small organization, along with Samuel Insull, which secured the Re-
publican nomination of Frank Smith for the Senate in 1926. In 1928,
the Thompson-Crowe-Small forces drafted Smith as their senatorial
candidate, and this added to the disrepute of the ticket and the extent of
its defeat in the primary.15
Certainly the Democrats were also involved with criminals in the
1920S, but the evidence indicates that this was to a lesser degree. They
held the mayoralty for only four years, 1923-1927, and Mayor Dever
was honest. Thus it was only logical for Capone and others to look to the
Thompson Republicans, for two reasons: Thompson was popular and
successful, and the alliance would be beneficial to the gangsters only if
their man became mayor; and Thompson was apparently willing to make
such an alliance, whereas Dever, and probably Cermak, were not.
Crime in politics did affect Chicago voting behavior. Lower socioeco-
nomic groups were considerably less affected by the issue than higher
ones, but all were affected to some degree. In the long run, Thompson's
connection with the hoodlums worked to his own disadvantage, and to
that of his party as well, particularly in that those socioeconomic groups
which were most prone to vote Republican turned to the Democrats in
desperation and helped to make Tony Cermak mayor of Chicago.
Two groups of people were actively involved in reform in Chicago
politics. First, there were the middle-class political activists: people to
whom involvement in the political or moral life of the city was almost a
vocation. This group included people such as Harold Ickes, Jane Addams,
and Donald Richberg. Second, there were the upper-class Ugentlemen-in-
politics," to whom political activities were secondary and ad hoc, and who
entered political reform as a result, often, of participation in various
commissions and Hbetterment" organizations of one kind and another.
Julius Rosenwald of Sears, Roebuck and Co. was a leading representative
14 See Carroll H. Wooddy, The Case 0/ Frank L. Smith (Chicago, 1931), p.
159·
15 See Wooddy, The Case 0/ Frank L. Smith and The Chicago Primary 0/
I926.· A Study in Election Methods (Chicago, 1926), passim.
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of this group; others came from the cream of Chicago usociety." Both
groups were basically Republican in national politics, but the former
were considerably to the Left of the latter; they, for example, were strong
supporters of Robert La Follette in 1924, while the upper-Class reformers
were not. Most important, by the end of the period the two groups
cooperated in local and state politics, supporting the Democrats.
Since susceptibility to reform influence in voting behavior seems to
commence only with the middle class, it was often ethnic group leaders,
rather than the masses, who were motivated for this reason. Leaders,
however, are often the source of influence. Moreover, a universal interest
in reform existed among those groups which tended to be middle class:
the Scandinavians, Germans, and, to a lesser extent, the Jews.
As early as 1919 and 1920, Thompson was under fire for being too
close to the gangsters. Julius Rosenwald and other leaders of the Chicago
Jewish community opposed his reelection in 1919 and after that battled
against his organization.16 The Dovre Club, Chicago's leading Norwegian-
American organization, endorsed Thompson in 1919 as a Republican
duty, but began to fight him ferociously in 1920.17 In 1924 this club
endorsed all Republican candidates except those who were members of
the Thompson-Small organization; even Democrats were preferable to
the latter.18 The Republican party was clearly split from 1920 on; to the
reformers Thompson was the leader of the Hbad guys."
In 1923, when Thompson did not run, the mayoralty campaign was
between two Hrespectables"-Lueder and Dever. And the upper-class
reformers were inactive. The professional, middle-class reformers, how-
ever, were involved and supported Democrat William Dever, although
they continued to consider themselves Republicans. Harold Ickes organ-
ized an Independent Republican Dever Committee. Graham Taylor of
Chicago Commons and Professor Charles Merriam were typical
members.19
The upper-class reformers were active in the meantime in trying to
16 Chicago T1'ibune, Mar. 5, 1919, p. 12; M. R. Werner, Julius Rosenwald:
The Life of a P1'actical Humanitarian (New York, 1939), pp. 315-16.
11 Scandia, Mar. 8, 1919, WPA; Skandinaven, Sept. 12, 1920, WPA.
18 Chicago Tribune, Oct. 2 I, 1924, p. 6.
19 Harold L. Ickes, The Autobiog1'aphy of a CU1'mudgeon (New York,
1943), p. 248; Jewish Cou1'ie1', April 2, 1923, p. 9; G. C. Sikes, uThompson
Rule in Chicago Ended," Outlook 133 (Mar. 14,1923): 481.
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purify Illinois Republican politics at the state level. Professor Carroll H.
Wooddy's expose of the 1926 primary nomination of Frank Smith was
financed by Julius Rosenwald.20 Moreover, Rosenwald, and apparently
others, decided that Smith, though nominated, should resign before the
November election and allow a reform candidate (Hugh S. Magill,
suggested by Ickes) to run as an independent. Rosenwald, in the interest
of good government, allegedly offered Smith 10,000 shares of Sears,
Roebuck common stock if he would withdraw, but Smith turned him
down.21
In 1927, when Thompson ran for mayor once again, all the forces of
reform strived to defeat him. As always, the clergy was active. From
pulpits allover the city on the Sunday before the election, the faithful
were exhorted to reelect Mayor Dever and save the city from ruin.
Upper-class preachers, from the Protestant Preston Bradley to the Reform
Jewish Louis L. Mann, spoke and wrote to defeat Big Bill.22 An Indepen-
dent Republican Dever Committee showed many of the same names-
Bradley, Mann, and representatives of both groups of reformers: the
leaders of the German-Jewish community and Graham Taylor; Potter
Palmer, carrying Chicago society'S foremost name, and Agnes Nestor of
the Glove Workers' Union; Walter Dill Scott of Northwestern Univer-
sity and Birger Osland of the Norwegian community.23 They all appar-
ently agreed with Rosenwald that Republicanism in national politics was
irrelevant in the quest for good government locally.24 Thompson took
cognizance of his opposition, but dismissed them as the uuniversity high-
brows.,,25 This was oversimplification, but it also showed that he knew
where his real strength lay.
Middle-class ethnic organizations also participated in this political
20 Werner, Julius Rosenwald, pp. 314-15. The book was The Case 0/ Frank
L. Smith.
21 Ibid., pp. 295-310. These shares were worth about $500,000 at the time,
and within two years would be worth about two million dollars. In his own way
Mr. Smith was a dedicated man. Interestingly, Wooddy did not mention, in either
of his two books on the subject, that he had been financed by Rosenwald, nor that
Rosenwald had tried to bribe Smith.
22 Chicago Tribune, April 4, 192 7, p. 5.
23 Ibid., Mar. 17, 1927, p. 28. See also Merriam-Dever correspondence of
1923-1927, in Merriam Papers, University of Chicago.
24 Chicago Tribune, Mar. 17,1927, p. 4; Werner, Julius Rosenwald, p. 316.
25 Chicago Tribune, April I, 1927, p. Iff.
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reform activity of 1927. The Chicago Chapter of the Sons and Daughters
of Sweden endorsed Mayor Dever, as did the Dovre Club and the Danish
Republican Club-all of them solid Republican, middle-class organiza-
tions. And each stressed the danger to good government of a Thompson
return.26 Voting for or against Thompson in 1927 was in good part a
socioeconomic phenomenon.
The 1931 campaign was similar to that of 1927, except that the
anti-Thompson furor among the reformers was even greater after another
four years of his rule. Anton Cermak was not quite as uclean" as Dever,
but the reformers nonetheless preferred him to Thompson. As Harold
Ickes put it, Hhe had made his pile, and we believed him when he told us
that he would give a straight administration."27 Cermak himself had left
little to chance, and, at the same time that he had been building his ethnic
base, he had also endeavored to endear himself to the ttbetter element." In
the late 1920S, for example, he had become a vice president of the
Chicago Regional Planning Association, working with Daniel Burnham,
Mrs. Ickes, Lorado Taft, Charles E. Merriam, and other leaders of both
reform groups.28
Cermak also benefited with the reformers from the long-range effects
of Thompson's 1927-1928 interference with the Board of Education. The
superintendent of schools whom Thompson had forced out of office had
been supported most strongly by such groups as the Chicago Association
of Commerce and Industry and the Illinois Manufacturers Association,
while he had been opposed by the Chicago Federation of Labor. The
former organizations tended to support Cermak in 1931; however, this is
another reason for the continuing lower-class support of Thompson in
the 1928 primary and, to a lesser degree, in 1931.29
Virtually every civic organization (as well as the ethnic ones) which
took a stand in 1931 supported Cermak; the same was true of influential
individuals. The Municipal Voters' League gave him its endorsement, as
did most other organizations representing one or another of the two
26 Ibid., Mar. 21, 1927, p. 4; Mar. 31, 1927, p. 9. See also Dever Papers,
Chicago Historical Society.
27 Ickes, Autobiography, pp. 254-55.
28 See list of officers on letterhead of letter in Merriam Papers, University of
Chicago.
29 George S. Counts, School and Society in Chicago (New York, 192 8),
passim.
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groups of reformers. As one leader put it, H even a yellow dog would be
better than Thompson.,,30
Many Republican groups also worked for Cermak; the desire for
reform was clearly more powerful than party regularity (which Thomp-
son had already weakened). Emily Dean, a prominent social worker and
longtime president of the Illinois Republican Women's Clubs, was very
active in organizing women for Cermak. She insisted that uThompson-
ism" must be defeated.3! The Greek-American Republican Club of Chi-
cago, in a widely publicized announcement, endorsed Cermak, so that
Chicago could ttregain its stature.,,32 The Independent Republican Club of
the Fifth Ward (upper-middle and upper class, Leopold-Loeb, University
of Chicago area) announced likewise.33 Many other Republican organiza-
tions and individuals did the same after Thompson defeated reformer
Judge John H. Lyle in the primary.34
Emily Dean was not the only woman who opposed Thompson in
1931. The Swedish women, as one might expect, did the same.35 The
Saturday before the election a woman's parade for Cermak was held in
downtown Chicago; 2,000 women marched, and sang:
Glory, glory to Chicago,
Glory, glory to Chicago,
Glory, glory to Chicago,
With Cermak marching on.36
Julius Rosenwald, who generally contributed little money or time to
local politics, gave $2,500 and considerable time to the Cermak cam-
30 M. A. Hallgren, "Chicago Goes Tammany," The Nation 132 (April 22,
1931): 446-48; The New Republic 66 (April 22, 1931): 261; Chicago
Tribune, Mar. 19,1931, p. 4; Mar. 20, 193 1, p. II. An exception was the Better
Government Association, which supported Thompson. Cermak's biographer sees
this as a result of the organization's Hfundamentalist, Puritan, quasi-Know
Nothing animus." Ethnic considerations could apparently outweigh others. (Gott-
fried, Boss Cermak, pp. 20S, 216.)
31 See 1931 correspondence in Dean Papers, Chicago Historical Society.
32 Greek Star, Mar. 13, 1931, WPA; Greek Press, Mar. 12, 1931, WPA;
Saloniki, Mar. 2 I, 193 I, WPA.
33 Chicago Tribune, April 6, 1931, p. 4.
34 E.g., ibid., Mar. 12,1931, p. 6.
35 Ibid., April I, 193 I, pp. 3-4.
36 Ibid., April 4, 1931, p. 3; April S, 1931, p. 3.
I78 A House for all Peoples
paign and tried to persuade his peers to do likewise.37 Rabbi Stephen S.
Wise, who had spoken in Chicago for Al Smith, did the same for Tony
Cermak, stressing the corruption of the Thompson regime and its ties
with gangdom.38 And not least important with Chicago's middle-class
Jews, Judge Henry Horner actively supported his fellow Democrat.39
The ethnic press reflected these reform sentiments. The Danish Times
criticized Thompson's primary campaign against Judge Lyle for making a
laughingstock of Chicago.4o The German press prominently mentioned
all the ttrespectables" who endorsed Cermak and all the udisreputables"
who endorsed Thompson. Thompson represented Al Capone and other
evils, and Cermak was the only possible choice.41 The newspapers of some
lower socioeconomic groups reasoned similarly. The leading Hungarian
paper argued that Thompson's administration was marked by too much
Ugangsterism" and therefore should be repudiated.42 A Spanish paper felt
the same.43
The rising Democratic vote among the ethnics of Chicago was defi-
nitely increased by this quest for reform, although its degree of effect
cannot be measured. The Germans and Swedes, for example, voted
Democratic for mayor for the first time in 1931. And the Native-Ameri-
cans, who were higher in socioeconomic status than any ethnic group, and
more Republican than any except the Negroes, voted Democratic for
mayor in 1927 and 1931. It is clear that the socioeconomic variations
played an important role in determining whether or not one voted for
reform. Certainly some ethnics in lower socioeconomic groups were
affected by reform, but this was to a decidedly lesser extent. Certainly,
also, changing patterns in national voting, and issues other than reform,
contributed to Cermak's rise and Thompson's fall. But the twin issues of
crime and reform were clearly important, at least with an influential
minority of Chicago's ethnics, and of Chicagoans generally.
37 Werner, Julius Rosenwald, pp. 317-19; Chicago Tribune, Mar. II, 1931,
p. 4; Gottfried, Boss Cermak, p. 214.
38 Chicago Tribune, Mar. 21, 1931, p. 5.
39 Jewish Courier, Mar. 25, 1931, p. 6.
40 Danske Tidende, Mar. 6, 1931, WPA.
41 Sonntagpost, April 5, 1931, pp. 4, 6-7; Abendpost, April 6, 1931, pp.
1,4·
42 Magyar Tribune, April 3, 1931, WPA.
43 El Nacional, April II, 1931, WPA.
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The reform impetus contributed to the growth and success of the
Democratic party locally. This did not necessarily carryover to voting in
national elections, but some effect was felt in that area as well. By and
large there was a divergence here between the two groups of reformers.
The professional, middle-class reformers (Ickes, Jane Addams, Richberg,
Merriam) did tend to leave the Republican party at all levels. They
deserted to La Follette in 1924 and did not return, since they were
attracted by Smith in 1928 and Roosevelt and Horner in I932. Thus,
however much Harold Ickes might call himself a Republican in I932,
the fact was that he had been voting for the Democrats, locally, statewide,
and nationally, since I927. The same was true for many of his fellows.44
The upper-class reformers, on the other hand, remained Republican in
national politics. They were not attracted to La Follette in I924, nor were
they particularly attracted to Smith or Roosevelt later.
The case of the upper-class Jews is a good example. Julius Rosen-
wald, who played an important role in the continuing upper-class battle
against Thompson, was one of Hoover's strongest supporters and gave
him in 1928 the largest political contribution of his life ($5°,000).
Smith, he said, was not uthe type I would like to see in the White
House.,,45 Rosenwald's rabbi was even more explicit. Reform Jews, he
said, were offended by Smith's ucommonness" and lack of gentility, and
by his wife's appearance as an uhumble Irish scrubwoman." UReform
Jews didn't want their president or his wife to speak with bad gram-
mar.,,46 Voting for Cermak over Thompson made sense to the socioeco-
nomically highest among Chicago's ethnics and citizens generally, but
this did not automatically translate into national Democratic voting.
This translation was partially accomplished, however, by the associa-
tion of reform with statewide as well as citywide politics. Reform animos-
ity to Thompson's ally, Governor Len Small, was almost as great as that
to Thompson himself.47 When Small managed to get the gubernatorial
44 Richberg and Ickes, for example, were active in the National Progressive
League of 1932, which was a nonpartisan Roosevelt organization. See Chicago
Tribune, Sept. 26, 1932, p. 4; Oct. 19, 1932, p. 6.
~5Werner, Julius Rosenwald, pp. 292-93.
~6 Dr. Louis L. Mann, personal interview.
47 A good example: When the Dovre Club endorsed Democrat Jones for
governor in 1924, rather than Small, it was the first time in the club's existence
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nomination in 1932, after being out of the governor's office for four
years, he faced a very Urespeetable" Democratic opponent; thus reform
served the Democrats, vigorously, in a statewide election in 1932.
Henry Horner was a good representative of a particular type of
American politician, seen often in Illinois politics: the professional hon-
est man.48 Both parties, but especially the Democrats, have nominated
such men for office, particularly at times when the pressure was felt, or
when there seemed little chance of winning anyway!9 Such candidates
serve a purgative purpose when they lose and can sometimes win when a
regular party man cannot. At the same time they sometimes become
sticks in the party wheel, if elected (as was eventually the case with
Horner).
Horner was a longtime judge of the Probate Court and had been
famously honest throughout his career. He had received reform support
from the beginning. In 1918, for example, 1,400 lawyers formed a
nonpartisan Horner organization to support his reelection to the Probate
Court. There was more publicity, of more kinds, in his behalf, than for
any other candidate in the election.50
Horner's candidacy for the governorship in 1932 was greeted with
tremendous support from the same groups and individuals which had
supported Cermak against Thompson the year before. If anything, the
reform outpouring was greater, since Cermak, unlike Horner, was not a
professional honest man. Professional groups of all kinds-physicians,
lawyers, restaurant owners, grocers--established Horner organizations in
a manner and to an extent not seen elsewhere in the period.51 A uHorner
Minute Men" organization of business and professional people was cre-
ated and obtained about 100,000 pledges for him.52 Two hundred mem-
that it supported a Democrat for this office. And this was due to the scandals of
the Small administration. (Chicago Tribune, Oct. 8, 1924, p. 4.)
48 His career and character were very similar to those of a later governor of
Illinois, Otto Kerner (the son of one of Cermak's closest allies, and Cermak's
son-in-law as well)_
49 The latter applied, for example, when Adlai Stevenson and Paul Douglas
were given the nominations for governor and United States senator, respectively,
in 1948, which looked to boss Jacob Arvey to be a bad year anyway.
50 Chicago Daily News, Nov. 4, 1918, p. 19; Chicago T".ibune, Nov. 4, 1918,
p.13·
51 See Chicago T".ibune, Oct. I-Nov. 6, 1932, passim.
52 Ibid., Nov. 4, 1932, p. 4-
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bers of the University of Chicago faculty and Chancellor Robert M.
Hutchins endorsed his candidacy, as did the Women's Republican Club of
suburban (and conservative and prohibitionist) Evanston, Illinois.53
There was a great outpouring of Jewish support, since Horner was
the first Jewish gubernatorial nominee in Illinois in over a generation.
Since he represented the upper class, Reform Jewish group (he was a
member of the same congregation as Julius Rosenwald), the Reform
elements were as enthusiastic as the mass of Chicago Jews.54 Other ethnic
groups also showed considerable interest in Horner's candidacy, despite
the fact that in presidential years attention was generally focused on the
highest contest. Not surprisingly, this support emanated primarily from
middle- and upper-class representatives of the ethnic groups. The
Polish-American Chamber of Commerce, and other Polish influentials,
for example, publicly endorsed his candidacy, as did an independent
German-American organization of business and professional people.55
The Horner candidacy aided the Democrats considerably in pulling
Republican voters into the Democratic column. He ran ahead of Roose-
velt among Jews, Swedes, and Native-Americans (63 percent to FDR'S 43
percent). Many who had voted Democratic only at the local level before
now voted Democratic in a national election also. This did not mean that
these voters were now Democrats, but it was another occasion when they
were voting Democratic, and every such occasion contributed to the
establishment of a tradition. The Democratic consensus was bolstered at
another level, and the association of Democratic voting with reform was
extended.
The question of political reform was an active one in Chicago politics
during the 1920S. And as with most other questions already considered, it
worked in the Democrats' favor. It was not nearly as important with the
mass of ethnics as an issue like Prohibition, but it did affect some of them
and thus contributed to the rise of the Democratic consensus.
53 Ibid., Oct. 10, 1932, p. 6; Oct. 26, 1932, p. 4.
54 Louis L. Mann, personal interview; Jewish Courier, Oct. 25, 1932, p. 8,
Nov. 6, 1932, p. 6.
55 Chicago T,ibune, Oct. 19, 1932, p. 6, Oct. 22, 1932, p. 2; Dziennik
Zwiazkowy, Nov. 7, 1932, p. 5·
x. Socioeconomic Class
To understand ethnic group political behavior generally, it has been
necessary up to this point to ignore socioeconomic variations within and
between groups. With this general behavioral pattern now clear, it will
be advantageous to add the socioeconomic factor. Indeed, arguments
have been made that socioeconomic position is a more important behav-
ioral determinant than ethnicity.l This is not true for Chicago ethnic
groups between 1890 and 1936, but class position did have some political
effects.
With the use of census data and other criteria, our ethnic political
units were placed into one of four socioeconomic classes. These are
labeled lower-lower, upper-lower, lower-middle, and middle-middle. Ad-
ditionally, one of the Native-American units has been labeled upper-mid-
dle. Not all the ethnic groups are represented in every class; the need to
use areas of high ethnic concentration precluded this. Table X: 1 gives the
distribution of ethnic units among the several socioeconomic classes. It
also indicates that the Jewish, Czech, and Polish middle-middle units
became usable, for methodological reasons, only after the middle of the
192 0S.
The vote of each of the four classes in the rnajor elections of the
period is summarized in Table X:2. Because of the unequal representa-
tion of the various ethnic groups within each class, these data are not
definitive. But from them emerge some tentative conclusions which will
help in understanding the more intensive data which follow.
Perhaps the most striking thing about these data is the lack of any
clear pattern. Certainly nothing jumps out and proclaims itself a major
voting change on socioeconomic grounds. The clearest differentials are
between the middle-middle class, on the one hand, and the other three, on
the other. While one might expect more variation between lower-lower,
upper-lower, and lower-middle class ethnics, the fact is that all three were
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essentially working class and have this socioeconomic characteristic in
common. It is interesting that upper-lower and lower-middle ethnics
tended to be more Democratic throughout than were lower-lower ethnics.
This was a function of several forces.
One might reasonably expect that the greatest socioeconomic varia-
tions in voting (within classes between elections, and between classes)
would come in elections where there were economic questions at stake,
particularly in the Depression-time elections of 1930 and 1932. In 1932,
for example, there was an unprecedented mobilization of the forces of
organized labor on one side, and of organized business on the other, with
each force supporting a rival presidential candidate more strongly than
ever before.2 But the difference in voting between middle-middle units
and the others was not unusually great in 1932, and in some cases was
less than in 1928 (a significant exception here being the Jews and Ger-
mans-see Table X: 3). And for all classes, the change in vote from the
previous election was considerably less for both 1928-1930 and
1928-1932 than it was for 1920-1928 or 1924-1928.
Socioeconomic questions were simply not as important, or as effective,
as purely ethnic ones. The fact that the Germans and Jews were different
and did show more interclass variation in 1932 than in 1928 is indicative.
They were the two groups relatively most issue-oriented, and as such they
were apparently more concerned with economic issues. The others, partic-
ularly the highly ethnocentric newer immigrants, simply do not show
significant variations on a socioeconomic basis.
There is more of a socioeconomic breakdown, then, in 1928 than in
the Depression-time elections of 1930 and 1932. When the ethnics were
politically aroused-and this came for essentially ethnic reasons-their
voting was more distinguished on all bases. And it appears that Smith's
appeal had socioeconomic as well as simply ethnic strength.
1 A recent participant-observation study of a second-generation Italian com-
munity tends to stress socioeconomic class above ethnicity as a determinant of
behavior generally. But, at the same time, the reader can see the ethnic determi-
nant constantly present; indeed, ethnicity is a major determinant of their class
position. The ethnic factor did prevail; the ethnic reference group was far and
away the most important. (See Herbert]. Gans, The Urban Villagers: Group and
Class in the Li/e 0/ Italian-Americans [New York, 1962], ch. 2, and passim.)
2 See, e.g., Chicago Tribune, Oct. 8, 1932, p. 5; Oct. 20, 1932, p. 2; Oct. 2 I,
1932, p. 4; Oct. 22, 1932, p. 2; Oct. 30, 1932, p. 8.
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TABLE X:l Distribution of Ethnic Political units in Four
Socioeconomic Classes* (Nwnber of units in each
class)
Lower- Upper- Lower- MiddIe-
Lower Lower Middle ~lidd1e
Group class class class class
Czechoslovaks none 2 3 It
Poles 2 3 1 l§
Lithuanians none 2 2 none
Yugoslavs none 3 none none
Italians 4 2 none none
Germans none none 2 2
Swedes none none 2 3
Jews none none 3 It
Negroes 2 2 1 none
Native-Americans none none none 1~
TOTAL 8 units 14 units 14 units 9 units
(8 ethnic)
*See Appendix for the method of selecting units and their character-
istics.
tUsable starting with the election of 1923.
§Usable starting with the primary of 1927.
~There was also a Native-American unit in upper-middle class.
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'fABLE X: 2 Vote of Nine Ethnic Groups Subsumed into Four
Socioeconomic Classes, 1918-1932 {Percentage
Democrati cJ *
Lower- Upper- Lower- Middle-
Lower Lower Middle Middle
Election class class class class
1918: Senator 62 64 67 43
1920: President 24 35 28 17
1924: President 26 33 26 14
1928: President 56 62 64 42
1930: Senator 60 73 82 77
1932: President 59 68 75 57
1919: Mayor 51 55 56 34
1923: Mayor 78 67 66 38
1927: Mayor 33 44 47 38
1931: Mayor 44 58 66 55
*Percentage Democratic of the two-party vote except 1924-percentage
Democratic of the three-party vote.
All of this can be rendered clearer and more definitive by considering
socioeconomic variations in voting within the individual ethnic groups.
Table X:3 summarizes these patterns for the relevant national elections.
The several newer immigrant groups demonstrated similar patterns
in national voting, with upper-lower and lower-middle class units being
the most Democratic throughout. Among the Czechs, for example, there
were no significant differences between upper-lower and lower-middle
units, but the middle-middle unit remained consistently twenty to thirty
points less Democratic. Thus there was a relationship between higher
class position and Republican voting. This did not vary much over time
-as the lower-class units became more Democratic, so too did the
TABLE X:3 Ethnic Grou~ Vote in Selected National Elections, 1918-1932·, by Socioeconomic Class (Percentage
Democratic)
Group and class
(no. of political 1918 1920 1924 1928 1930 1932
units in each class) Senator President President President Senator President
Czechoslovaks:
Upper-Lower (2) 80 46 48 79 88 86
Lower-Middle (3) 86 42 41 77 90 87
Middle-Middle (1)
- -
24 51 86 66
Poles:
Lower-Lower (2) 75 31 37 77 82 85
Upper-Lower (3) 70 47 35 73 86 80
Lower-Middle (1) 68 29 30 70 91 85
Middle-Middle (1)
- - -
55 85 67
Lithuanians:
Upper-Lower (2) 77 53 61 75 82 82
Lower-Middle (2) 77 53 35 80 87 87
Yugoslavs:
Upper-Lower (3) 61 22 20 54 74 67
Italians:
Lower-Lower (4) 74 29 30 59 63 62
Upper-Lower (2) 65 34 32 70 76 69
Germans:
Lower-Middle (2) 67 22 19 76 89 80
Midd1e-111dd1e (2) 41 14 8 39 81 58
Swedes:
Lower-Middle (2) 43 14 11 36 81 53
Middle-Middle (3) 44 19 21 33 69 48
Jews:
Lower-Middle (3) 60 15 22 63 85 80
Middle-Middle (1)
- -
10 55 80 66
Negroes:
Lower-Lower (2) 27 6 6 28 31 27
Upper-Lower (2) 32 11 10 21 21 17
Lower-Middle (1) 55 21 14 17 15 15
Native-Americans:
Middle-Middle (1) 48 22 18 41 68 39
Upper-Middle (1) 44 19 15 39 69 47
Lower-Lower TOTAL 62 24 26 56 60 59
Upper-Lower TOTAL 64 35 33 62 73 68
Lower-Middle TOTAL 67 28 26 64 82 75
Middle-Middle TOTALt 43 17 14 42 77 57
*Percentage Democratic of two-party vote except for 1924--percentage Democratic of three-party vote (see
Table X:4 for socioeconomic breakdown of La Follette 1924 vote).
tEthnic vote only: Middle-Middle Native-American unit excluded.
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middle-middle unit, maintaining the same relative position from 1923 to
1932. This indicates that higher socioeconomic Czechs were subject to the
same ethnopolitical pressures as those lower on the socioeconomic scale;
were it otherwise, the spread would have enlarged with time.
Virtually the same thing was true among the Poles. The lower-lower,
upper-lower, and lower-middle units voted quite similarly in national
elections, and the middle-middle unit remained more Republican though
closer to the others than among the Czechs (and reasonably so, since it
was socioeconomically slightly lower than the Czech middle-middle unit
-see Appendix).s The limited spread among Lithuanian and Yugo-
slavian units again demonstrates the lack of any considerable difference in
voting behavior between upper-lower and lower-middle units: both
classes were essentially working class, and entrance into the economically
middle-class lower-middle did not seem automatically to entail an adop-
tion of middle-class political values.
Among the Italians, who were all lower class, there was considerable
variation that is not explicable in socioeconomic terms. But upper-lower
units were somewhat more Democratic than lower-lower, and this be-
came more pronounced as time passed; this was consistent with the
intra-lower-class behavior of other newer immigrant groups.
The more middle-class older immigrants demonstrated clearer and
more predictable socioeconomic voting patterns. The German lower-mid-
dle units, for example, were clearly more Democratic than the middle-
middle units throughout, and the difference became greater toward the
end of the period. The same was true of the Jews. But the highly
Republican Swedes varied from this pattern before 1928. Until that time
the lower-middle units rivaled the middle-middle units in Republicanism.
But in 1928 and after, the lower-middle units were more Democratic.
Thus the Smith campaign and the Depression created division in Swedish
voting behavior, with working-class Swedes moving more readily into the
S An interesting exception here was an upper-lower class Polish unit (Polish
area F on the map in the Appendix), which was the most Republican Polish unit
for almost the entire period. This is a good example of the role of geography,
since this unit was in the far south side steel mill area, far removed from the
mainstream of Polish residence and Polish organizational activity. Thus geo-
graphical isolation is another determinant of political behavior and one which is
not necessarily socioeconomic in nature; it is, however, potentially antiethnic in
its effect.
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Democracy than their white-collar countrymen; and Swedish voting be-
havior was henceforth more like that of socioeconomically similar groups.
Socioeconomic forces in Negro voting are not clear. Early in the
period the one lower-middle unit was more Democratic than the others,
but later it was more Republican. Similarly, the lower-lower units
changed from being more Republican than the upper-lower, to less
Republican as time passed. Since all Negro areas were overwhelmingly
Republican anyway, socioeconomic variations do not seem very meaning-
ful.
Generally, then, in national politics, ethnic voting behavior was
affected only moderately, and in certain situations, by socioeconomic class.
Predictably, ethnics who were solidly entrenched in the middle class, both
economically and, one supposes, in terms of values (i.e., middle-middle
units), tended to be Republican, while -among the three lower classes
there was little consistent variation, except that lower-lower units were
not quite so Democratic as upper-lower and lower-middle. The Republi-
canism of middle-middle ethnics reflected general American middle-class
feelings, both for the protection of an assumed economic position and in
upwardly mobile emulation of the leaders of society, who were, in
Chicago as elsewhere, strongly Republican.4 This is logical, since middle-
middle ethnics tended to be more assimilated; middle-middle areas, for
example, had higher proportions of second-generation group members
than did socioeconomically lower areas.
The relatively high Democratic voting of lower-middle class ethnics,
relative to their groups, is intriguing. These people were more middle
class economically than socially and in many respects would still consider
themselves lower, or at least working class. The fact that so many of
them were first-generation Americans served to reinforce this. Thus their
political behavior resembled that of their upper-lower class countrymen.
This class also probably included the highest proportion of union mem-
bers-they filled the ranks of those skilled and semiskilled blue-collar
occupations which were pretty well organized by the 1920S (as opposed
to the nonskilled factory jobs, held by lower-class ethnics, which were not
well organized until the New Deal). As such they were affected by
4 On the virtually innate Republicanism of Chicago's upper class, see
Arthur Meeker, Chicago, with Love: A Polite and Personal History (New York,
1955), p. 76.
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growing organized labor support of the Democratic party. This had
started in the Wilson era and continued during the 1920S; labor was
moving toward the Democrats in Chicago at this time and strongly
supported Smith and Roosevelt.5 Thus lower-middle ethnics had a strong
socioeconomic reason for staying within or joining the Democratic party
over the period. (That lower-middle ethnics were the most pro-La Fol-
lette in 1924 reinforces this conclusion; see below.)
The data in Table X:3 provide some other insights into the effect of
socioeconomic status on voting. Those elections which resulted in the
greatest socioeconomic variations in the voting of a given ethnic group
would appear to be the elections wherein socioeconomic considerations
were most important. I have found no clear pattern here encompassing
all the ethnic groups and have seen that the 1928 election resulted in a
more general socioeconomic voting breakdown than did either of the
more Ctlogical" Depression-time elections of 1930 and 1932. Thus I am
led to conclude that most ethnic group members did not vote as members
of a given socioeconomic class, that class was not a major reference
group, especially for lower-class ethnics.
But the Smith candidacy does seem to have a socioeconomic as well as
purely ethnic explanation. This conclusion is reinforced by the compara-
tive increases in Democratic voting. All lower-lower units (Polish, Ital-
ian, and Negro) showed their largest gains in Democratic percentage
strength in the 1928 election. And among the Poles and Negroes the
lower-lower Democratic gains were clearly greater than those among the
socioeconomically higher units of the same ethnic group. Smith's appeal
to the ethnics was basically ethnic in nature, but he was also attractive to
lower-class ethnics to an unprecedented degree. Whether the attraction
was for socioeconomic or purely ethnic reasons is not clear, but it did
change the socioeconomic bases of Democratic support. And this helps
explain the Democratic resurgence of 1928.
On the whole, socioeconomic variations in national voting were not
5 With the exception of 1924, when labor supported La Follette, most
national, state, and local labor organizations supported the Democrats at all levels
during the 1920S. This became more pronounced from 1928 on. (For Chicago,
see John Fitzpatrick Papers, Chicago Historical Society; Chicago Tribune, April
30, 1920, p. 3; Sept. 7,1920, p. 2; Nov. 1, 1920, p. 12; Sept. 4,1924, p. 6; Mar.
28,1927, p. IS; Mar. 31,1927, p. 9; Mar. 14,1931, p. 8; Oct. 21, 1932, p. 4;
Oct. 30, 1932, p. 8.)
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surprising. Those ethnics who had entered the substantial middle class
(middle-middle) tended to be the most Republican of their groups. By
and large, however, all socioeconomic levels of a given ethnic group were
on the same side of the political balance by 1932 (except the Swedes,
with lower-middle units just above 50 percent Democratic, and middle-
middle units just below). And all socioeconomic levels of a given group
were affected by the same political forces. The Democratic party through-
out the decade, and particularly after 1928, was the party of the majority
of lower-class ethnics; and most Chicago ethnic voters were lower class.
The 1930 election is interesting in that a woman led the Republican
ticket. This probably explains the unusually high Democratic vote for
senator in 1930; all ethnic groups (except Negroes) at all socioeconomic
levels delivered landslide Democratic votes. What is somewhat surprising
is that lower-lower and upper-lower ethnics were no more strongly
affected by this factor than were lower-middle and middle-middle ethnics.
Indeed, the latter, having been less affected by the forces of 1928, show a
considerably higher 1928-1930 Democratic switch. Repulsion from a
female candidate for major office, then, seems to have been a general
immigrant phenomenon, irrespective of socioeconomic class.
Finally, in national politics, socioeconomic class does contribute to
our understanding of La Follette's strengths and weaknesses in 1924 and
of his role in pulling voters out of the Republican party, facilitating a
shift to the Democrats four years later. La Follette received only 11
percent of the lower-lower vote, 18 percent of the upper-lower, 24
percent of the lower-middle, and 22 percent of the middle-middle.
Within the individual ethnic groups, too, his support was greatest among
lower-middle units (see Table X:4). With ethnic groups whose units fell
mainly into the lower-lower to lower-middle range, it was the units in
lower-middle and, to a lesser extent, upper-lower classes which were most
attracted to La Follette. And among those groups mainly in lower-middle
and middle-middle classes, lower-middle units were again the most pro-
La Follette.
Thus again the working class and trade union influence was operating
on ethnics in the lower-middle class. La Follette was strongly supported
by organized labor at all levels; he was also supported by the Socialist
party, which likewise had the allegiance of many class-oriented ethnics.
Many of these lower-middle voters had been Republican, but the I.a
TABLE X:4 Ethnic Response to La Follete Candidacy, 1924, and Rise in
Democratic Vote, 1924-1928, bg Socioeconomic Class
Group and class
(no. of political Percentage for Increase in Democratic
units in each class) La Follette, 1924 percentage strength, 1924-1928
Czechoslovaks:
Upper-Lower (2) 15 32
Lower-Middle (3) 21 36
Middle-Middle (1) 29 27
Poles:
Lower-Lower (2) 11 40
Upper-Lower (3) 25 38
Lower-Middle (1) 26 40
Middle-Middle (1)
Lithuanians:
Upper-Lower (2) 13 14
Lower-Middle (2) 17 45
Yugoslavs:
Upper-Lower (3) 16 34
Italians:
Lower-Lower (4) 14 29
Upper-Lower (2) 25 38
Germans:
Lower-Middle (2) 34 57
Middle-Middle (2) 31 31
Swedes:
Lower-Middle (2) 22 25
Middle-Middle (3) 16 16
Jews:
Lower-Middle (3) 30 41
Middle-Middle (1) 17 39
Negroes:
Lower-Lower (2) 6 22
Upper-Lower (2) 15 11
Lower-Middle (1) 15 3
Native-Americans:
Middle-Middle (1) 15 23
Upper-Middle (1) 8 24
Lower-Lower TOTAL 11 30
Upper-Lower TOTAL 18 29
Lower-Middle TOTAL 24 38
Middle-Middle TOTAL* 22 28
*Ethnic vote only--Middle-Middle Native-American unit excluded.
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Follette candidacy served to bring them out of that party. Thus upper-
lower ethnics had been slightly more Democratic than lower-middle in
1920 and 1924, but starting with 1928 these positions reversed, as
ethnics who had voted Republican in 1920 and La Follette in 1924
entered the Democratic party. La Follette first pulled these workers out of
the Republican party; then in 1928, when there was no Progressive party
and labor supported Smith, many of them opted for the Democrats. Then
with the Depression, and organized labor's animosity to the Hoover
administration, they followed the path of least resistance and remained
Democratic. It is indicative that the Germans and the Jews, the two
groups most attracted to La Follette in 1924 (and two groups with
relatively high proportions of union members), were also the two groups
which made the greatest pro-Democratic shift in 1928. Finally, the strong
middle-middle support for LaFollette resulted from the fact that well-es-
tablished middle class ethnics were more likely to be blue collar than
Native-Americans of the same socioeconomic position. They were thus
subject to many of the same forces as lower-middle ethnics, and their
political behavior was similarly affected.
All of this is not to deny the purely ethnic forces operating in 1928
and other elections as well. Nor is it to deny that, for the Germans at
least, there were strong ethnic reasons behind support for La Follette in
1924. But these socioeconomic considerations do provide our best indica-
tor of the strengths and weaknesses of the La Follette movement and its
contribution among selected ethnics to the rise of the Democratic major-
ity.
Socioeconomic factors operated somewhat differently in local voting
and offer some insight into the interrelationship between ethnicity, class,
and reform. The relevant data are presented in Table X: 5.
Socioeconomic patterns in mayoral voting were even less predictable
than at the national level. For example, lower-lower units were the most
Republican in 1927 and 1931, after having been the most Democratic in
1923. Within individual ethnic groups similar incongruities also emerge.
But most of these apparent problems can be explained through consider-
ing the twin questions of Big Bill Thompson and reform.
The pattern of ethnic Democratic voting at the national level (up-
per-lower and lower-middle units most Democratic, followed by lower-
TABLE X:5 Ethnic Group Vote in Local Elections, 1919-1931, by Socioeconomic Class
Group and class Percentage Democratic Percentage Pro-Thompson*
(no. of political ·1919 1923 1927 1931 1928 Republican
units in each class) Mayor Mayor Mayor Mayor Primary
-- -- -- -
Czechoslovaks:
Upper-Lower (2) 68 92 63 82 77
Lower-Middle (3) 77 74 62 92 50
Middle-Middle (1) - 49 79 61 43
Poles:
Lower-Lower (2) 55 85 57 65 80
Upper-Lower (3) 55 71 52 70 42
Lower-Middle (1) 51 69 52 82 30
Middle-Middle (1)" - - 58 67 41
Lithuanians:
Upper-Lower (2) 76 80 51 59 76
Lower-Middle (2) 76 84 64 65 49
Yugoslavs:
Upper-Lower (3) 52 52 36 64 42
Italians:
Low.er-Lower (4) 65 84 35 44 80
Uppe'r:"'Lower (2) 54 72 58 52 77
Germans:
Lower-Middle (2) 65 60 54 66 39
Middle-Middle (2) 34 29 20 49 31
Swedes:
Lower-~1iddle (2) 37 41 ·28 46 37
Hiddle-Middle (3) 33 43 4'5 57 21
Jews:
Lower-Middle (3) 40 66 40 66 41
Middle-Middle (1)
- 31 35 46 25
Negroes:
Lower-Lower (2) 16 60 7 21 77
Upper-Lower (2) 22 40 6 13 64
Lower-Middle (1) 33 65 10 11 59
Native-Americans:
Middle-Middle (1) 39 42 53 58 22
Upper-Middle (1) 45 45 58 64 21
Lower-Lower TOTAL 51 78 33 44 79
Upper-Lower TOTAL 55 67 44 58 58
Lower-Middle TOTAL 56 66 47 66 40
Middle-Middle TOTALt 34 38 38 55 29
*Equals mean of vote for Crowe for States Attorney and Small for Governor.
tEthnic vote only: Middle-Middle Native-American unit excluded.
I96 A House for all Peoples
lower and then middle-middle) breaks down locally, particularly in the
last two Thompson elections of 1927 and 1931. Here, and in the
Republican primary of 1928, there are strong suggestions of socioeco-
nomic effect on voting. In his first reelection campaign, in 1919, Thomp-
son did not break traditional voting patterns. But in 1927 and 1931 he
did: the pro-Thompson vote increased as one went down the class scale.
The same tendency prevailed within most ethnic groups, even where
there were no lower-lower units. The Lithuanian upper-lower units, for
example, were more Republican in 1927 and 1931 than the Lithuanian
lower-middle units, while this had not been the case in 1919, and had
prevailed to a lesser degree in 1923. The Italian lower-lower units were
clearly more Democratic than the upper-lower units in 1919 and 1923,
and then clearly more Republican in 1927 and 1931. Similarly, the Czech
upper-lower and lower-middle units were much more Republican than
the middle-middle in 1927 (but this broke down in 1931, when a Czech
opposed Thompson; again, the ethnic factor overwhelmed the socioeco-
nomic). An important key to Thompson's strength thus emerges-a
socioeconomic, or class, rather than ethnic attraction to the socioeconomi-
cally lowest among virtually all ethnic groups.
This phenomenon is even clearer in the Republican primary of 1928,
where the issue of reform predominated. This uPineapple Primary" wit-
nessed a new high in corruption and violence, as the Thompson-Crowe-
Small organization fought for its life and lost. All the forces of ((respecta-
bility" were organized against the Thompson candidates, and the vote for
Governor Small and State's Attorney Crowe, or their opponents, provides
an excellent indicator of pro-Thompson versus pro-reform sentiment. The
issue was never clearer.
The results are striking: an obvious relationship between lower socio-
economic class and pro-Thompson voting. The lower-lower units voted
79 percent pro-Thompson (i.e., average of vote for Crowe and Small);
the upper-lower units 58 percent; the lower-middle 40 percent; and the
middle-middle 29 percent.
This use of a primary election eliminates one of the major problems
in dealing with the question of socioeconomic reaction to reform: the
most pro-reform voters were in the middle-middle class and above, and
were largely Republican. But in Chicago in the 1920S ureform" generally
meant being anti-Thompson and thus voting Democratic. This created a
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real ambivalence within the middle-class electorate, which wanted to
reform the city and eliminate Thompson, but which was nonetheless
reluctant to vote Democratic. The 1928 Republican primary afforded an
opportunity around this dilemma, and they used it to repudiate over-
whelmingly the Thompson organization within the Republican context.
This feeling was clearly middle class rather than ethnic: the Native-Amer-
icans, also strongly Republican, gave Thompson's candidates only 21
percent.
Lower-class ethnics, on the other hand, were not positively motivated
toward reform. Or, at least they did not allow questions of reform to
dissuade them from voting in favor of politicians-in this case, Thomp-
son and his organization-whom they otherwise preferred. For each of
the ethnic groups which had a lower-lower unit, that unit was the most
pro-Thompson in the primary. And within every single ethnic group, the
socioeconomically lowest units were those most pro-Thompson.
The primary returns reflected a personal, Thompson appeal to lower-
class ethnics (as was made clear by their voting in 1923, when Thomp-
son did not run). If the mayor's appeal was not successfully ethnic, it was
successfully class. He was an effective demagogue, not like a Cermak or a
LaGuardia, who built on an ethnic base, but rather like a Huey Long,
who built on an essentially socioeconomic base. His demagoguery, how-
ever, was constructed on a rather fragile foundation, since ethnic motiva-
tion was considerably stronger than socioeconomic. And when Cermak
confronted Thompson in 1931 this was proved conclusively. Upper-lower
and lower-middle Czechs, for example, were influenced by ethnic rather
than socioeconomic forces in their strong support of Cermak. And among
the Poles, the middle-middle unit moved from least Republican in 1927
to second most Republican in 1931-a more predictable stance and one
which reflected the ethnic factor operating among lower-class Poles once
again. Among the most middle-class ethnic groups, lower-middle and
middle-middle units drew closer together in 1931, to Cermak's advan-
tage. Cermak profited from the ethnic attraction among socioeconomi-
cally lower ethnics and the quest for reform among socioeconomically
higher. Thompson retained popularity in 1931 with lower-class units
generally, but to a definitely lesser degree than in 1927, and thus he could
not win. The lower-lower units were the most opposed to Prohibition (89
percent UAnti" in the 1919 referendum, to 83 percent for upper-lower,
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85 percent for lower-middle, and 71 percent for middle-middle), and,
while there might be much to hold them to Thompson in 1931, Tony
Cermak was the Wet in Chicago, and they knew it. His strength on the
basis of ethnicity and ethnic issues simply outweighed Thompson's non-
ethnic socioeconomic appeal.
When Thompson was reelected in 1927, one commentator offered a
word of optimism: ctRemember, however, that the same people who vote
enthusiastically for a Thompson or a Hylan at Qne election may vote with
even more rejoicing for Al Smith at the next. They are not so much
opposed to good government as they are to the exclusive gentlemen who
conspicuously favor it, and to the repressive objects which puritannical
government often proposes."6
Thus ureform" did not always make much sense to the lower-class
ethnic, while Thompson, who flouted the reformers, could seem attractive
indeed. But Anton Cermak was similar to Al Smith in his appeal to the
ethnics, promising clean government that was also highly attuned to
ethnic sentiments and desires. This made Thompson considerably less
attractive in 1931 than he had been four years earlier.
Reform sentiment tended to favor the Democrats, particularly in
local politics. The socioeconomic breakdowns I have made qualitatively
in Chapter 9 and quantitatively here establish that this was a reason for
rising middle- and upper-class ethnic Democratic voting. Lower- and
working-class ethnic Democratic voting increased more for ethnic than
for reform or socioeconomic reasons, and in ethnic rather than socioeco-
nomic patterns; but even here Cermak and Smith undermined the socio-
economic attraction of the Thompson organization. This combination of
Democratic forces, appealing at once to ethnics of all socioeconomic
classes, was really unbeatable, and the Democracy had it made.
Because socioeconomic class divisions comprise categorical and not
interval variables, I am unable here to use Pearson's r correlations. But I
can substitute another correlation measure, known as Goodman and
Kruskal's lambda-b (L-b), whose computation is a good deal less forbid-
ding than its name. This is a measure of strength of association for
categorical variables, used here for association between our four socioeco-
6 UWhy Chicago Did It," The New Republic 50 (April 20, 1927): 234-36.
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nomic categories and voting in selected elections (with voting made
categorical by dividing percentages into equal quartiles) . As distinct from
Pearson's rJ L-b is not a measure of linear relationship, but only of
monotonicity; and it ranges only from zero to one, since negative rela-
tionships are not possible. I shall actually be using the square root of L-b
in all the values given here, to make it statistically comparable to the
values expressed by Pearson's rj the nature of this measure will preclude
values of as high an order as occur with Pearson's rJ however.7
Table X: 6 gives L-b for selected elections in our period of major
concern. When using two-party vote, L-b will be the same for either
candidate, since it is a symmetrical measure; moreover, it does not show
the direction of association. For example, L-b computed for either the
Smith or Hoover vote of 1928 comes out .39, indicating some relation-
ship between socioeconomic class and voting, but not from which classes
7 Lambda-b is based on quite simple calculations, made from modal categories
in a contingency table, as illustrated below:
x = Socioeconomic class
I 2 3 4
b.Q ~
.s 2 5 4 0 II~
0 2. 3 6 7 2 18:>
II 3 3 2 2 6 13
~ 4 0 I 0 2
2;8 14 14 8 44
Here, the X variable is socioeconomic class (I = lower-lower, 2 = upper-lower,
3 =lower-middle, 4 =middle-middle), and the Y variable is voting for the
candidate concerned (I =76-100 percent, 2 = 51-75 percent, 3 =26-50 per-
cent,4 == 0-25 percent). To compute Lambda-b, add the modal figure for each X
variable (viz., 3 + 6 + 7 + 6), and subtract from it the modal total voting
figure (viz., 18). This is divided by the value derived when the modal total
voting figure (viz., again, 18) is subtracted from the corner total (viz., 44).
Thus:
(3 + 6 + 7 + 6) - 18 = -±.. = .154 = Lambda-b
44 - IS 26
Then take the square root of .154 and arrive at the correlation of .39 for
socioeconomic class and Smith voting in 1928. For further explanation and
examples, see Jensen, "Methods of Statistical Association for Historical Research,"
mimeo. (St. Louis, Mo., 1968), pp. 37-40.
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each candidate benefited (whereas there was a difference: Smith carried
five of eight lower-lower units, eleven of fourteen upper-lower and
lower-middle, and two of eight middle-middle) .
The table, first of all, strongly supports the assertion that socioeco-
nomic class was not as important an overall determinant of voting
behavior as was ethnicity; there are no very strong correlations. It also
supports the idea that there was some socioeconomic effect in 1928
voting, especially when compared to 1920 and 1924, and that this
increased in 1932. The 1920 presidential election seems to have elicited
no reaction in socioeconomic terms. This is largely true of I 924 as well;
note that if the La Follette vote is added to that of Coolidge, the election
as a whole has a L-b of zero, as did 1920.
In local elections there is a striking effect in 1931, just as was
indicated by the voting returns by class. While each preceding Thompson
election had to some degree been associated with socioeconomic class, and
this reached its highest point in the 1928 primary where Thompson's
organization fought for its life, the L-b of zero in 1931 shows the purely
ethnic nature of that election, to Cermak's profit. Thompson's socioeco-
nomic as well as edmic appeal had been broken; L-b points to the source
of this defeat.
In Table X:7 I again use the standard deviation (s) as a measure of
dispersion to see the effect of major elections on dispersion of the vote
between classes and between the units comprising the sample for each
class. In national elections there is a hint that 1928 had socioeconomic
overtones, since s between classes is highest of all there. On the other
hand, s within classes shows no very clear pattern, except an overall
increase over time. Were the relationship between socioeconomic class
and Smith voting really great, for example, we should expect intraclass s
to be low, and this does not obtain. The figures are not entirely satisfac-
tory.
This is even truer of the s values for the La Follette vote, where s
both between and within classes is extremely low. This is best explained
by questioning the measure, since La Follette was a third-party candidate,
whose vote nowhere exceeded about 40 percent; thus the range (and s)
is bound to be narrow, when compared to major-party candidates. There
is still a hint of support for the earlier suggestions about the socioeco-
TABLE X:6
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Lambda-b Correlations of Socioeconomic Class and
Selected National and Local Elections, 1919-1932*
Year, office,
candidates
1920: President:
Cox-Harding
1924: President: t
Davis
Coolidge
1928: President:
Smith-Hoover
1932: President:
Roosevelt-Hoover
1919: Mayor:
Sweitzer-Thompson
1923: Hayor:
Dever-Lueder
1927: Mayor:
Dever-Thompson
1928: Republican Primary§
1931: Mayor:
Cermak-Thompson
Square root
of Lambda-b
0.00
0.00
.37
.39
.57
.31
.52
.40
.57
0.00
*For explanation of this statistic, see text.
tFigure is not the same for Davis and Coolidge because per-
centage computed on basis of three-party vote; if La Follette
vote is. added to that of Coolidge, L-b for the election = 0.00.
§Based on mean percentage of two-candidate vote received by
two leading Thompson candidates in the primary: Small for gover-
nor and Crowe for states attorney.
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TABLE X: 7 Standard Deviations for Socioeconomic Class Breakdowns of vote of
Nine Ethnic Groups in Selected National and Local Elections, 1919-
1932*
~ within classes
Q)
J.I
Q) M
J.I
'""'
9'Q
<J) <J) ~ ~~ ~ "'t:j ¥0 ~H HI I Q))4 J.I .... ,...
Q) Q) <J) -,jl
Year and s between ~ p. ~ "'t:jfo~r classes ~ •.-1election H t-1 ~
1920: President 7.5 17.1 18.4 15.8 9.5
i-P24: President 7.9 15.8 20.3 12.8 8.8
1928: President 9.9 19.7 21.0 20.8 10.1
1932: President 8.3 23.3 23.1 20.8 9.5
1924: La FQ11ette 5.7 6.6 7.6 5.6 5.7
1919: Mayor 10.2 22.2 22.0 19.4 11.3
1923: Mayor 17.0 14.4 21.5 18.9 9.4
1927: Mayor 6.2 19.1 19.7 19.4 14.7
1931: Mayor 9.1 17.5 21.7 22.8 7.9
*Standard deviation computed for range between classes or between areas
comprising sample for each class, based on Democratic percentage of two-party
vote, except for 1924--Democratic percentage of three·party vote. Figures for
La Follette based on La Follette percentage of the three-party vote.
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nomic effect of the La Follette candidacy, in the somewhat lower s among
middle- as opposed to lower-class ethnics.
In local elections, the highest interclass s by far occurs in the least
controversial mayoralty of the period. The reason for this is unclear, as is
that for the low s of 1927, which is rather the opposite from what we
would expect, given our suggestions about the socioeconomic strength of
Thompson's appeal prior to 1931.
Our L-b correlations pretty generally agree with the other quantita-
tive and qualitative measures of this chapter; this is at best partially true
for the standard deviations, which are unsatisfactory at the local level.
Regarding the role of socioeconomic class in the political behavior of
Chicago's ethnic groups, it appears to be a rather selective force, operat-
ing only in certain situations and in various ways. In national politics, the
clearest socioeconomic breakdown in voting was that of relatively
stronger Republicanism among ethnics firmly established in the middle
class. This is as one should expect. Ethnics of other classes seem to have
behaved more in terms of the ethnic rather than the socioeconomic
reference group, and thus socioeconomic factors do not tell us very much
about them. The major exception to this generalization would seem to be
that union member ethnics-and particularly those in the lower-middle
class-did sometimes operate in terms of a class reference group. We
learn this more by inference than anything else, but it does seem to
explain some otherwise inexplicable developments and is particularly
useful in understanding the effects of the La Follette candidacy of 1924.
Locally, socioeconomic class operated differently, because it was inti-
mately associated with the question of reform and in this period reform
involved support of the Democrats. Involvement in reform was very
much a class phenomenon, with higher class correlating with greater
support of reform. Class, then, was a factor in bringing middle-class
ethnics into the Democratic party in the local context. And as a corollary
to this, class operated among lower-class ethnics to reinforce local Repub-
licanism until nonclass forces persuaded them to switch.
In some ways, then, socioeconomic class had antithetical effects at the
national and local levels. But in the long run the Democrats profited in
both. Class either ultimately worked to the Democrats' advantage or else
ceased to be an effective causative factor. Locally, class served to bring the
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otherwise Republican ethnic middle class into the Democracy; and
lower-class ethnic voters were brought into the Democracy for other than
class reasons. Nationally, class did produce in the solid middle class a
certain reluctance to vote Democratic, but it also seems to have supported
Democratic voting among the much larger ethnic working class.
Socioeconomic class did not have the political force of ethnicity
among any except perhaps the highest class ethnics. But it was somewhat
effective in the situations noted-situations which, on the whole, served
to make it another servant of the Democratic consensus.
XI. Conclusion:
A House for all Peoples
Ethnic political behavior and the politics of Chicago underwent consid-
erable change and development between 1890 and 1936. As the ethnic
groups increased in number and became larger and more acculturated to
American political mores, their role in the city'S politics changed. They
became not only more important generally, and more hearkened to, but
they came to affect the style of Chicago politics, the kind of people and
the kind of issues that would characterize the city's political life. Perhaps
the most important change of this half-century is just that-Chicago's
politics became a house for all peoples, wherein each could find at least
something it was looking for. In the 1890S Chicago had many immi-
grants, most of whom could not vote and almost all of whom were
concerned primarily with surviving in a hostile environment; as such they
were a rather passive force and one which politicians tended to take for
granted-the ethnics, after all, had no alternatives. In the 1930S, on the
other hand, the ethnics were well organized, largely naturalized and thus
able to vote, and by then accustomed to being recognized as specific
groups, with individual interests of their own and the power to recipro-
cate if those interests were not met. It is this general change, built up
slowly, over time and with much trial-and-error, that had the greatest
effect on Chicago and American politics.
It is difficult to generalize about newer immigrant voting behavior
prior to the First World War, since small proportions of these groups
were naturalized and voting. The ethnics as a whole voted as Chicago and
Illinois voted, although frequently more Democratic in this era of Repub-
lican hegemony. The older immigrant groups-Germans and Swedes-as
the nation at large, were generally Republican in their voting for national
and state offices. Most of the newer immigrants, however, were living in
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areas that generally delivered national and state Democratic majorities
through the coming of the war. Negroes remained overwhelmingly
Republican. Local voting tradition in this early period was also mixed,
although the Democrats did better than at state and national levels. Thus
many of the immigrants did have their first political experience in
Democratic neighborhoods.
It was not until the end of the First World War, however, that the
newer immigrants began to become naturalized in large numbers, and it
is here that I have sought major indications of ethnic political behavior.
There were heavy Republican majorities of almost all ethnic groups for
national and state office in the first half of the 1920S, followed by rapidly
increasing Democratic majorities starting with 1928. By 1931 most
groups were voting locally much the same as they were for national
office. However, in the 1920S there is less change in traditional voting
patterns than the establishment of the first real long-term political com-
mitments that many of these groups ever had. The late 1920S to early
1930s, then, witnessed not so much changes in coalitions as the formation
of the first ethnic voting coalition; not so much realignment as a first
alignment, for most of these groups. There was, of course, some real
change, particularly for the older immigrant groups, and most especially
the Germans and Jews, who clearly surrendered long-term Republican
loyalties for new Democratic ones in this critical period (as the Negroes
would do in the mid-1930s). But this was a period for the settling down
of the percolating forces of rapidly naturalizing new groups, creating in
the process a political coalition with some older groups that would last
for a generation and replacing in power the really preethnic or preurban
coalition which had maintained the Republicans sinc~ the 1890s.
A variety of quantitative and qualitative measures have been em-
ployed in this study to view changes in ethnic political behavior and
Chicago politics after 1918. Democratic voting and Democratic party
membership grew at all levels, and for really all groups, after 1928.
Political heterogeneity among the ethnics was slowly replaced by political
homogeneity. Seven of the nine groups voted Democratic for mayor in
1931, and eight for president in 1932. Only the Negroes could be rightly
labeled Republican in 1932, and even that would not last too much
longer. When Edward Kelly, Cermak's successor, was reelected with a
record majority in 1935, his opponent said, ccThere is no local Republican
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Party."l This was true. The Republican party in Chicago, as a viable
political opposition, was dead and would largely remain so. Without the
rising consensus of Chicago's ethnic groups this Democratic strength
could not have come about. There was a complex of factors leading to
this consensus: ethnically attractive and attentive national and local
Democratic politicians; the Democratic versus Republican stand on issues
of ethnic concern; ethnic representation on party tickets and in patronage
jobs; the entanglement of the Republicans locally with crime; superior
Democratic party organization and solidarity. The ethnics entered the
Democracy because their support was sufficiently reciprocated to make it
reasonable for them to do so; or, negatively, because the Republicans
offered no reason for them not to vote Democratic. Because the Demo-
crats came to represent a politics that was a house for all peoples, while
the Republicans did not, the Democrats became the majority party for
the second third of the twentieth century.
This change was created by no one election or issue, nor by any single
variable. But there were crucial elections, issues, and other phenomena.
According to my ethnic variant of the theory of critical elections, as
defined by V. O. Key, and further developed by others, I have found that
what was true in other cities emerges as true for Chicago also: the 1928
election was certainly the most critical of the period.2
But although 1928 was the single election contributing most to
changes, or permanent developments in ethnic voting behavior, it did not
exist in a vacuum. Both our qualitative information and our quantitative
1 News- Week 5 (April 13, 1935): 7.
2 v. O. Key, Jr., ccA Theory of Critical Elections," Journal of Politics 17 (Feb.
1955); Duncan MacRae, Jr., and J. A. Meldrum, «'Critical Elections in Illinois,
1888-1958," American Political Science Review 54 (Sept. 1960); Jerome M.
Clubb and Howard W. Allen, "The Cities and the Election of 1928: Partisan
Realignment?" American Historical Review 74 (April 1969); John L. Shover,
«tWas 1928 a Critical Election in California?" Pacific Northwest Quarterly 58
(Oct. 1967). See also J. Joseph Huthmacher, Massachusetts People and Politics,
I9I9-I933 (Cambridge, Mass., 1959); Samuel Lubell, The Future of American
Politics (Garden City, N.Y., 1952); M. J. Bluestein, «'Voting Tradition and
Socioeconomic Factors in the 1936 Presidential Election in Illinois" (M.A. thesis,
University of Chicago, 1950), p. 5; Harold F. Gosnell and N. N. Gill, "An
Analysis of the 1932 Presidential Vote in Chicago," American Political Science
Review 29 (Dec. 1935); William F. Ogburn and Nell S. Talbot, «'A Measure-
ment of the Factors in the Presidential Election of 1928," Social Forces 8 (Dec.
192 9) ·
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measures (voting, party identification, etc.) have pointed to the impor-
tance of 1930 and 1932 in building into a tradition ethnic national and
state Democratic voting, and of 1931 in bringing local voting behavior
into line with national. It is better, therefore, to speak of a critical period
of voting change than of a critical election. One Illinois voting study so
labeled the period 1924-1936.3 But in terms of our data this seems
unnecessarily long; 1924 really had little effect on overall voter loyalties,
and all the changes that obtained in 1936 had really been well developed
by 1932 (Negro Democratic voting majorities at the national level are
really a post-1936 phenomenon). There is a temptation to stop in 1931
and exclude the Roosevelt election because of the overwhelming impor-
tance of voting tradition as a determinant of voting behavior and the fact
that there was already an ethnic Democratic tradition by 1932.4 Roose-
velt's strength certainly built on the Democratic impetus created during
1928-1931.5 But Roosevelt also contributed to the firmness of this tradi-
tion (e.g., our party identification measure), adding more ethnics and
regaining voters who had left the party in reaction against Smith (Protes-
tants, southerners) .6
Thus 1928-1932 comprises an ideal critical period in the politics of
Chicago's ethnic groups, as well as for the city as a whole, and indeed for
the nation. This is supported by almost all our measures of political
behavior, in addition to those built on voting alone. This was the first
such period since the 1890S and was even larger in its scope and more
permanent in its effects.
3 MacRae and Meldrum, "Critical Elections in Illinois," pp. 669-83.
4; On the importance of party tradition as a force of political behavior, see
Angus Campbell and others, The Voter Decides (Evanston, 111., 1954), pp.
88-90. Gosnell and Gill found Democratic party tradition the strongest factor in
Roosevelt's 1932 victory, which indicates his indebtedness to Smith ("An Analy-
sis of the 1932 Presidential Vote in Chicago," p. 983). See also Bluestein,
"Voting Tradition," p. 28.
5 Gosnell and Gill, "An Analysis of the 1932 Presidential Vote in Chicago."
Nationally the usimple coefficient of correlation" between Roosevelt and Smith
voting was .94 (ibid., p. 976), while that between Smith and Cox or Davis was
not significant (Ogburn and Talbot, ccA Measurement of the Factors," p. 178).
We have seen for Chicago a Roosevelt-Smith Pearson l' correlation of .95, even
higher than the national. See also Harold F. Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago
Model (Chicago, 1937),P. 102.
6 This was true in Illinois: MacRae and Meldrum, "Critical Elections in
Illinois, p. 678.
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I have made little effort here to determine if anyone issue created any
given voting shift, since this determination cannot really be made. The
Smith election is a good case in point, since it has been intensively studied
in a variety of ways and at several points in time. Scholars differ strongly
on what they see as the major variables of Smith voting, and their
conclusions often differ partially from those of the quantitative and
qualitative measures used in this study.7 In dealing with political relation-
ships one must be as catholic and inclusive as possible. No one quantita-
tive tool or subjective insight will alone suffice. The political decision-
making process of each individual is a complex phenomenon, innately
multivariate, and at least partially irrationa1.8 In 1928, for example, an
ethnic voter supported Smith because of his Wetness, urbanness, Roman
Catholicism, or apparent social familiarity; because he was paid or other-
wise influenced to do so; or for any of a variety of other reasons. There is
evidence-in correlation coefficients and in the ethnic press-to associate
Smith voting with opposition to Prohibition, and good evidence about the
lesser roles of empathy, prejudice, and general liberalism. It is quite clear
that these were the major issues of 1928 since both quantitative measures
and qualitative evidence point to them as the issues of utmost ethnic
concern. Beyond this, however, there is an area of uncertainty. The voter
chooses as an individual, within the framework of his reference groups,
because and in spite of the many forces operative upon him; one underes-
timates the voter and the complexities of his decision process if he tries
fully to isolate individual forces.
Were it possible to quantify other issues as has been done for
Prohibition (e.g., had there been referenda on immigration restriction,
etc.) , partial analysis would have been possible and might have provided
statistical insights into the relative weight of various issues. Multivariate
analysis is another possibility, but one still needing considerable develop-
7 E.g., Ruth C. Silva, Rum, Religion ana Votes: 1928 Re-Examined (Univer-
sity Park, Pa., 1962), p. 43; Ogburn and Talbot, uA Measurement of the
Factors," pp. 176-78. The former found Wetness and Catholic religion statisti-
cally insignificant correlates of Smith voting; the latter found a negative partial
correlation between urban residence and Smith voting. This points not to
weaknesses of statistics, but of statisticians; and to the need for qualitative
research as a check on quantitative data, as well as vice versa.
8 See, e.g., A. J. Brodbeck, uThe Problem of Irrationality and Neuroticism
Underlying Political Choice," in American Voting Behavior, ed. Eugene Burdick
and A. J. Brodbeck (Glencoe, Ill., 1959), pp. 121-35.
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ment for applicability to historical problems.9 And even with the addition
of these more sophisticated quantitative techniques, the elements of emo-
tion and irrationality that accompany political decision-making would
still remain.
To endeavor to differentiate between forces of party, issues, and
candidates, or between different types of issues, can also be misleading.
One leading voting study postulates three main variables (party, candi-
dates, and issues), anyone of which can predominate in any given
election, with party generally the most important.10 This is a useful
distinction, but not always possible. Smith's 1928 strength was certainly
not from party loyalty; it was, in fact, an antiparty vote: the voting
change centered around Smith as an individual versus the Republicans as
a party. But the candidate and the issues were really one package, insepa-
rable. And Cermak's 1931 victory was a careful blend of all three
variables. The evaluations of campaigns in the ethnic press show the
difficulty of maintaining this type of distinction.
In terms of types of issues, a distinction has been made between
tcPosition" (content) and uStyle" (attitudinal) issues, with the latter
having importance mainly when the former fail to occur.11 But what was
Prohibition in the 1920S? or the Ku Klux Klan? or religious prejudice?
Clearly these issues involved both content and attitude, both rational and
irrational factors, and cannot be so easily characterized. A distinction
between ethnic issues and issues of ethnic interest makes more sense for
this study, and generally, as a distinction between those issues which
encompass social and cultural problems and those which do not. The
former can be called more attitudinal or less substantive than the latter,
but they tend also to be more determining.12
In short, an effort to isolate the variables of political behavior must
not lead to oversimplification of the complexities of political relationships
9 Note 7 above points to some of the problems that seem to emerge when
partials and multivariate techniques are employed. The answer, of course, lies not
in abandoning the techniques, but in further exploration by historical statisti-
cians.
10 Campbell and others, The Vote, Decides, pp. 183-84.
11 Bernard Berelson and others Voting: A Study of Opinion FOl'mation in a
Pl'esidential Campaign (Chicago, 1954), pp. 184-85.
12 Samuel P. Hays, "History as Human Behavior," Iowa ]oul'nal of Ristol'Y 58
(July 1960); Gosnell and Gill, "An Analysis of the 1932 Presidential Vote in
Chicago."
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and the element of irrationality in political decision-making by individu-
als and by groups. Political motivation is complex and involves a multi-
plicity of factors which often cannot be separated. Just as the study of
political behavior which ignores quantitative tools cannot possibly be
complete, so too is a study limited by an ignoring of the irrational and
subjective forces which are always present. Some historians of this period
have recognized this, at least implicitly.13 And I have hopefully made it
explicit in this study of ethnic political behavior in Chicago.
I have considered only one city and its ethnic groups. The characteris-
tics and forces of ethnic political behavior, however, are general and
applicable to all cities. There are very strong similarities in the responses
of different ethnic groups to similar stimulii at the same or different
times. This suggests that the forms of American ethnic group thought-
patterns, behavior, and belief would be constant from city to city, even
where the substance of political response might vary for local reasons.
The substance of Chicago's ethnic politics 1890-1936 does have
some elements which make the city'S experience unique. No other Ameri-
can city, for example, had a mayor quite like Big Bill Thompson, and
Thompson certainly affected the configurations of ethnic political behav-
ior in Chicago. But each city has its distinctive elements (James Curley in
Boston was in several ways a Democratic Thompson), none of which are
as powerful as the similarities which link all American cities. Where
local Republican organization was more effective (Philadelphia, for ex-
ample) the rise of the Democratic party came more slowly.14 But the fact
is that it came everywhere, and for essentially the same reasons. The
political acculturation of the immigrant and other ethnic minority groups
followed a pretty consistent path throughout the United States, and it was
just this similarity of forces operating in most places at the same time that
created the revival of the Democratic party.
Indeed, given the variations in the political and ethnic makeup of
13 E.g., Huthmacher, Massachusetts People and Politics; Lubell, The Future of
American Politics; Oscar Handlin, Al Smith ana His America (Boston, 1958).
14 See J. T. Salter, Boss Rule: Portraits in City Politics (New York, 1935),
and David H. Kurtzman, "Methods of Controlling Votes in Philadelphia" (Ph.D.
diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1935). The distinctiveness of California, which
did have unique elements, is noted in Shover, "Was 1928 a Critical Election in
California?" And a multi-city approach can be found in Clubb and Allen, "The
Cities and the Election of 1928."
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American cities, the similarities of their political development are a good
deal more striking than the differences. This study, then, provides a
microcosmic view of a general process taking place in American political
life at this time. This half-century view has hopefully provided focus not
only on the substantive question of the rise of the Democratic party but
also on those problems of form mentioned above: the desires, complaints,
and tensions of people in the process of acculturating and assimilating
themselves into an essentially alien society. Ethnic political behavior, in
the American democratic context, was a rather good measure of ethnic
Americanization generally (and perhaps of the relation between any
minority ethnic group and a larger society) and of the ethnic role in and
effect on American life. The United States of the twentieth century has
been overwhelmingly affected-in domestic affairs, relations with foreign
nations, and myriad specific problems-by its ethnically pluralistic na-
ture. Thus the forces dealt with in this study are not without their
significance in understanding the unfolding of American history.
The ethnic groups of Chicago comprised a majority of its population
long before they came to have any real force in the making of its political
decisions. Partially this was because of their inability to work together;
but far more so was it because the groups in power in Chicago sought to
maintain their own positions and keep the ethnics out. Thus the process
outlined in these pages was a rather dramatic one, as groups of Americans
sought the powers that were essential to the realization of their version of
the American dream.
As the Democratic party, and Chicago politics generally, became
more of a house for all peoples by the early 1930s, this signified a
considerable expansion of American democracy. Certainly it was a jerry-
built house, whose elements had little more in common with one another
than a mutual need for its shelter. But the house was now open to nearly
everyone, and each could enter in company with his ethnic peers; if that
was not the American dream of some older Americans, it fit very well
indeed with that of the ethnic groups of Chicago, 1890-1936.
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There are two main reasons for my adoption of a different methodology
for ethnic political behavior in the period 1890-1916 than for the years
following. First, there is the fact that most of the immigrants were just
entering Chicago during these years, and that, at least for the newer
immigrant groups, majorities of each group were not naturalized and thus
able to vote until about the time of the First World War. Thus a newer
immigrant group's preponderance of the population in a given political
unit did not necessarily mean a similar preponderance of the voters in
that unit. Second, we are limited by the nature of census information for
this period. The Bureau of the Census, for example, before 1920 reported
data for cities on inconsistent bases, and never for units smaller than the
ward. Wards are large units, often with tens of thousands of people
(Chicago had thirty-five wards through 1921, for a population of just
over a million in 1890 and 2.7 million in 1920); obviously, there would
be few instances where one ethnic group would comprise the majority of
a ward. School censuses are another important source of information, but
since these use data from schoolchildren, they are bound to underrepre-
sent newer immigrant groups and Negroes, who, because of poverty, kept
their children in school less often and for shorter periods of time than did
more established groups.
We must, therefore, use a more cursory approach to the prewar era
and recognize that the data are less reliable than for the 1920S. It is for
this reason that I speak of, for example, the CCItalian area" vote rather
than the CCItalian vote" for these years. Moreover, the proportions which
some of our groups comprise of the wards of their main concentration are
often quite small, making any generalizations questionable (Table A: I).
But I had the alternatives of using these imprecise data or simply ignoring
voting behavior prior to 1918; and considering the alternatives, it was
reasonable to proceed as I have, a glimmer of light being preferable to
none at all.
There are a couple of subjective factors also arguing for this decision.
First, the censuses tended to underrepresent the ethnics. Second, it can be
argued that an ethnic group's dominance of an area stems not only from
its proportion of the area's population but also from its being the largest
ethnic group in the area regardless of its numbers. I chose the sample
!ABLE A:l Characteristics of Ethnic Areas Studied, 1890-1916
1890-1901 1901-1910 1911-1917
Ward % of ward Ward % of ward Ward % of ward
Group number(s) popu1ation* number(s) popu1ation* number(s) population*
-
Germans 14, 20, 21, 57 24, 26, 27 46 24, 26, 27 41
22, 26
Swedes 23 38 22 17 23 14
Bohemians 8, 9 42 10, 12 39 10, 12 41
Poles 16 46 16, 17 43 16, 17 57
Italians 19 15 19 30 4, 19 41
Jews t 7 39 9 47 10, 20 40
Negroes§ 2 15 2 23 2 39
*10. multiple-ward units the figure is the mean of the group percentages for each of the wards included.
tpercentages given are those for Russians in these known Jewish areas; in fact the number of Jews would
be higher, especially for the Twentieth Ward which was the ghetto an.d included Jews from many eastern European
countries.
§Negro percentages probably considerably higher than indicated; they would probably be most underrepre-
sented in school censuses.
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areas not only on the basis of group proportion of total population but
also when possible from areas where no other group existed in large
numbers. Additionally, at all times the data is at most for the first and
second generations (i.e., the immigrants and their children) and does not
include the third generation (listed as native-born white of native-born
white parentage by the census) who are often quite ethnic in every way;
this factor is even more pertinent to the samples for 1918-1936. Finally,
I have also followed the lead-where it did not conflict with the data-of
contemporary students of the ethnic groups.
Table -A: I describes the sample used for 1890-1916. It is based
primarily on the Chicago School Censuses of 1898, 1908, and 1914, and
secondarily on the federal censuses of 1890, 1900, and 1910 (the elev-
enth, twelfth, and thirteenth). The changes in ward numbers reflect the
decennial redistricting that took place in Chicago; the geographic areas
remain pretty much the same, but the ward number(s) applicable to
these areas changed over time.
Table A:2 gives the vote for each of the ethnic 'areas for the contests
included 1890-19 I 6. The vote is expressed in terms of the percentage
Democratic of the major-party vote. For all except four years this is the
two-party vote, and the Republican percentages can be computed by
simple subtraction. For 1891, 1897, 1912, and 1914, however, I have
included minor party voting; so for these elections the figures in Table
A:2 indicate Democratic percentage of the three- or four-party vote.
Table A:3 shows the percentages of the vote received by these minor
party candidates. And the Republican vote in these cases can be computed
by subtracting from 100 first the Democratic vote shown in Table A:2,
and then the minor party vote shown in Table A: 3.
Finally, in Table A:4 are listed the names of all the candidates in all
the elections studied for the period 189°-1916. This may be of use to
readers who wish to remanipulate my data, or for those who are inter-
ested in drawing substantive conclusions beyond the areas of concern in
this study. It also makes the information for the first half of this inquiry
as complete as possible.
For the period after 1918 I have been able to apply a more satisfac-
tory methodology; it is, however, controlled to a degree by the nature of
the quest. Since this is a study of ethnic political behavior, wherein the
TABLE A:2 Ethnic Area voting, 1890-1916 (Percentage Democratic)*
Year, office German Swedish Bohemian Polish Italian Jewish Negro
-- --- --- --- --- -
1890: State Treasurer 43 57 67 59 70 54 46
Sheriff 47 59 65 61 72 60 41
1891: Mayor 18 35 30 46 39 32 30
1892: President 60 57 74 72 71 63 47
Governor 60 57 74 72 71 64 46
1893: Mayor 51 58 73 71 75 62 54
1894: State Treasurer 39 48 55 49 58 46 39
Sheriff 42 52 57 52 59 47 43
1895: Mayor 47 42 59 49 53 43 36
1896: President 41 42 55 52 55 41 32
Governor 47 44 60 56 58 46 34
1897: Mayor 49 52 73 68 71 66 59
1898: State Treasurer 53 49 63 58 69 48 48
Sheriff 53 49 60 58 67 46 44
1899: Mayor 58 57 70 63 74 54 62
1900: President 52 45 66 63 64 54 40
Governor 56 47 69 65 68 65 44
1901: Mayor 56 57 60 72 68 56 44
1902: State Treasurer 45 48 56 60 65 51 36
Sheriff 54 54 56 62 67 52 43
1903: Mayor 51 54 59 57 67 63 43
1904: President 32 39 39 38 46 36 24
Governor 31 38 40 37 46 37 25
1905: Mayor 50 56 64 60 75 71 46
1906: State Treasurer 33 46., 49 45 60 47 25
Sheriff 36 52 56 51 69 54 30
1907: Mayor 44 45 61 56 70 53 37
1908: President 40 47 53 50 57 52 31
Governor 50 54 65 54 67 70 42
1910: State Treasurer 53 57 74 63 73 85 43
Sheriff 53 53 76 62 70 85 44
1911: Mayor 51 57 70 69 69 63 51
1912: President 26 28 34 30 39 34 25
Governor 36 33 48 46 55 46 32
1914: Senator 43 37 61 63 67 68 31
Sheriff 49 39 64 64 71 70 34
1915: Mayor 34 31 40 55 59 44 29
1916: President 44 37 68 68 68 67 27
Governor 46 41 67 68 67 66 28
*Two-party vote except for 1891, 1897, 1912, and 1914; see Table A:3.
TABLE A: 3 Minor-Party Vote in Four Elections (Percentage in each ethnic area)
Year, office German Swedish Bohemian Polish Italian Jewish Negro
1891: Mayor 'Ie 42 31 45 31 41 39 26
1897: Mayort 31 28 10 17 10 7 18
1912: President§ 41/16 47/11 23/20 25/16 24/15 19/18 48/5
Governor 26/17 30/10 15/17 15/14 14/13 18/15 33/4
1914: Senator~ 26 30 14 11 13 11 18
Sheriff 15· 17 6 5 6 5 12
*Independent 'Democratic party.
tlndependent Repub1ican'party.
§Two minor parties: Progressive/Socialist.
~Progressive party.
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TABLE A:4 Candi dates in Chicago Elections, 1890-1916
Year, office Republican: Democratic
1890: State Treasurer W. Amberg Wilsont
Sheriff Gilbert Lawler
1891: Mayor H. Washburne D. Cregier
1892: President B. Harrison G. Cleveland
Governor Fifer J.P. Altgeld
1893: Mayor S. Allerton C.H. Harrison I
1894: State Treasurer Wulff Claggett
Sheriff Pease Peabody
1895: Mayor G.B. Swift F. Wenter
1896: President W. McKinley W.J. Bryan
Governor J.R. Tanner J.P. Altgeld
1897: Mayor N.C. Sears C.H. Harrison II
1898: State Treasurer Whittemore Dunlap
Sheriff Magerstadt Kersten
).899: Mayor Z.R. Carter C.H. Harrison II
1900: President W. McKinley W.J. Bryan
Governor R. Yates S. Als chuler
1901: Mayor E. Hanecy C.H. Harrison II
1902: State Treasurer F.A. Busse G. Duddleston
Sheriff D.D. Healy T.E. Barrett
1903: Mayor G. Stewart C.H. Harrison II
1904: President T. Roosevelt A.B. Parker
Governor C.S. Deneen L.T. Stringer
1905: Mayor J.M. Harlan E.F. Dunne
1906: State Treasurer J.F. Smulski N.L. Piotrowski
Sheriff C. Strassheim H.R. Gibbons
1907: Mayor F.A. Busse E.F. Dunne
1908: President W.H. Taft W.J. Bryan
Governor C.S. Deneen A.E. Stevenson
1910: State Treasurer E.F. Mitchell A.K. Hartley
Sheriff F.A. Vogler M. Zimmer
Other*
C.H. Harrison I
J.M. Harlan
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TABLE A: 4 (con tinued) :
Year, office Republican Democratic
1911: Mayor C.E. Merriam C.H. Harrison II
1912: President W.R. Taft W. Wilson
Governor C.S. Deneen E.F. Dunne
1914: Senator L.Y. Sherman R. Sullivan
Sheriff G.K. Schmidt J. Traeger
1915: Mayor W:R. Thompson R.M. Sweitzer
1916: President C.E. Hughes W. Wilson
Governor F.O. Lowden E.F. Dunne
Other*
T. Roosevelt!
E. Debs
F.R. Funk!
J.G. Kennedy
R. Robins
F.S. Oliver
*Parties of other candidates: 1891: Independent Democrat; 1897: Independent
Republican; 1912: Progressive/Socialist; 1914: Progressive.
t For some of the earlier contests, only the last names of the candidates are
recorded.
major quantitative measure is that of ethnic voting behavior, the basic
methodological problem was that of isolating unchanging political units
of high ethnic concentration for each of the ethnic groups under study.
Therefore, the first criterion applied to any area was the degree to which
it was dominated by a single group. This innately prejudiced the results in
favor of those ethnic group members who lived among large numbers of
their fellow ethnics. Obviously the socioeconomically higher members of
any group are underrepresented in such a scheme, since they are less
likely to live in such homogeneous areas. But successful quantitative
conclusions precluded using nonhomogeneous areas; and since most eth-
nics in the 1920S were socioeconomically lower and lower-middle class,
the problem is minimized. Once ethnic group members have moved out
of the area of high ethnic concentration, their political and other behavior
lose much of their previous ethnic reinforcement, and the ethnic group
becomes a less important reference group to them anyway.
Census data for 1920 and 1930 were used to determine every area of
high ethnic concentration in Chicago for each of the nine groups. This
was facilitated by extensive compilations of otherwise unpublished 1920
and 1930 census data for Chicago done by social scientists at the Univer-
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sity of _Chicago in the early 1930s.1 Areas whose ethnicity changed
significantly between 1920 and 1930 were eliminated, leaving areas
which were dominated by the same group throughout. These areas were
then entered on a map of the city (Map A: I) and labeled for purposes of
identification (e.g., Italian A, Italian B, et seq.) .
The next step was to isolate political units in each of the ethnic areas.
A number of problems arose at this point. Census data were collected
from Census Bureau-created units: Community Areas and their constitu-
ent Census Tracts; while voting data were collected from wards and their
constituent precincts.2 Since the two systems did not correspond, it was
necessary to correlate them in order to have political data for ethnic areas
and vice versa. Moreover the boundaries of political units were changed
repeatedly, making it difficult to discover and follow stable political units
over the 1918 to 1932 or 1936 period. Until 1921 Chicago had thirty-
five wards; in that year the number was changed to fifty, with few wards
escaping major redrawing and renumbering. Subsequently, ward lines
changed with each decennial census. Beyond this, however, for most of the
ethnic groups considered, and for most of the ethnic areas being used, the
ward was too large a political unit anyway. Thus precincts had to be used.
There were over 3,000 precincts in Chicago, and their boundaries were
redrawn after each election (they often were not changed, but could be
changed this often); their numbers could be changed just as frequently.
Thus I had to find precincts, or groups of precincts, lying within a
selected ethnic area, whose boundaries remained essentially the same
from 1918 to 1932.
With the map of ethnic areas in hand, I consulted the bound sets of
Chicago ward and precinct maps for the period. Six of these sets had to be
consulted to ascertain changing boundaries and numbers of the wards and
1 Ernest W. Burgess and Charles Newcomb, Census Data of the City of
Chicago, I920 (Chicago, 1931), and Census Data of the City of Chicago, I930
(Chicago, 1933); and Charles Newcomb and R. O. Lang, Census Data of the
City of Chicago, I934 (Chicago, 1934).
2 192 0 was the first year in which the Census Bureau began to use its own
units rather than those of the cities themselves. Published 1920 census data (the
Fourteenth Census) were still given for wards, but Burgess and Newcomb used
Community Areas and Census Tracts in their published returns and correlated the
Community Areas and Census Tracts of 1920 with those of 1930. I was therefore
able to use Community Areas and Census Tracts for both 1920 and 1930.
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precincts. Often, for example, a given precinct would retain its boundaries
throughout the period, but change its number, or even the ward to which
it belonged, several times. Each of these changes had to be noted. I started
with the 1932 maps and picked a number of precincts in each ethnic area.
Then the next earlier set of ward-precinct maps was studied to see if
boundaries or numbers had changed, and any such changes were noted;
then I went on to the maps next earlier in time, and so on, until I had
reached 1918. This process was followed for each of the ethnic areas I
had chosen (all those on Map A: I and others). During this process
many precincts became unusable. Often, as I went back in time, I found
groups of precincts gradually becoming single ones, as I was dealing with
population decrease; sometimes the reverse was true-what was one
precinct in 1932 was four or five in 1918. But if the overall boundaries
remained the same I simply grouped the precincts together as one politi-
cal unit. Sometimes I found that no single precinct in an ethnic area
retained its boundaries over the years, but that groups of four or five, or
even more, did maintain their overall boundary and could be used in this
way. For individual precincts the general rule adopted was that if they
changed their boundaries more than two city blocks (in any direction and
in either addition or subtraction) over the fourteen-year period, they
would be eliminated; for groups of precincts slightly more latitude was
allowed.3 I thus was able to create a situation wherein I was dealing with
the same ethnic group in the same political unit from 1918 to 1932 (and,
generally, to 1936); and I could assume I was dealing with many of the
same individuals throughout.
As I moved back in time, more and more precincts had to be
eliminated, as were some whole ethnic areas for want of stable political
units within them. It is for this reason that some of the middle-middle
class ethnic political units used in this study become usable only in the
middle of the decade--earlier than that the political unit was indetermin-
able, or the area was insufficiently homogeneous. Since I started in 1932
with large numbers of precincts for each ethnic area, I was generally able
3 This rule was observed fairly religiously, but not without exception. Particu-
larly early in the period, and in areas of low population density, a precinct might
be very large (a square mile or more), and in situations like this more latitude
was allowed. Conversely, in geographically tiny precincts (two to four blocks) in
areas of high population density, I eliminated precincts that changed even less
than our two block standard.
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MAP A: 1
ETHNIC AREAS OF CHICAGO
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TABLE A:5 Characteristics of Ethnic Areas Studied (See Map A:l)
Census tracts or Other ethnic groups
community areas included Total pop. Group % of total present if 10% or
Group and area (1930 Census) of area pop. (1st &2nd gen.)* more of total pop.
Czechoslovak A Tracts 478, 490, 491 16,441 68 (28) None
Czechoslovak B Tracts 496, 497, 499 15,488 55 (25) Yugoslav - 20%
Czechoslovak E Tracts 821, 823 10,795 44 (17) Polish - 16%
Polish A Tracts 293, 294, 311,
312, 313, 314, 315 44,804 78 (30) None
Polish X Tract 248 6,238 77 (27) None
Polish B Tract 799 6,287 73 (27) None
Polish C Tracts 734, 736 1,264 59 (23) None
Polish E Tracts 213, 218 10,356 60 (20) None
Polish F Tract 718 7,118 55 (20) None
Lithuanian A Tract 773 2,869 48 (26) None
Lithuanian C Tract 501 5,865 41 (22) None
Yugoslavian A Tract 710 483 36 (20) None
Yugoslavian B Tract 703 3,641 46 (18) None
Italian A Tracts 409, 421, 428,
429, 430, 435, 436 20,898 70 (29) None
Italian B Tracts 392, 393, 394,
396, 397 10,928 68 (27) None
Italian C Tract 318 5,329 56 (26) Polish - 23%
Italian D Tract 133 2,957 63 (25) Negro - 21%
German A Tracts 56, 57, 62, 63,
64, 65 13,234 42 (18) None
German B Tracts 115, 116 12,798 33 (18) None
Swedish A Tracts 84, 85 8,680 51 (30) German - 10%
Swedish B Tracts 30, 31 10,295 31 (18) German - 14%
Swedish D Tract 889 8,097 26 (16) Irish - 11%
Jewish A Tracts 446, 447, 450, 451,
452, 453, 461, 463 57,908 57T
-
Polish - 13%
Jewish B Tracts 285, 286 9,023 27t
-
Polish - 26%
Jewish C Tract 165 7,204 38T
-
None
Negro A Areas 35, 38§ 117,913 87 - None
Negro B Tract 934 1,897 92
-
None
Negro C Tracts 385, 386 1,261 92 ~ None
Negro D Tract 625 8,689 81
-
None
TABLE A:5 (con tinued) :
Group and area
Native-
American A
Native-
American B
Census tracts or
community areas included
(1930 Census)
Areas 1 & 3 minus
Tracts 30, 31, ~2, 33
Areas 71, 72, 73, 74,
75
Total pop.
of area
162,184
105,096
Group % of total
pop. (1st & 2nd gen.)*
48
42
Other ethnic groups
present if 10% or
more of total pop.
German - 11%
Jewish - 12%
German - 12%
'*The figure in parentheses is the foreign born percentage. Thus Czechoslovak A is 28 percent Czech foreign-
born and 40 percent native-born with one or both parents born in Czechoslovakia.
+Jewish percentage of total was much higher, especially for A and B. The number of Russians only was used
for Jewish population, while most of the Poles and others here were also Jewish. A was probably 90 percent
Jewish, and B 70-80 percent Jewish.
§This area includes Wards 2 and 3, which encompassed more than Community Areas 35 and 38. Most of the data
used were taken on a ward basis rather than a community area basis, since this information was more readily avail-
able. Community Areas 35 and 38 are good percentage indicators for information about these two wards.
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to find at least one precinct or group of precincts for each of the areas for
the entire period.
Thus we have geographic areas of ethnic concentration throughout
the city-areas which remained ethnically the same from 1918 to 1932.
And we have political units-precincts, groups of precincts, or wards-
within each of these geographic areas, whose boundaries likewise re-
mained constant. The voting behavior of the political unit provides a
quantitative measure of the political behavior of the members of the
group in that area. This is by no means random sampling; it is a
particular kind of sampling procedure dictated both by the questions I
wanted- to answer and by the data available. The conclusions are more
meaningful with more precincts for each area and more areas for each
ethnic group. Since we have in effect sampled the voting behavior of
almost every ethnic area in the city, we are in a reasonably good position
to generalize about the voting of each group and of the ethnics as a
whole. And with this ethnic voting tool, the greater question of ethnic
political behavior can be more confidently approached.
It should be remembered that these demographic data come from the
census, on census-created units rather than political ones. Therefore all
this data is for the ethnic area in its entirety, rather than for the political
units which were taken from within the ethnic area. That is, it is
impossible to determine, for example, the percentage of Italians, or the
percentage of homeowners in any given precinct. But this determination
can be made for the larger ethnic area in which the precinct is found.
Since I chose the ethnic areas on the basis of homogeneity, this is not
really a problem; we can reasonably infer conclusions about the political
unit from data on the larger ethnic area in which it was found.
The following series of summary tables gives much of the basic
ethnic and socioeconomic data used in this study for the period
1918-1932. Table A:5 summarizes characteristics of the ethnic areas
described above and pictured in Map A: I. This includes, first of all, the
numbers of the Census Tracts and/or Community Areas which comprise
the ethnic area, based on the census of 1930. Also included are the total
population of the area, its ethnicity (i.e., the percentage of its total
population which is first or second generation of the ethnic group in-
volved), and other ethnic groups present in the area if they comprise 10
percent or more of its total population.
TABLE A:6 Measures oE Socioeconomic Status Eor Ethnic Areas Considered in Table A:5
Region of % area % families
city homes Rental % in white- with Socioeconomic
Group and area (Map A:2) owned group collar industries radio class·
-- -
Czechoslovak A III 47 I to II 15 59 Lower-Middle
Czechoslovak B II 19 I 18 34 Upper-Lower
Czechoslovak E IV 61 II to III 18 61 Middle-Middle
Polish A I 19 I 15 32 Lower-Lower
Polish X II 28 I 14 42 Upper-Lower
Polish B IV 35 I 12 35 Upper-Lower
Polish C III 70 II to III 8 34 Lower-Middle
Polish E IV 47 II to III 15 55 Middle-Middle
Polish F IA 48 I 10 46 Upper-Lower
Lithuanian A III 31 I 22 56 Lower-Middle
Lithuanian C II 24 I 20 34 Upper-Lower
Yugoslavian A 1A 55 I 8 73 Upper-Lower
Yugoslavian B IA 51 I 13 42 Upper-Lower
Italian A I 19 I 15 27 Lower-Lower
Italian B II 30 I to III 15 34 Upper-Lower
Italian C I 10 I 15 29 Lower-Lower
Italian D I 14 I 13 23 Lower-Lower
German A III 35 I to III 23 67 Middle-Middle
German B II 20 I 20 49 Lower-Middle
Swedish A III 16 II to III 18 57 Lower-}fiddle
Swedish B IV 24 IV 31 76 Middle-Middle
Swedish D IV 38 III 26 74 Middle-Middle
Jewish A III 22 III to IV 40 58 Lower-Hiddle
Jewish B II 22 III 32 57 Lower-Hiddle
Jewish C IV 30 IV 44 72 Midd1e-Hiddle
Negro At
Ward 2 II 10 I to II 15 30 Lower-Lower
Ward 3 III 9 I to IV 12 46 Upper-Lower
Negro B IV 70 I 12 53 Upper-Lower
Negro C II 8 I 9 20 Lower-Lower
Negro D IV 26 III 18 65 Lower-Middle
Native-
American A IV 13 V 42 75 Upper-Middle
Native-
American B IV 57 III to V 29 80 Middle-Middle
*Based on all preceding measures.
tSubdivided to show differences between the two wards in this ethnic area.
232 A House fo, all Peoples
Table A:6 provides further information on the same areas and ex-
plains how they were tagged with socioeconomic classifications. The
following measures were employed:
1) Region of the city: This followed one standard practice of deter-
mining social class in part from the proximity of one's place of residence
to the center of the city-with greater proximity correlating with lower
class position. Map A:2 shows the regional divisions created, from Re-
gion I at the city core, proceeding outward to Regions II, III, and IV.
Standardized progressions, census information, and my own knowledge of
the city were used here-thus a far-south side steel mill area was tagged
Region lA, rather than Region IV, because in all important respects it
was similar to the center of the city.
2) Percentage of area homes owned by their occupants: from census
data.
3) Median rental ,group: based on the median rent paid by renters in
the area; from census data. Where there was variation in median rental
among Census Tracts in the same ethnic area, the general range is given.
(I == $14-33; II == $33-45; III == $45-58; IV == $58- 67;
V == $67-172.)
4) Percent of area population in white-collar industries: The 1930
Census did not list occupations, but rather the industry in which one was
employed. Thus a bank president and a bank janitor were both listed
under ubanking." I therefore isolated four categories wherein the great
majority of members would be white collar and middle class in employ-
ment (banking and brokerage; insurance and real estate; wholesale and
retail trade, except automobiles; other professional and semi-professional
service). Obviously this is not an ideal measure, but it was decided that it
could safely be used in conjunction with the other measures in our
socioeconomic index.
5) Percentage of families in the area owning a radio: from census
data. This is a good indicator not only of economic position but also of
social attitude. The purchase of a radio by an immigrant was in some
respects a sign of a desire to achieve acculturation.
These five measures were the basic determinants of the socioeconomic
class into which each ethnic area-and so the political units within them
-was placed. But other criteria, both objective and subjective, were also
used, for example the relative proportion of first- to second-generation
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MAP A: 2
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'XABLE A:7 Ethnic Area Location and Ward and Precinct Nurribers of Political units Studied
Ethnic area of Ward (W) and precinct (p) number of the political unit
which unit a part 1918-1921 1921-1926 1926-June 1928 July 1928-1931 1932
-- ---
Czechoslovak A W12-P2 W22-P2 W22-P2 W22-P2 W22-p4l
Czechoslovak A W12-Pl W22-P1 W22-Pl W22-Pl W22-p40
Czechoslovak A W34-P71 W23-P35 W23-P35 W23-P35 W23-P38
Czechoslovak B W10-P24 W26-P24 W26-P24 W26-P34 W21-P38
Czechoslovak B WIO-P25 W26-P25 W26-P25 W26-P35 W2l-P39
Czechoslovak E
-
W15-P17 WlS-P18 WlS-P18 W15-P15
Polish A W17-Ps13,14 W31-P18 W3l-P6 W3l-P6 W26-P23
Polish A W17-P4 W3l-P4 W3l-Ps4,S W31-Ps4,5 W26-Ps2l,22
Polish X W16-Pl W33-Pl W33-Pl W33-Pl W33-P5l
Polish B W30-P20 W14-P16 W14-Pl6 W14-P16 W14-P22
Polish C WS-P29 & W12-Ps32,34 W12-P42 W12-Ps58,61* W13-Psl,Z,3
W29-P12
Polish E
- -
W39-P23 W39-Ps23,28, W35-Ps39,40,41,
84,86,103 t 42 &W38-Ps52,
53,54,55
Polish F WS-P55 WIO-P25 WIO-P31 WlO-·Ps3l,33 WI0-Ps41,44
Lithuanian A W4-P20 WII-PI6 WII-PI6 WII-PI8 WII-P38
Lithuanian A W4-P27 WII-PI9 Wll-P19 W11-P33 WII-PI9
Lithuanian C W20-P17 W20-P17 W20-P17 W20-P17 W21-P47
Lithuanian C W20-P18 W20-?15 W20-P15 W20-P15 W21-P46
Yugoslavian A WS-P52 WIO-P22 WIO-P30 WIO-P30 WlO-P39
Yugoslavian B WS-P39 WlO-P7 WIO-PI! WIO-PI1 WIO-P30
Yugoslavian B WS-Ps40,37 WIO-P6 WIO-P8 WIO-P8 WIO-P28
Italian A WIO-P8 W26-PIO W26-PIO W26-P12 W20-P8
Italian A WI9-Ps22,23 W26-Ps4,5 W26-Ps4,5 W26-Ps5,6 W20-Ps2,3
Italian B WII-P3 W25-P30 W25-P30 W25-P30 W25-P26
Italian B W13-P6 W25-P15 W25-P15 W25-P15 W25-P24
Italian C W17-P14 W3I-P10 W31-PIO W31-P26 W26-P43
Italian D W22-P31 W42-P20 W42-Ps20,37 W42-Ps20,37 W42-Ps38,39
German A W24-Pl3 W45-Pll W45-Pl1 W45-Pll W45-P37
German A W24-P17 W45-P15 W45-P15 W45-P15 W45-P42
German B W22-P13 W43-P12 W43-P12 W43-P12 W43-P16
German B W22-PIO W43-P9 W43-P9 W43-P9 W43-Pll
Swedish A W23-P7 W46-P29 W46-P29 W46-P29 W46-P36
TABLE A:1 (continued) :
Ethnic area of Ward (W) and precinct (P) number of the political unit
which unit a part 1918-1921 1921-1926 1926-June 1928 July 1928-1931 1932
-
Swedish A W23-P15 W46-P33 W46-P33 W46-P33 W46-P39
Swedish B W26-P70 W50-P12 W50-P12 W50-P32 W50-P42
Swedish D W7-P68 W8-P25 W8-P25 W8-P25 W6-P34
Swedish D W7-P71 W8-P24 W8-P24 W8-P24 W8-P3
Jewish A W34-Ps9,10, W24-Ps4,5, W24-Ps4,5, W24-Ps4,5, W24-Ps 3 thru 8
11,13,20, 14,15,16, 14,15,16, 12,15,16,18, and 15 thru 28
21,22,23, 18,19,20 18,19,20, 19,20,36,37,
24,25 30 38,39
Jewish B W15-Ps13, W35-Ps25 , W35-Ps25, W35-Ps27,39 W31-Ps33,34,35
14,15 26,27 26,21 40
Jewish B W15-Ps29, W35-Ps37,38 W35-Ps37,38 W35-Ps37,38 W31-Ps29,32
30,31
Jewish C - W40-Ps8,9 W40-Ps8,9, W40-Ps56,71, W39-Ps10,12,13,
56 72 14
Negro A Ward 2 Ward 2 Ward 2 Ward 2 Ward 2
Negro A Ward 3 Ward 3 Ward 3 Ward 3 Ward 3
Negro B W32-P106 W19-P46 W19-P52,59 W19-Ps52,59, W19-Ps44, 45,46
96
Negro C W14-P51 W28-P28 W28-P28 W28-P32 W28-P38
Negro D W7-P53 W6-P56 W6-P56 W6-Ps56,57 W6-Ps21,22
Native-
American A Ward 25 Ward 49 Ward 49 Ward 49 Ward 49
Native-
American B Ward 32 Ward 19 Ward 19 Ward 19 Ward 19
*For 1930 and 1931 elections, P62 of W12 should also be added.
tFor 1930 and 1931 elections, Ps110 and 111 of W39 should also be added.
TABLE A: 8 Size of Samples Employed in the Study (First and second
generation)
(1) (2) (2+1)
Population Population in Sample percentage of
Group in city areas studied group city population
--
Czechoslovaks 122,089 24,882 20
Poles 401,316 56,075 14
Lithuanians 63,828 3,870 6
Yugoslavs 32,291 1,897 6
Italians 181,861 27,501 15
Germans 377,975 9,976 3
Swedes 141,913 9,951 7
Jews 325,000* 39,253t 12
Negroes 233,903 112,630 48
Native-Americans 945,403 122,697 13
Source: Fifteenth Census, 1930.
*Source: Census of Religious Bodies, 1926.
tThe figures for Jews are not accurate because only Russians were counted;
the actual Jewish sample was probably over 50,000, making the sample'percentage
at least 15 percent.
TABLE A:9 Candidates in Chicago Elections, 1918-1936
Year, office Republican Democrat
1918: Senator M. McCormick J.H. Lewis
Congressman* R. Yates W.E. Williams
Sheriff C.W. Peters A.J. Cermak
1919: Mayor W.H. Thompson R.M. Sweitzer
1920: President W.G. Harding J.M. Cox
Senator W.B. McKinley R.A. Waller
Governor L. Small J.R. Lewis
1922: State Treas. o. Nelson P. Bartzen
1923: Mayor A.C. Lueder W.E. Dever
1924: President t C. Coolidge J.W. Davis
Senator C.S. Deneen A.A. Sprague
Governor L. Small N.L. Jones
1926: Senator F.L. Smith G. Brennan
1927: Mayor W.R. Thompson W.E. Dever
1928: President H. Hoover A.E. Smith
Senator O.F. Glenn A.J. Cermak
Governor L.L. Emmerson F.E. Thompson
1930: Senator R.H. McCormick J.H. Lewis
Congressman§ R. Yates W.A. Dieterich
F.L. Smith w. Nesbit
Pres.-Cook
County Board O.F. Reich A.J. Cermak
193~::. Mayor W.H. Thompson A.J. Cermak
1932: President H. Hoover F.D. Roosevelt
Senator O.F. Glenn W. Dieterich
Governor L. Small H. Horner
1934: State Treas. W.J. Stratton J. Stelle
1936 : President A. Landon F.D. Roosevelt
*Congressman-at-Large, elected statewide.
tMinor party significant vote for president: Robert M. La
Follette, Progressive party.
§Two Congressmen-at-Large elected.
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ethnics in the area, whether it was an older or newer immigrant group,
the general social position of the group in the city, and so on.
Table A:7 provides information, by political unit, for every political
unit studied. The ethnic area in which it was located is first noted (thus
allowing the reader to check back to Tables A:S and A:6 for demo-
graphic data on the political unit), and then its ward and precinct
number(s) at every point in time from 1918 to 1932.
Table A:8 gives the size of the samples used: the percentage which
the ethnic areas studied comprised of the total membership of each ethnic
group (first and second generation) in the city.
Data on the voting of each group for each election 1918-1936 can be
found in Chapter 3 (especially Table 111:3 and Chart 111:3), and so are
not repeated here.4
Table A:9 gives the names of the candidates in each of the elections
studied for this period.
4 Data on the voting of each individual political unit are not included here,
since it would be extensive, while being of interest only to those scholars who
wanted to reanalyze the data. Readers who have use for this data may feel free to
correspond with me.
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The basic quantitative materials for the study were data on ethnicity and
residential and socioeconomic characteristics of the ethnic groups, and
data on precinct voting patterns over time. For the former I relied on the
Eleventh through Fifteenth censuses, 1890-1930, and the census of
Religious Bodies, I926 (Washington, D.C., 1892-1932, 1930). Very
valuable for Chicago are several compilations of census data prepared by
social scientists at the University of Chicago, with 1920 and 1930 areas
collated: Ernest W. Burgess and Charles Newcomb, eds., Census Data of
the City of Chicago, I920 (Chicago, 1931) and Census Data of the City
of Chicago, I930 (Chicago, 1933); and Charles Newcomb and R. O.
Lang, eds., Census Data of the City of Chicago, I934 (Chicago, 1934).
Some voting returns, even at the precinct level, can be found in the
Chicago Daily News Almanac (published annually from 1890 to 1937),
but for my needs it was necessary also to employ the official returns of the
Chicago Board of Election Commissioners, bound in large, heavy, dusty
volumes. The same agency also had bound volumes of ward and precinct
maps which I needed to follow changes over time in ward and precinct
numbers and boundaries.
As important as the availability of the data itself were the means for
utilizing them. While my methodology is explained in detail in the
Appendix, I might mention here a couple of my major guides. Hubert M.
Blalock, Social Statistics (New York, 1960) is a valuable text. Richard
Jensen, HMethods of Statistical Association for Historical Research,"
Mimeo. (St. Louis, Mo., 1968) is very useful for the historian.
For the conceptual, rather than the manipulative framework, I
learned much from a variety of social scientists. Robert K. Merton, Social
Theory and Social Structure, rev. and en!. ed. (Glencoe, Ill., 1957) is a
very important work. Lee Benson's article on HVoting Behavior" in
American History and the Social Sciences, ed. Edward N. Saveth (New
York, 1964) was also helpful, especially on reference group theory.
Seymour M. Lipset's Political Man.' The Social Bases of Politics (New
York, 1963) is another seminal work, as are these basic voting studies:
Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Helen Gaudet, The People's
Choice, 2d. ed. (New York, 1948); Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin,
and Warren E. Miller, The Voter Decides (Evanston, Ill., 1954); and
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Bernard Berelson, Paul F. LazarsfeId, and William N. McPhee, Voting.·
A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago,
1954). There are also a number of good articles in Eugene Burdick and
A. J. Brodbeck, eds., American Voting Behavior (Glencoe, Ill., 1959),
and in Heinz Eulau, Samuel J. Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz, eds.,
Political Behavior.' A Reader in Theory and Research (Glencoe, Ill.,
1956), among other such collections. Samuel P. Hays, HHistory as
Human Behavior," Iowa Journal of History 58:3 (July 1960) makes
clear the relationship of these and other social science concepts to the
study of history. Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence:
The Part Played by People in the Flow of Mass Communications (Glen-
coe, Ill., 1955) guided my analysis of this central problem in political
decision-making. James A. Davis, HA Formal Interpretation of the
Theory of Relative Deprivation," Sociometry 22:4 (Dec. 1959), is a
good guide to this underused concept. And William L. Warner and
Leo Srole, The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups (New Haven,
Conn., 1945) remains worthwhile.
I have also benefited from other studies of urban and ethnic voting.
The seminal work is V. O. Key, Jr., uA Theory of Critical Elections,"
Journal of Politics 17:1 (Feb. 1955). Others that have followed are:
Duncan MacRae, Jr., and J. A. Meldrum, HCritical Elections in Illinois,
1888-1958," American Political Science Review 54: 3 (Sept. 1960);
John L. Shover, HWas 1928 a Critical Election in California?" Pacific
Northwest Quarterly 58 (Oct. 1967), which points to that state's atypi-
cality; and Jerome M. Clubb and Howard W. Allen, uThe Cities and the
Election of 1928: Partisan Realignment?" American Historical Review
84:4 (April 1969), which adds little to this intriguing question. Two
older studies retain value: Harold F. Gosnell and N. N. Gill, HAn
Analysis of the 1932 Presidential Vote in Chicago," American Political
Science Review 29:6 (Dec. 1935); and William F. Ogburn and Nell S.
Talbot, uA Measurement of the Factors in the Presidential Election of
1928," Social Forces 8:2 (Dec. 1929). A more recent study, Ruth C.
Silva, Rum, Religion and Votes: I928 Re-Examined (University Park,
Pa., 1962) comes up with answers incompatible to my own. And Bruce
M. Stave, uThe tLa Follette Revolution' and the Pittsburgh Vote, 1932,"
Mid-America 49:4 (Oct. 1967), sees effects from the La Follette candi-
~acy in Pittsburgh that do not seem to have been present in Chicago.
Bibliographical Essay 245
I benefited only moderately from manuscript collections, since few
urban political or ethnic leaders have left such materials behind. The
William E. Dever papers at the Chicago Historical Society contain little
beyond clippings, but the Carter H. Harrison II papers at the Newberry
library do offer some interesting insights into the politics of his time. The
Adolph J. Sabath papers at the American Jewish Archives were some-
what helpful, but had little material relative to Chicago. The papers of
John Fitzpatrick, Chicago union leader, in the Chicago Historical Society
had little of ethnic interest. Unfortunately the papers of Negro political
leader Arthur Mitchell were not available at the Chicago Historical
Society when I was doing my research; they may be useful to future
students.
The Emily Dean, Mary McDowell, and Agnes Nestor papers in the
Chicago Historical Society are quite useful, since each of these individuals
was involved in a variety of Chicago problems, not excluding work
among the ethnics and in politics. Finally, the Charles E. Merriam papers
in the University of Chicago are full of a variety of relevant materials left
behind by this scholar. And interspersed and unclassified among the
Merriam papers are some papers of Harold F. Gosnell, the first and one
of the finest students of American ethnic politics.
Personal interviews played a very small part in my research. Most of
the people who would have been helpful were dead, a number were more
or less senile, and others simply refused to talk. I am grateful to Mrs.
Oscar Durante, loyal wife of the late publisher of L'Italia, for her
information on the ethnic press; and to Victor Arrigo, Virgil P. Puzzo,
and George J. Spatuzza for conversations on the Italians in Chicago. The
late Dr. Louis L. Mann offered some interesting comments on the politics
of the 1920S, and especially the place of Chicago's Reform Jews therein.
Along with the quantifiable data, my most important source of
information was the press, both metropolitan and ethnic. The latter is a
real mine of information on American history which has been sadly
underused. I carefully read the Chicago Tribune for the whole period,
which gave good political coverage. I also used the Chicago Herald and
Examiner and Chicago Daily News.
For the ethnic press, the German-language Abendpost/Sonntagpost
246 A House for all Peoples
was very useful, as were L'Italia and La Tribuna Italiana Trans-Atlantica
for the Italians. Less useful for the latter were the smaller La Parola del
Popolo and Avanti. For the Poles, I was able to use two of their three
leading newspapers: Dziennik Zwiazkowy and Dziennik Chicagoski; the
third, unfortunately, was unavailable. For the Jews, their great national
newspaper, Yiddisher Vorwarts (Jewish Forward) was useful, but
limited by its still-doctrinaire socialism. I got considerably more from its
local Chicago competitor, Teglicher Yiddisher Kuryer (Daily Jewish
Courier).
For the Swedes I relied primarily on the Svenska-Tribunen-Nyheter,
and for the Danes on Danske Tidende. Hellenikos Aster (Greek Star)
was a good source concerning the Greeks. I regret that I was incapable of
reading any of the Czech papers. For the Negroes, in Chicago and
anywhere, the Defender is very valuable. The Broad-Ax was also informa-
tive, until it went out of business in the late 1920S.
The official publication of the Foreign Language Information Service,
originally titled The Interpreter and later The Bulletin, had several useful
articles and statistics. And I mined a good deal of information, especially
for those groups whose languages I could not read, from: Works Projects
Administration, Chicago Foreign Language Press Survey (Chicago,
1942). This is a collection of over 70 reels of microfilm of translations
from Chicago foreign language newspapers from the 1880s to the 1930s.
While it is not as complete as one would like, especially on politics, it is a
well-organized sampling of writings on many subjects from the ethnic
press during this long period. In this context I might also mention some
studies of the foreign language press, the most important still being the
first: Robert E. Park, The Immigrant Press and Its Control (New York,
1922). Also useful were: Mordecai Soltes, The Yiddish Press: An Ameri-
canizing Agency (New York, 1924); Carl Wittke, The German-Lan-
guage Press in America (Lexington, Ky., 1957); and Edmund G. Olszyk,
The Polish Press in America (Milwaukee, Wis., 1940).
On the history of Chicago and its politics, Bessie L. Pierce, A History
of Chicago, 3 vols. (New York, 1937-1957), is very good, but thus far
ends in the 1890s. The work of early University of Chicago social
scientists, especially HaroldF. Gosnell and Charles E. Merriam, is very
valuable. Gosnell, Machine Politics: Chicago Model (Chicago, 1937);
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Grass Roots Politics (Washington, D.C., 1942); uThe Chicago Black
Belt as a Political Battleground," American Journal of Sociology 39
(Nov. 1933); Merriam, Chicago: A More Intimate View of Urban
Politics (New York, 1929); uRecollections" (Manuscript autobiog-
raphy, filed in Merriam papers, University of Chicago). Merriam and
Gosnell, Non-Voting.' Causes and Methods of Control (Chicago, 1924).
Equally valuable were a number of journalistic accounts, written by
perceptive newspaper reporters who often knew the people and events
about which they wrote: John Bright, Hizzoner Big Bill Thompson
(New York, 1930); Lloyd Lewis and Henry J. Smith, Chicago.' The
History of Its Reputation (New York, 1929); William H. Stuart, The
Twenty Incredible Years (Chicago, 1935), valuable for the author's ap-
parent closeness to Mayor Thompson; and Lloyd Wendt and Herman
Kogan, Big Bill of Chicago (Indianapolis, Ind., 1953), and Lords of the
Levee.' The Story of Bathhouse John and Hinky Dink (Indianapolis, Ind.,
1943) ·
Among many biographies and autobiographies I used to advantage
was Alex Gottfried, Boss Cermak of Chicago.' A Study of Political
Leadership (Seattle, Wash., 1962), which is best if one ignores its
psychoanalytic appendix. The two volumes of autobiography by Carter
H. Harrison II provide some useful insights into Chicago politics: Stormy
Years.' The Autobiography of Carter H. Harrison, Five Times Mayor of
Chicago (Indianapolis, Ind., 1935) and Growing Up with Chicago
(Chicago, 1944). Harold F. Gosnell, Negro Politicians (Chicago,
1935), has some good short biographies. Roi Ottley, The Lonely Wat-
rior.' Life and Times of Robert S. Abbot (Chicago, 1955), is good on the
founder of the Chicago Defender. And Fred D. Pasley, Al Capone.' The
Biography of a Self-Made Man (New York, 1930), has some information
on this important but elusive national figure. M. R. Werner, Julius
Rosenwald.' The Life of a Practical Humanitarian (New York, 1939), is
a reasonably objective study of this interesting man.
A great deal has been written on ethnic groups, individually and
collectively, much of it of doubtful value. But many of these books served
me well. J. Joseph Huthmacher, Massachusetts People and Politics,
1919-1933, is good overall, but wants a more intensive look into the
ethnic groups; as a state-level study it is valuable. Samuel Lubell, The
Future of American Politics (Garden City, N,Y., 1952), remains a model
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combination of quantitative analysis and qualitative insight. Paul F.
Cressey, uThe Succession of Cultural Groups in the City of Chicago"
(Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1930), helped to reinforce my own
conclusions about ethnic residential dispersion.
There are several good works on the Scandinavians: Reuel G. Hem-
dahl, "The Swedes in Illinois Politics: An Immigrant Group in an
American Political Setting" (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University,
1932), and Gustave E. Johnson, uThe Swedes of Chicago" (Ph.D. diss.,
University of Chicago, 1940), are both informative. Adolph B. Benson
and Naboth Hedin, Americans from Sweden (Philadelphia, 1950);
Adolph B. Benson, ed., Swedes in America (New Haven, Conn., 1938);
and Birger Osland, A Long Pull from Stavanger (Northfield, Minn.,
1945 ), are all useful.
For the Poles, the classic work remains William I. Thomas and
Florian Znaniecki, The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, 2d ed., 2
vols. (New York, 1927). And for the Czechs there is considerable useful
information in Gottfried, Boss Cermak, mentioned above. For the Ger-
mans I profited from Andrew J. Townsend, The Germans of Chicago
(Chicago, 1927). Among the vast literature on the Jews in America, I
might single out here Lawrence J. Fuchs, The Political Behavior of
American Jews (Glencoe, Ill., 1956), which is very well done. I also
used the Louis Wirth classic, The Ghetto (Chicago, 1928), and Philip P.
Bregstone, Chicago and Its Jews (Chicago, 1933).
Much has been written on the Italians, little of it very good. Virgil P.
Puzzo, uThe Italians in Chicago, 1890-193°" (M.A. thesis, University of
Chicago, 1937), was helpful, and Herbert J. Gans, The Urban Villagers:
Group and Class in the Life of Italian-Americans (New York, 1962), is
quite good, although I disagree with the extent of his emphasis on class.
Literature on the Negro in America is happily growing rapidly. I
benefited from the works of Harold F. 'Gosnell cited above, as well as his
UHow Negroes Vote in Chicago," National Municipal Review 22
(1933). St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton, Black Metropolis (New
York, 1945), remains outstanding.
These are but some of the many sources to which I am indebted. For
more comprehensiveness I refer readers to the footnotes.
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